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The court dismissed a motion for directions on uncontested appellate jurisdiction as an unnecessary waste of judicial resources.
The moving party brought a motion for directions concerning a February 21, 2025 order of Justice Rady, seeking clarification on whether the order was final or interlocutory and the proper route of appeal.
The moving party contended the order was final and that jurisdiction lay with the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
The responding parties agreed with this position.
The Court dismissed the motion, holding that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement, but that where jurisdiction is not contested, the appeal should proceed in the normal course without requiring an advance motion for a positive finding on jurisdiction.
The Court noted that jurisdiction is ultimately a matter for the panel hearing the appeal.
The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding the purchaser acted in good faith when terminating the dental practice sale agreement.
A dispute arose between a seller of an endodontics practice and the proposed purchaser regarding the sale of the practice.
The parties executed a Letter of Intent that contained conditions precedent to closing, including the negotiation of a new lease on terms satisfactory to the purchaser and the purchaser's satisfaction with due diligence investigations.
The purchaser terminated the Letter of Intent after learning of key employee departures and difficulties in finalizing the lease agreement.
The seller alleged breach of good faith and honest performance.
The court found no breach, holding that the purchaser exercised his contractual discretion reasonably and in good faith, and was entitled to terminate the transaction when conditions precedent were not met.
The court granted summary judgment dismissing a daughter's claim to beneficial ownership of her mother's property.
The court granted summary judgment in favour of Maureen Chevalier, finding that Melissa Chevalier was a tenant and not a co-owner or beneficiary of the property at 1377 Matthew Crescent, Belle River, Ontario.
The decision turned on the evidence that Melissa did not contribute to the purchase price, her payments were treated as rent, and there was no evidence of a trust or unjust enrichment.
The court found no genuine issue for trial and dismissed Melissa’s claims.
Commercial driver's licence downgrade upheld; nine-month seizure-free period insufficient under CCMTA standards.
The appellant appealed the Minister of Transportation's decision to downgrade their Class A commercial driver's licence to a Class G licence due to a medical condition.
The appellant had experienced two nocturnal seizures and was diagnosed with epilepsy.
While the appellant was compliant with medication and had been seizure-free for nine months, the Tribunal applied the CCMTA Medical Standards for Drivers, which require a five-year seizure-free period for commercial drivers.
The Tribunal found that the appellant's medical condition was likely to significantly interfere with their ability to safely drive a Class A vehicle and confirmed the Minister's decision.
Child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care or fiduciary duty to foster parents.
The appellants, a foster parent and his daughters, appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their claims against Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region (FCS) and two of its employees.
The claims included breach of statutory duty, breach of duty of care, breach of fiduciary duty, and defamation, stemming from an FCS investigation into sexual abuse allegations.
The motion judge struck the claims, granting leave only for misfeasance in public office.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care or fiduciary duty to foster parents, as their paramount duty is to the child, which would create an irreconcilable conflict of interest.
The Court also upheld the striking of claims against individual employees, finding the allegations of bad faith insufficiently particularized to overcome statutory immunity under s. 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.