Chevalier v. Chevalier, 2025 ONSC 4025

COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00032130-0000
DATE: 2025-07-08
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:
Melissa Chevalier, Plaintiff
– and –
Maureen Chevalier, Defendant

Appearances:

• Melissa Chevalier, acting in person
• Adam Elkeeb, for the Defendant

Heard: June 13, 2025
Ruling on summary judgment motion
Justice: Jennifer E. Bezaire

Overview

[1] The plaintiff, Melissa Chevalier, and defendant, Maureen Chevalier, are daughter and mother. In early 2013, Maureen lived in Gatineau, Quebec and Melissa lived in Ottawa, Ontario. Their living arrangements changed when Maureen’s husband, also Melissa’s father, passed away and left Maureen $200,000 in life insurance. Some of the money was used to enable them to move to a property in Belle River, Ontario, located at 1377 Mathew Crescent, Belle River, Ontario. The property was purchased in Maureen’s name only for $280,000.

[2] Melissa claims the parties agreed to purchase the property together—Maureen was to use the proceeds from the life insurance for the downpayment and they were to then share the costs of the property. Melissa claims that upon the mortgage being paid off or Maureen's death, the property was to be transferred to Melissa. They both signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

[3] Maureen claims Melissa was a tenant only; she was not promised any beneficial interest in the property. Melissa could not secure financing to contribute to the purchase and as a result, Maureen solely purchased the property. She used $100,000 of the life insurance proceeds for the downpayment and obtained a $180,000 mortgage for the balance. The mortgage was secured in Maureen’s name only.

[4] The parties resided together at the property for approximately one month. Thereafter, they parted ways with Melissa remaining at the property. She, and at times with the assistance of her children, paid Maureen $1,300.00 per month plus heat and electricity. Maureen claimed these payments as rent on her Income Tax Returns.

[5] Melissa claims the payments were not rent; they were her contribution towards the purchase of the property. Melissa also claims she made substantial improvements to the property including the deck, bathroom, and pool, totalling approximately $60,000. At para. 1 of the Statement of Claim, Melissa claims:

a. A declaration that she has an interest of the proceeds of sale of the property municipally known as 1377 Matthew Crescent, Belle River, Ontario, and legally described as LOT 64, PLAN 12M501, Town of Lakeshore (the "Property");

b. A determination of her interest in the sale proceeds;

c. In the alternative, restitution or damages in an amount to be determined; and

d. Damages for Maureen’s willful deceit of Melissa in deliberately misleading her to believe that she was a co-owner of the home.

[6] Maureen has since sold the property for $566,500.00. The net proceeds of sale are being held in trust pending resolution of this action.

[7] Maureen brings this summary judgment motion to dismiss Melissa’s action on the basis that she was at all material times a tenant with no beneficial interest in the property. The issue to be determined is whether I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that Melissa was a tenant of the property.

[8] Having considered the evidence and submissions of the parties, I have determined that the evidence overwhelmingly supports Melissa being a tenant of the property, including the fact that she did not contribute towards the purchase price, represented her monthly payments as “rent” to Ontario Works, and did not list the property as her asset to Ontario Works or in her Consumer Proposal. Further, Maureen listed the payments as rent on her Income Tax Returns. I further find that the evidence does not support Melissa having a beneficial interest in the property. I therefore grant summary judgment in favour of Maureen. There is no genuine issue for trial; Melissa’s claim is dismissed.

The Law

[9] Rule 20.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or a defence. The burden is on the moving party to satisfy the court that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. After the moving party satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to the other party to prove that their claim or defence has a real chance of success, and that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.

[10] In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, r. 20.04(2.1) permits the motion judge to exercise any of the following powers, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:

a. Weighing the evidence.
b. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.
c. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.

[11] These powers were extensively reviewed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. Writing for the court, Karakatsanis J. laid out a two-part roadmap for summary judgment motions, at para. 66:

On a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.04, the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial if the summary judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure, under Rule 20.04(2)(a). If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice. Their use will not be against the interest of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole. [Emphasis in original.]

[12] To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the responding party must put forward some evidence to show that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. The responding party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings but must set out—in affidavit material or other evidence—specific facts establishing a genuine issue requiring a trial.

[13] The motion judge is entitled to assume that the record contains all the evidence that would be introduced by both parties at trial. A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by vague references as to what may be adduced if the matter is allowed to proceed to trial.

[14] Both parties on a summary judgment motion are required to put their best foot forward: see Mazza v. Ornge Corporate Services Inc., 2016 ONCA 753, [2016] O.J. No. 5364, at para. 9. Given the onus placed on the moving party to provide supporting affidavit or other evidence under r. 20.01, “it is not just the responding party who has an obligation to ‘lead trump or risk losing’”: Ipex Inc. v. Lubrizol Advanced Materials Canada Inc., 2015 ONSC 6580, [2015] O.J. No. 5699, at para. 28.

[15] Thus, if the moving party meets the evidentiary burden of producing evidence on which the court could conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial, the responding party must either refute or counter the moving party’s evidence or risk summary judgment.

[16] While r. 20.04 provides the court hearing a summary judgment motion with “enhanced forensic tools” to deal with conflicting evidence on factual matters, the court should employ these tools and decide a motion for summary judgment only where it leads to “a fair process and just adjudication”: Mason v. Perras Mongenais, 2018 ONCA 978, [2018] O.J. No. 6381, at para. 44; Eastwood Square Kitchener Inc. v. Value Village Stores, Inc., 2017 ONSC 832, [2017] O.J. No. 552, at paras. 3-6 (and cases cited therein).

Analysis

[17] I find that this matter is appropriate for summary judgment. The overarching consideration is whether summary judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication. The standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles to resolve the dispute: Hryniak at para. 50.

[18] I am satisfied that the record before me is sufficient to find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles. The legal issues are not complex and both parties put forward the best available evidence. It is not in the interests of justice for any question of fact or law to wait for disposition at trial.

[19] Having considered all the evidence on the motion and the submissions of the parties, I find that there is no genuine issue for trial. The evidence overwhelmingly supports Melissa being a tenant of the property. The supporting evidence includes:

a. Maureen is listed on title as the sole owner of the property.
b. Maureen contributed the sole, sizable downpayment for the purchase of the property.
c. Maureen declared the payments from Melissa as rent on her Income Tax Returns.
d. Melissa did not contribute any funds towards the purchase of the property, nor did she assume any of the risk on the mortgage.
e. The property was not listed as an asset in Melissa’s Ontario Works file or in her Consumer Proposal.
f. When Melissa’s son started contributing towards the $1,300 payments, Melissa’s payments were reduced from $1,300.00 to $900.00 per month to account for her son’s contribution. Had the funds been an agreed upon amount for Melissa to purchase the property, one would think her payments would have remained constant until the property was fully paid. The fact that the payments were split between Melissa and her son supports the property being a rental with the rent being split between two tenants.
g. Melissa was found to be a “tenant” under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 in proceedings before the Landlord and Tenant Board. Her appeal to the Divisional Court was denied.

[20] The most compelling evidence is the letters contained within Melissa’s Ontario Works file that indicate the payments she made were “rent”. For example, the letter dated June 1, 2013, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
My daughter Melissa Chevalier is renting my home at 1377 Matthew Crescent, Belle River, Ontario N0R 1A0 effective 15 June 2013 at the rate of $1,300 per month. Melissa is also responsible to pay for all the monthly bills such as water heater including furnace and air conditioner, hydro, gas, phone, cable, internet and water…
Sincerely Yours,
Maureen Chevalier
Homeowner

[21] I do not accept that the letters were submitted to Ontario Works without Melissa’s knowledge. They were contained within her own file, and there is nothing within that file to indicate Melissa informed Ontario Works she co-owned the property. Further, no evidence was presented from Ontario Works to support Melissa’s assertion that they would have listed the funds as rent regardless of whether they were mortgage payments.

[22] While the parties both signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, and perhaps the initial intent was for Melissa to be a co-owner, I accept Maureen’s evidence that Melissa could not obtain financing and the plans changed.

[23] Melissa did not contribute any funds towards the purchase of the property and knew, or should have known, very early on that she was not named on title. She did not attend at the lawyer’s office for the purchase and did not sign any of the closing documents. There exists no evidence of “deceit” on the part of Maureen. She purchased the property and allowed her daughter and her family to live at the property for nearly ten years.

[24] I accept Maureen’s submission that Melissa does not have a beneficial interest in the property. First, the evidence does not support a resulting trust. Melissa did not provide money to Maureen to purchase the property such that it could be found Maureen purchased it for Melissa. The only evidence to support a resulting trust is Melissa’s monthly payments, which she claims were made towards the mortgage and utilities. She also submits that some of the utilities were in her name and that Maureen was able to use her alarm system to reduce the insurance costs of the property.

[25] I agree with Maureen that this case is distinguishable from other cases where a resulting trust was found due to shared financial obligations or equity building conduct. Here, Melissa’s own documentation from Ontario Works indicates the payments made were rent. Further, Melissa’s claim of ownership only arose after she was asked to leave the property approximately ten years later.

[26] Second, the evidence does not support an express trust. There is no written document that Maureen promised to hold the property in trust for Melissa. Melissa relies entirely on an alleged verbal agreement.

[27] Third, the evidence does not support a constructive trust. Constructive trusts are recognized both for wrongful acts like fraud and breach of loyalty, as well as to remedy unjust enrichment and corresponding deprivation. Constructive trusts may be imposed on either ground: where there is a wrongful act but no unjust enrichment and corresponding deprivation; or where there is an unconscionable unjust enrichment in the absence of a wrong act: Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 40; Soulos v. Korkontzilas.

[28] No wrongful act was committed here. Maureen paid to purchase the property; Melissa did not.

[29] There is also no unjust enrichment. There is a juristic reason for the payments made by Melissa to Maureen; they represented rent and utility expenses for Melissa and her family’s use and enjoyment of the property.

[30] I do not accept Melissa’s claims that substantial renovations were made by her, unjustly enriching Maureen. No supporting documentation or other evidence to substantiate the renovations or their value was tendered. The only evidence I have is that of Melissa.

[31] I do not find Melissa to be credible given her denial of the representations made to Ontario Works as detailed above. In the absence of supporting evidence, I cannot accept Melissa’s evidence regarding the renovations. Further and even if renovations were made, Melissa had the benefit of them while she was residing at the property and has not provided evidence to establish Maureen unjustly benefitted from them.

Disposition

[32] For these reasons, I grant Maureen’s motion for summary judgment. Melissa was at all material times a tenant of the property with no ownership interest. As such, there exists no genuine issue for trial and Melissa’s claims are dismissed.

[33] I encourage the parties to agree upon costs. If they are unable to do so, they may make submissions in writing limited to five pages each, double spaced, not including a cost outline or offers to settle. The Moving Defendant’s submissions are due July 29, 2025, the Plaintiff’s are due August 19, 2025, and any reply (not to exceed two pages, double spaced), if necessary, by the Moving Defendant are due September 2, 2025.

Jennifer E. Bezaire
Released: July 8, 2025