Raymond Gary Colautti

The court determined costs following a successful summary judgment motion by the Belleville defendants, dismissing the action against them.

The plaintiffs sought to defer the costs decision or reduce the quantum, arguing potential Bullock/Sanderson orders, impecuniosity, and public interest litigation.

The court dismissed the deferral request, finding no exceptional circumstances to deviate from the normative approach to costs.

It found the plaintiffs were of modest means but not impecunious, requiring robust evidence for such a claim.

The court also rejected the "pro bono litigant" analogy for parties represented under a contingency fee agreement, citing the Solicitors Act.

Ultimately, costs were fixed at $47,801.47, jointly and severally against the plaintiffs, reflecting a reduction from the partial indemnity amount due to the plaintiffs' modest means and access to justice considerations.

The successful respondent on an appeal sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $93,000 for the action, various motions, and the appeal, in addition to the $75,000 already awarded for the summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal applied principles of reasonableness and proportionality, noting that both sides had unnecessarily complicated a simple collection case.

The court reduced the requested costs to $64,500 and then applied a further reduction for overall disproportionality, ultimately awarding the respondent $44,500 in costs.

The police defendants brought two motions: one to exclude the public from the court hearing pursuant to s. 135(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and another to seal the file pursuant to s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Both motions were dismissed.

The court noted that the defendants could seek public exclusion on a hearing-by-hearing basis to address concerns over the release of personal and identifying information of complainants and minor witnesses.

Material for a future summary judgment motion (Rule 20) may be sealed upon filing, subject to the motion judge's discretion.

Costs were reserved.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding they had entered into a settlement agreement to pay the respondent for a load of carrots.

The appellants argued there was no consensus ad idem on the monthly payment rate.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that an implied agreement had been reached based on the parties' post-negotiation conduct.

On cross-appeal, the Court found the motion judge erred by allowing the appellants' counterclaim to proceed, holding that the settlement of the main action implied an obligation to release the counterclaim.

The appellants appealed a mini-trial judgment and costs order, arguing the trial judge erred by proceeding with the mini-trial before ruling on whether the action against one of the appellants was stayed under s. 69(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding the stay applied only to the bankrupt appellant and did not preclude the stand-alone claims against the others.

The court allowed the costs appeal in part, reducing the trial costs award by $7,500 to account for the appellants' success on a continuance motion.

The appellant creditor appealed the dismissal of its application for a bankruptcy order against the respondent debtor.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in her assessment of whether the debtor had ceased to meet his liabilities generally and whether special circumstances existed for a single-creditor bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge applied the correct standard of proof and her factual findings were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The Belleville police defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action against them for negligent investigation, false imprisonment, wrongful arrest, and Charter breaches.

The plaintiffs had been arrested for possession of property obtained by crime after picking up merchandise from Lowe's that was ordered using fraudulent credit cards.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claims for false arrest and Charter breaches were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Furthermore, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the negligent investigation claim, as the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges and met the standard of care of a reasonable police officer.

The defendants, a treating psychologist and a children's aid society, brought motions under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.

The plaintiffs' action arose from a child protection investigation and criminal charges based on allegations of abuse made by a child previously adopted by the plaintiffs.

The court struck the claim against the psychologist without leave to amend, finding she owed no duty of care to the parents of her patient and was statutorily obligated to report suspected abuse.

The court also struck the adult plaintiffs' claims in negligence and various intentional torts against the children's aid society defendants, finding no duty of care was owed to the parents during a child protection investigation.

Leave to amend was granted for claims of misfeasance in public office and Charter damages.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's solicitor, Ms. Avery, from the record in contempt proceedings.

The respondent argued that Ms. Avery must testify regarding her attendance at a police station with the applicant on October 7, 2015, and therefore could not continue as counsel.

The applicant opposed removal, arguing that Ms. Avery's evidence did not meet the high threshold of materiality and necessity required to deprive him of counsel of choice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was available from other sources and did not reach the exceptional circumstances threshold required for removal.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their action for delay pursuant to Rule 48.13(14).

The appellants had failed to comply with a timetable set at a first status hearing and could not provide a satisfactory explanation at a second status hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision, noting that the appellants were only spurred into action by the issuance of status notices.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Following a successful summary judgment motion concerning a debt dispute and alleged settlement, the plaintiff sought substantial costs for the motion and the broader action.

The court held that the defendants had unnecessarily complicated what was a relatively straightforward settlement issue through procedural steps and a counterclaim.

However, the court emphasized proportionality and the principle that the losing party should not reasonably expect to pay for two senior counsel on a relatively simple motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles in Boucher v. Public Accountants for the Province of Ontario, the court reduced the claimed costs and fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court deferred determination of the remaining action costs pending resolution of issues relating to the counterclaim.

Police defendants brought a motion to strike numerous paragraphs of an affidavit filed by plaintiffs’ counsel in response to a pending summary judgment motion in a civil action alleging negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches.

The impugned affidavit summarized discovery evidence, relied on hearsay and discovery transcripts of multiple parties, and included argument, opinion, and allegedly inflammatory allegations.

The court reviewed the admissibility of affidavit evidence under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including rules governing hearsay, discovery evidence on motions, and improper argument in affidavits.

The court permitted reliance on certain discovery transcripts already filed by the moving parties and allowed narrative evidence derived from other parties’ discovery where proportionality and fairness warranted.

However, numerous passages containing argument, opinion, speculation, or inflammatory allegations were struck.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce an alleged settlement agreement arising from a dispute over unpaid invoices for agricultural produce.

The defendants argued that no binding settlement existed because the parties never reached agreement on a fundamental term, namely the schedule of repayment.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement on the principal compromise amount through email exchanges and subsequent conduct, including the issuance and negotiation of cheques consistent with the proposed settlement.

Silence in response to a counter‑proposal combined with partial performance supported an inference that the repayment terms were accepted.

Summary judgment was granted enforcing the settlement against certain corporate defendants but not against the individual defendants.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14(13), the plaintiffs sought to restore their breach of contract action to the trial list, while the defendants sought its dismissal for delay.

The action had been commenced in 2008 and was subject to multiple delays, missed timetables, and changes of counsel.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the nearly seven-year delay, particularly the period following an unsuccessful mediation in 2013.

As the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their onus to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the court dismissed the action with costs.

In a mini-trial of an agreed issue arising from judgment-enforcement litigation, the court held that after the debtor's bankruptcy and discharge, any claim under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act belonged to the bankruptcy estate and could only be pursued by the trustee or a creditor acting under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The plaintiff's motion to continue personally against the bankrupt debtor on the theory that the claim survived discharge under s. 178(1)(d) was dismissed.

On the factual issue tried, the court found that a series of real estate transfers and mortgage transactions involving family members and related parties were undertaken with intent to defeat, hinder or delay the plaintiff's collection efforts.

The court made no liability ruling on remaining non-FCA causes of action and reserved costs.

The parties were involved in matrimonial litigation.

The wife, as registered owner, sold a commercial property and sought a writ of possession.

The husband opposed, producing a newly 'found' trust agreement claiming beneficial ownership.

The motion judge granted the writ, relying in part on an unsworn handwriting expert report refuting the wife's signature.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in relying on the unsworn report but upheld the writ of possession, noting the husband's prior financial statements acknowledging the wife's ownership and the need to preserve the favourable sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, appealed a trial decision awarding her $350,000 in dependant's relief from the deceased's estate.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge made several errors in principle, including misapplying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, improperly relying on the deceased's unimplemented intentions, and incorrectly calculating the net estate assets.

The Court set aside the trial judgment, conducted its own analysis of the legal and moral claims of the dependants, and increased the appellant's award to $750,000, plus costs, to adequately provide for her proper support while balancing the competing claims of the deceased's separated wife and adult daughters.

On a reference concerning the admissibility of proposed expert evidence, the court considered whether an accountant’s report met the criteria for expert evidence under the framework established in R. v. Mohan.

The issue focused on the necessity requirement and whether the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact through independent analysis.

The court found the report was based largely on the applicant’s instructions and assumptions rather than the expert’s own analysis and conclusions.

As a result, the evidence lacked the independence required of expert opinion evidence and functioned merely as advocacy for the applicant’s position.

The proposed expert evidence was therefore excluded.

The appellant recruitment agency sued the respondent trucking companies for breach of contract after its services were terminated.

The trial judge found only the subsidiary company liable for failing to provide six months' notice, but that company subsequently went bankrupt.

On appeal, the appellant argued the parent companies were liable for inducing breach of contract and under the common employer doctrine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the inducing breach claim was not pleaded at trial and lacked the requisite intent, and upholding the trial judge's finding that the contract was solely with the subsidiary.

The respondents' cross-appeal regarding a Sanderson costs order was also dismissed.

The corporate appellant appealed the Registrar's proposal to refuse the transfer of a liquor licence for 'The Dugout'.

The refusal was based on the criminal records of three of the four shareholders, particularly the twin brothers who had been convicted of illegal bookmaking.

The Tribunal found that the brothers had not fully accepted their criminal past and had attempted to mislead the Tribunal regarding their use of a previously licensed premises for illegal betting.

The Tribunal ordered the Registrar to transfer the licence only on the condition that the two brothers have no direct or indirect involvement in the corporation or the licensed premises.