Raymond Gary Colautti

The appellant, the Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes, appealed a correcting decision made by a referee regarding appeals from the Ontario Drainage Tribunal.

The appellant sought to have the correcting decision set aside and the original decision confirmed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient confusion at the time of the hearing to justify the correcting decision.

The court held that issues regarding the appropriateness, timeliness, and jurisdiction of the respondents' motion under section 47 of the Drainage Act were matters for the referee to determine.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an employee manual could not eliminate the respondent's entitlement to reasonable notice for the 10 years of employment preceding its introduction.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's objective assessment of repudiation and found no palpable and overriding error in the findings of fact regarding mitigation.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to certify her action as a class proceeding.

She alleged that she and other women were coerced into posing nude or topless for the respondents' newspaper and subjected to inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims lacked common issues, as determining liability would require individual assessments of each proposed class member's circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Parliament enacted legislation barring claims for interest prior to 1990.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expropriative legislation was valid and not inconsistent with the due process or fair hearing protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as Parliament has the power to expropriate property without compensation using clear and unambiguous language.

The appellants, minority shareholders in Colio Wines of Canada Ltd., appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy and the appointment of an inspector under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The appellants alleged that a 1992 amalgamation unfairly valued their shares at one cent each.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to provide cogent evidence that oppressive conduct appeared to have occurred, as required by s. 161(2) of the Act.

The court confirmed that mere suspicion or a report suggesting oppression 'may have been' present is insufficient to warrant the appointment of an inspector.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an engineering student, sued the respondent university for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its two-year program to other Ontario universities.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and denied class certification, finding that the appellant's failure to complete one elective course meant he had not met a 'condition precedent' to rely on the representations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was framed in tort, not contract, and therefore no condition precedent applied.

The summary judgment was set aside, and the certification motion was remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant cohabited with the deceased for 18 months before he was killed in a motor vehicle accident.

She sued the driver for damages under s. 61 of the Family Law Act.

The definition of "spouse" in s. 29 of the Act requires three years of cohabitation.

The appellant challenged this definition under s. 15(1) of the Charter, arguing it discriminates against common-law partners who have cohabited for less than three years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of her claim, finding that cohabiting for less than three years is not an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, as it is a fluid and transitory status rather than an immutable characteristic.

The successful respondent in an appeal regarding the Crown's breach of fiduciary duty to disabled veterans sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued for partial indemnity costs and requested that the quantum be referred to an assessment officer.

The dissenting judge would have awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's historical conduct.

However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that because the Crown raised serious and important issues of law on appeal, the appropriate scale was partial indemnity.

The court unanimously agreed that the case was exceptional and referred the quantum of costs to an assessment officer.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.

Neighbouring property owners sued mushroom farmers in nuisance for severe odours from composting operations and obtained damages at trial.

On appeal, the court held that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction to determine whether the statutory immunity for a normal farm practice applied, but that absent special circumstances such questions should generally be left first to the specialized board.

The majority held that the statutory definition of normal farm practice contains a qualitative and site-specific evaluative element, permitting consideration of the intensity of the disturbance and the surrounding circumstances, including the prior character of the area.

The appeal was dismissed and the nuisance damages award was upheld.

On a motion in a class proceeding appeal, the appellant Crown sought a stay of a partial summary judgment on liability, a stay of damages proceedings, transfer of a related appeal from Divisional Court, an extension of time to perfect, and other procedural relief.

The court held that the Crown's appeal from the dismissal of its own summary judgment motion was sufficiently intertwined with the respondents' summary judgment to warrant transfer under s. 6(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The stay request was refused on balance of convenience grounds because the damages proceeding should continue notwithstanding the pending appeal.

The court granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal, left any overlength factum request to be renewed later, kept the appeal on the expedited list, and reserved costs.