Raymond Gary Colautti

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved mixed success by reducing the respondent's damages award, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $146,108.35 to $110,000, finding that the reduced judgment no longer exceeded the respondent's settlement offer and that pre-litigation conduct did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, offsetting the respondent's success on liability against the appellant's success on damages and motion costs.

The respondent, a cable installer, had an employment offer from a contractor withdrawn after the appellant, a large cable provider, informed the contractor it would not allow the respondent to work on its projects.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for intentional interference with economic relations and awarded damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the tort of intentional interference with economic relations was not made out because the appellant's breach of its own internal policy was not an 'unlawful act', the appellant was liable for the tort of inducing breach of contract.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the damages for past loss of income by the amount the respondent actually earned during that period.

The cross-appeal for punitive damages was dismissed.

The appellants alleged they suffered harm due to mislabelled medication and sued the pharmacy.

After the expiry of the one-year limitation period under the Regulated Health Professions Act, they moved to add the dispensing pharmacist and the numbered company operating the pharmacy as defendants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal regarding the pharmacist, finding no evidence of due diligence to discover her identity.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the numbered company, holding that it was not a 'health profession corporation' under the Act and was therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed an order denying a motion to amend a statement of claim to add a new cause of action.

The motion judge had found non-compensable prejudice and denied the motion.

The Court of Appeal held that there was an evidentiary basis for the motion judge's finding and that the decision was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The defendants appealed an order refusing their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the defendants had failed to deliver their affidavit of documents for seven years, which under Rule 24 was a condition precedent to bringing the motion to dismiss.

The motion judge did not err in exercising his discretion to refuse the motion.

The appellant contractor sued the respondent bank for misrepresentation after the bank failed to advance a $150,000 loan to a mall owner to pay for renovations.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the bank had informed the contractor that the loan was conditional on a guarantor's signature.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The bank had represented that the loan was a sure thing and that the signature was a mere formality, knowing this was untrue and that the contractor would rely on it.

Judgment was entered for the contractor for the undisputed contract amount plus costs.

The appellant, acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed a decision regarding the Crown's obligation to pay administered funds to a veteran's estate upon death.

The appellant argued that clear statutory language was required to divest such funds, which was absent in the lapsing provisions of the Pension Act and Veterans Treatment Regulations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lapsing provisions clearly intended to prioritize spouses and dependants over estates.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, with the court finding that section 55 of the Veterans Treatment Regulations remained intra vires after 1986, as subordinate legislation is not required to mirror its enabling statute exactly.

The appellant, the Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes, appealed a correcting decision made by a referee regarding appeals from the Ontario Drainage Tribunal.

The appellant sought to have the correcting decision set aside and the original decision confirmed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient confusion at the time of the hearing to justify the correcting decision.

The court held that issues regarding the appropriateness, timeliness, and jurisdiction of the respondents' motion under section 47 of the Drainage Act were matters for the referee to determine.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an employee manual could not eliminate the respondent's entitlement to reasonable notice for the 10 years of employment preceding its introduction.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's objective assessment of repudiation and found no palpable and overriding error in the findings of fact regarding mitigation.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to certify her action as a class proceeding.

She alleged that she and other women were coerced into posing nude or topless for the respondents' newspaper and subjected to inappropriate conduct.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims lacked common issues, as determining liability would require individual assessments of each proposed class member's circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Parliament enacted legislation barring claims for interest prior to 1990.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expropriative legislation was valid and not inconsistent with the due process or fair hearing protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as Parliament has the power to expropriate property without compensation using clear and unambiguous language.

The appellants, minority shareholders in Colio Wines of Canada Ltd., appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy and the appointment of an inspector under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The appellants alleged that a 1992 amalgamation unfairly valued their shares at one cent each.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the appellants failed to provide cogent evidence that oppressive conduct appeared to have occurred, as required by s. 161(2) of the Act.

The court confirmed that mere suspicion or a report suggesting oppression 'may have been' present is insufficient to warrant the appointment of an inspector.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an engineering student, sued the respondent university for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its two-year program to other Ontario universities.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action and denied class certification, finding that the appellant's failure to complete one elective course meant he had not met a 'condition precedent' to rely on the representations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was framed in tort, not contract, and therefore no condition precedent applied.

The summary judgment was set aside, and the certification motion was remitted to the Superior Court.

The appellant cohabited with the deceased for 18 months before he was killed in a motor vehicle accident.

She sued the driver for damages under s. 61 of the Family Law Act.

The definition of "spouse" in s. 29 of the Act requires three years of cohabitation.

The appellant challenged this definition under s. 15(1) of the Charter, arguing it discriminates against common-law partners who have cohabited for less than three years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of her claim, finding that cohabiting for less than three years is not an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15(1) of the Charter, as it is a fluid and transitory status rather than an immutable characteristic.

The successful respondent in an appeal regarding the Crown's breach of fiduciary duty to disabled veterans sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued for partial indemnity costs and requested that the quantum be referred to an assessment officer.

The dissenting judge would have awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's historical conduct.

However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that because the Crown raised serious and important issues of law on appeal, the appropriate scale was partial indemnity.

The court unanimously agreed that the case was exceptional and referred the quantum of costs to an assessment officer.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.

Neighbouring property owners sued mushroom farmers in nuisance for severe odours from composting operations and obtained damages at trial.

On appeal, the court held that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction to determine whether the statutory immunity for a normal farm practice applied, but that absent special circumstances such questions should generally be left first to the specialized board.

The majority held that the statutory definition of normal farm practice contains a qualitative and site-specific evaluative element, permitting consideration of the intensity of the disturbance and the surrounding circumstances, including the prior character of the area.

The appeal was dismissed and the nuisance damages award was upheld.

On a motion in a class proceeding appeal, the appellant Crown sought a stay of a partial summary judgment on liability, a stay of damages proceedings, transfer of a related appeal from Divisional Court, an extension of time to perfect, and other procedural relief.

The court held that the Crown's appeal from the dismissal of its own summary judgment motion was sufficiently intertwined with the respondents' summary judgment to warrant transfer under s. 6(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The stay request was refused on balance of convenience grounds because the damages proceeding should continue notwithstanding the pending appeal.

The court granted an extension of time to perfect the appeal, left any overlength factum request to be renewed later, kept the appeal on the expedited list, and reserved costs.