Raymond Gary Colautti

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that an Easement and Lake Water Supply Agreement had been conveyed to the appellant through an Assignment and Assumption of Contracts Agreement and a vesting order.

The motion judge erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the agreement had not been transferred.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and partial summary judgment granted declaring the agreement was conveyed to the appellant.

The appellants brought an action against a mortgage broker and its professional liability insurer for damages arising from the broker's alleged fraud.

The insurer rescinded the policy due to material misrepresentations made by the broker during the application process.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissing their action against the insurer, arguing that an undertaking given by the insurer to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) to provide fraud coverage negated the right of rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the misrepresentations were material, the FSCO undertaking was predicated on a valid policy, and relief from forfeiture was unavailable because the misrepresentations constituted non-compliance with a condition precedent.

The defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order requiring production of an environmental report over which litigation privilege was claimed.

The report had been referenced in an affidavit and supported by an invoice attached as an exhibit.

The court considered whether referencing the report and attaching payment documents constituted a waiver of litigation privilege and whether the dominant purpose test had been properly applied.

Applying Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found conflicting authority and concluded there was reason to doubt the correctness of the earlier order compelling production.

Because the issues regarding litigation privilege and waiver had broader importance to litigation practice, leave to appeal was granted.

Following an appeal, the appellant sought trial costs based on an offer to settle.

The respondent argued that determining trial costs was premature because her application for support under the Succession Law Reform Act had been remitted to the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed and remitted the question of all Superior Court costs to the judge hearing the support application.

The plaintiffs sued various provincial and municipal officials for negligent investigation, malfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches after the plaintiff Hilary Payne was charged with arson by negligence following a fire at a student rental property.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against one defendant (an engineer-in-training) and the Charter claims under ss. 8, 11(d), and 11(g).

However, the court dismissed the balance of the summary judgment motions, finding that the novel issues of duty of care, standard of care, causation, and statutory immunity required a full trial to resolve conflicting evidence and assess credibility.

Following the release of the Court of Appeal's decision allowing the appeal and awarding the statutory pre-retirement death benefit to the appellant, the respondent requested that the court address her entitlement to support under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The trial judge had previously dismissed the respondent's SLRA application because she had awarded the death benefit to the respondent, finding no further need for support.

Because the Court of Appeal's decision removed the basis for that dismissal, the court set aside the trial judge's order dismissing the SLRA application and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for determination.

The deceased was a member of a pension plan who died before the commencement of his deferred pension.

At the time of his death, he was living with a common law spouse but remained legally married to his separated spouse, whom he had designated as a beneficiary along with their daughters.

The Court of Appeal held that because the deceased and his legally married spouse were living separate and apart, the spousal priority under s. 48(1) of the Pension Benefits Act did not apply.

Consequently, the designated beneficiaries were entitled to the death benefit under s. 48(6).

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The court rejected the respondents' request for substantial indemnity costs and the appellants' request for no costs.

Instead, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, ordering the appellants to pay a total of $64,000 to the various respondents.

Following dismissal of an application alleging that a municipality and its mayor and councillors conspired in bad faith to block a bridge expansion project through heritage and demolition control by-laws, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the allegations of conspiracy, illegality, and bad faith against the municipal defendants to be entirely without merit and emphasized that unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty justify elevated costs.

Applying the principles in s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial full indemnity costs to the successful municipal respondents and individual councillors, subject to proportionality considerations reflecting differing levels of participation.

The court held that both the applicants and the Canadian Transit Company—though formally a respondent but aligned with the applicants—were jointly and severally responsible for the costs award.

The appellant farmer appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent grain elevator for breach of several agricultural futures contracts.

The appellant argued that the parties had a single overall business arrangement, that they had mutually agreed to terminate all dealings, and that the respondent failed to mitigate its damages after the appellant's anticipatory repudiation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contracts were independent, no termination agreement existed, and the respondent acted reasonably by waiting until the contractual delivery dates to calculate its losses in accordance with the contracts' valuation provisions.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s law firm as solicitors of record on the basis of conflict of interest.

A lawyer associated with the firm had previously been retained by the hospital defendant to assist with workplace conflict mediation and had obtained confidential information while acting in that capacity.

The court found that the lawyer was an associate of the firm and that the hospital was therefore a client of the firm.

Applying the “bright line” rule from R. v. Neil and the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court held that a law firm cannot act against a current client in directly adverse litigation absent informed consent.

Because confidential information was obtained and no effective screening measures existed, the firm was disqualified.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him interest on a shareholder's loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for interest as there was no agreement between the shareholders, no demand for repayment, no finding of oppression, and no judgment upon which to award prejudgment interest.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claims for the return of funds advanced to the respondent Society.

The trial judge had found the funds were donations, not loans.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made multiple errors of law and fact, including failing to apply the law of spoliation regarding missing corporate records, improperly admitting late expert handwriting evidence without an adjournment, refusing to hold a voir dire for reply evidence, and failing to act as a gatekeeper for opinion evidence.

The appellant challenged the validity of a series of wills executed by an elderly testatrix, alleging undue influence by the respondent beneficiaries and executors, who included the testatrix's lawyer, doctor, and accountant.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the challenge, which the motion judge granted after finding no triable issue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to grant summary judgment and erred in finding no triable issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to amend the order for directions was a mere procedural defect and that the appellant failed to present any evidence to counter the respondents' substantial evidence supporting the wills' validity.

The appellants appealed a decision restraining them from objecting to an application to extract aggregate from a property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the individual appellant used the appellant corporation as his agent to breach his personal covenant not to object to the extraction.

The substantive appeal was dismissed.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the lower court's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the relative merits of the case did not justify the higher scale.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for trespass to land and chattels, and aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the $35,000 award for trespass to chattels and the $5,000 award for trespass to land, finding sufficient evidence of actual damage.

However, the court set aside the $10,000 aggravated damages award to the individual plaintiff, as the trespass was committed against the corporate plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing total damages to $40,000.

The applicants sought costs following a successful judicial review application.

The court reviewed the lengthy submissions and deducted amounts claimed for an initial, unsuccessful application brought before the Commercial Court.

The court also disallowed partial indemnity rate increases that exceeded the actual rates charged to the client.

Costs were fixed at $151,065.82, inclusive of fees, GST, and disbursements.

The appellant university appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its engineering program credits.

The trial judge found that the university's promotional materials misleadingly suggested that transferring to another university after two years would be routine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings that the representations were misleading, negligently made, and reasonably relied upon by the respondent.

The court also upheld the finding that the respondent acted reasonably to mitigate his damages.

Leave to appeal costs was granted on consent to delete specific paragraphs from the trial judgment.

The appellants purchased a new townhouse and discovered dampness in the basement due to a cement slab that did not meet the Ontario Building Code depth requirement.

They sued the builders and the Ontario New Home Warranty Plan after rejecting a proposed sealant solution.

The trial judge awarded $29,700 in damages against the builders but dismissed the claim against the Plan, finding the appellants failed to mitigate by refusing a reasonable solution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings and damages assessment.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.