Raymond Gary Colautti

Following dismissal of an application alleging that a municipality and its mayor and councillors conspired in bad faith to block a bridge expansion project through heritage and demolition control by-laws, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found the allegations of conspiracy, illegality, and bad faith against the municipal defendants to be entirely without merit and emphasized that unsubstantiated allegations of dishonesty justify elevated costs.

Applying the principles in s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial full indemnity costs to the successful municipal respondents and individual councillors, subject to proportionality considerations reflecting differing levels of participation.

The court held that both the applicants and the Canadian Transit Company—though formally a respondent but aligned with the applicants—were jointly and severally responsible for the costs award.

The appellant farmer appealed a trial judgment awarding damages to the respondent grain elevator for breach of several agricultural futures contracts.

The appellant argued that the parties had a single overall business arrangement, that they had mutually agreed to terminate all dealings, and that the respondent failed to mitigate its damages after the appellant's anticipatory repudiation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contracts were independent, no termination agreement existed, and the respondent acted reasonably by waiting until the contractual delivery dates to calculate its losses in accordance with the contracts' valuation provisions.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s law firm as solicitors of record on the basis of conflict of interest.

A lawyer associated with the firm had previously been retained by the hospital defendant to assist with workplace conflict mediation and had obtained confidential information while acting in that capacity.

The court found that the lawyer was an associate of the firm and that the hospital was therefore a client of the firm.

Applying the “bright line” rule from R. v. Neil and the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court held that a law firm cannot act against a current client in directly adverse litigation absent informed consent.

Because confidential information was obtained and no effective screening measures existed, the firm was disqualified.

The appellant appealed a decision denying him interest on a shareholder's loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for interest as there was no agreement between the shareholders, no demand for repayment, no finding of oppression, and no judgment upon which to award prejudgment interest.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claims for the return of funds advanced to the respondent Society.

The trial judge had found the funds were donations, not loans.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made multiple errors of law and fact, including failing to apply the law of spoliation regarding missing corporate records, improperly admitting late expert handwriting evidence without an adjournment, refusing to hold a voir dire for reply evidence, and failing to act as a gatekeeper for opinion evidence.

The appellant challenged the validity of a series of wills executed by an elderly testatrix, alleging undue influence by the respondent beneficiaries and executors, who included the testatrix's lawyer, doctor, and accountant.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the challenge, which the motion judge granted after finding no triable issue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to grant summary judgment and erred in finding no triable issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to amend the order for directions was a mere procedural defect and that the appellant failed to present any evidence to counter the respondents' substantial evidence supporting the wills' validity.

The appellants appealed a decision restraining them from objecting to an application to extract aggregate from a property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the individual appellant used the appellant corporation as his agent to breach his personal covenant not to object to the extraction.

The substantive appeal was dismissed.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the lower court's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the relative merits of the case did not justify the higher scale.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for trespass to land and chattels, and aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the $35,000 award for trespass to chattels and the $5,000 award for trespass to land, finding sufficient evidence of actual damage.

However, the court set aside the $10,000 aggravated damages award to the individual plaintiff, as the trespass was committed against the corporate plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing total damages to $40,000.

The applicants sought costs following a successful judicial review application.

The court reviewed the lengthy submissions and deducted amounts claimed for an initial, unsuccessful application brought before the Commercial Court.

The court also disallowed partial indemnity rate increases that exceeded the actual rates charged to the client.

Costs were fixed at $151,065.82, inclusive of fees, GST, and disbursements.

The appellants purchased a new townhouse and discovered dampness in the basement due to a cement slab that did not meet the Ontario Building Code depth requirement.

They sued the builders and the Ontario New Home Warranty Plan after rejecting a proposed sealant solution.

The trial judge awarded $29,700 in damages against the builders but dismissed the claim against the Plan, finding the appellants failed to mitigate by refusing a reasonable solution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's factual findings and damages assessment.

The appellant university appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for negligent misrepresentation regarding the transferability of its engineering program credits.

The trial judge found that the university's promotional materials misleadingly suggested that transferring to another university after two years would be routine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings that the representations were misleading, negligently made, and reasonably relied upon by the respondent.

The court also upheld the finding that the respondent acted reasonably to mitigate his damages.

Leave to appeal costs was granted on consent to delete specific paragraphs from the trial judgment.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved mixed success by reducing the respondent's damages award, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $146,108.35 to $110,000, finding that the reduced judgment no longer exceeded the respondent's settlement offer and that pre-litigation conduct did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, offsetting the respondent's success on liability against the appellant's success on damages and motion costs.

The respondent, a cable installer, had an employment offer from a contractor withdrawn after the appellant, a large cable provider, informed the contractor it would not allow the respondent to work on its projects.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for intentional interference with economic relations and awarded damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the tort of intentional interference with economic relations was not made out because the appellant's breach of its own internal policy was not an 'unlawful act', the appellant was liable for the tort of inducing breach of contract.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the damages for past loss of income by the amount the respondent actually earned during that period.

The cross-appeal for punitive damages was dismissed.

The appellants alleged they suffered harm due to mislabelled medication and sued the pharmacy.

After the expiry of the one-year limitation period under the Regulated Health Professions Act, they moved to add the dispensing pharmacist and the numbered company operating the pharmacy as defendants.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal regarding the pharmacist, finding no evidence of due diligence to discover her identity.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the numbered company, holding that it was not a 'health profession corporation' under the Act and was therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed an order denying a motion to amend a statement of claim to add a new cause of action.

The motion judge had found non-compensable prejudice and denied the motion.

The Court of Appeal held that there was an evidentiary basis for the motion judge's finding and that the decision was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The defendants appealed an order refusing their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the defendants had failed to deliver their affidavit of documents for seven years, which under Rule 24 was a condition precedent to bringing the motion to dismiss.

The motion judge did not err in exercising his discretion to refuse the motion.

The appellant contractor sued the respondent bank for misrepresentation after the bank failed to advance a $150,000 loan to a mall owner to pay for renovations.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the bank had informed the contractor that the loan was conditional on a guarantor's signature.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The bank had represented that the loan was a sure thing and that the signature was a mere formality, knowing this was untrue and that the contractor would rely on it.

Judgment was entered for the contractor for the undisputed contract amount plus costs.

The appellant, acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed a decision regarding the Crown's obligation to pay administered funds to a veteran's estate upon death.

The appellant argued that clear statutory language was required to divest such funds, which was absent in the lapsing provisions of the Pension Act and Veterans Treatment Regulations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lapsing provisions clearly intended to prioritize spouses and dependants over estates.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, with the court finding that section 55 of the Veterans Treatment Regulations remained intra vires after 1986, as subordinate legislation is not required to mirror its enabling statute exactly.