Tanya Marion McNevin

The respondent sought costs following a successful motion to dismiss the applicant's rule 14(4.2) motion to change on the basis that the court was functus officio.

The applicant argued that the contempt motion and the motion to change should be viewed as a continuum and that the respondent acted recklessly.

The court rejected these arguments and found that the presumption of entitlement to costs was not displaced.

However, the court reduced the claimed costs of $15,239.59 to $6,250.00, finding that the hours claimed were excessive and that certain expenses were not recoverable.

The court also disallowed claimed court attendances that should have been addressed at prior steps in the case and rejected a claim for lost wages and travel expenses.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's motion to change a final custody and support order on the grounds that the court was functus officio.

The applicant had attempted to bring the motion to change under Family Law Rules subrule 14(4.2) (urgent motions for temporary orders) rather than under Rule 15 (the prescribed procedure for changing final orders).

The court held that once a final order is signed, it can only be changed by appeal or by a motion to change under Rule 15.

The applicant's attempt to use Rule 14(4.2) was procedurally improper, and the motion to dismiss was granted.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's solicitor, Ms. Avery, from the record in contempt proceedings.

The respondent argued that Ms. Avery must testify regarding her attendance at a police station with the applicant on October 7, 2015, and therefore could not continue as counsel.

The applicant opposed removal, arguing that Ms. Avery's evidence did not meet the high threshold of materiality and necessity required to deprive him of counsel of choice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was available from other sources and did not reach the exceptional circumstances threshold required for removal.

The respondent brought a motion to suspend or terminate the applicant's access to two children pending trial, following a section 112 report from the Children's Lawyer that raised concerns regarding the applicant's behaviour, including allegations of sexual abuse of the younger child and parental alienation of the older child.

The court found a material change in circumstances since the original custody order and determined that a temporary variation of access was necessary in the best interests of the children pending trial.

The court suspended access to the younger child entirely and restricted access to the older child to alternate weekend visits with specific conditions prohibiting negative statements about the respondent.