James Michael Mac Coristine

The plaintiff, severely injured in a correctional facility assault, sought leave to amend his statement of claim to identify anonymous correctional officers and lift a statutory stay to pursue claims against them, alleging bad faith.

The court denied leave to add the officers, finding no reasonable prospect of success on the bad faith claim.

While the plaintiff demonstrated good faith in bringing the action, the officers' actions, though negligent, did not meet the high threshold for bad faith, which requires intent or conscious wrongdoing.

The court also denied leave to include a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the individual officers, as the Crown generally owes no fiduciary duty to inmates, and no personal duty was pleaded.

Leave was granted for a minor amendment to plead specific conduct from an investigation report.

Jamal Mohamed sought an extension of time to appeal a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, which directed the forfeiture of $38,570 in Canadian currency and awarded costs against him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that Mr. Mohamed failed to satisfy the well-established criteria for granting an extension of time.

Specifically, he did not demonstrate a timely intention to appeal, provide an adequate explanation for the seven-month delay, or show apparent merit to his proposed appeal.

The court emphasized that a lack of merit alone can be a sufficient basis to deny such an extension.

This decision addresses costs arising from a previous ruling where the Ellison Defendant's motion for leave to examine witnesses was denied, and motions by the plaintiffs, the Crown, and Iler Campbell LLP to quash summonses were granted.

The successful parties sought costs, with the plaintiffs and Iler requesting substantial indemnity due to the Ellison Defendant's conduct, which included voluminous, unhelpful, and amended materials, and an abuse of process by issuing irrelevant summonses to delay proceedings.

The Crown sought partial indemnity costs.

The Ellison Defendant did not submit costs arguments.

The court found the Ellison Defendant's conduct unnecessarily lengthened proceedings and constituted an abuse of process.

While not egregious enough for full substantial indemnity, the conduct warranted more than partial indemnity.

The court fixed costs for the plaintiffs, Iler, and the Crown, ordering the Ellison Defendant to pay.

The Madan Defendants, subject to a Mareva injunction, brought a motion to vary a prior order to access additional funds for legal expenses from their frozen assets.

They sought to either remove a cap or access an additional $883,682.78.

The court applied the four-part test for varying Mareva injunctions for legal fees, finding the defendants had no other assets and the funds were not subject to a proprietary claim by the plaintiff.

While acknowledging the complexity and unanticipated factors increasing legal fees, the court found some budgeted items moot or premature.

The motion was partially granted, allowing access to an additional $587,433.33, and an enhanced monthly reporting protocol for legal expenditures was imposed.

The court addressed multiple motions, primarily the Ellison Defendant's motion for leave to examine non-parties and various motions to quash summonses issued by the Ellison Defendant.

The court denied the Ellison Defendant's request for leave, finding that the proposed witnesses lacked relevant evidence and that the examinations would constitute an abuse of process as the information was already available.

Additionally, Crown immunity prevented compelling testimony from Ministry of the Attorney General employees.

The summonses issued by the Ellison Defendant were quashed.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court finding that he had repudiated an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for the respondent's business.

The application judge granted rectification of the closing date, found that the appellant had waived the deadline for closing and delivery of landlord's consent, and that the appellant had agreed to pay interim rent.

The application judge also found that the landlord ultimately delivered consent in the form of a one-page handwritten document signed by all parties in September 2014.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual determinations regarding waiver or the interpretation of the landlord's consent document.