Alfred J. O'Marra

The plaintiff, a 60-year-old senior manager with 30 years of service, was dismissed without cause due to restructuring.

She brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal.

The court applied the Bardal factors and awarded a 24-month reasonable notice period, noting her age, long tenure, and the competitive disadvantage she faced in the job market.

The court also applied the trust and accounting approach rather than a contingency discount for mitigation, impressing the award with a trust in favour of the employer for any earnings obtained during the balance of the notice period.

Sentencing for historical sexual assaults committed by an adult uncle against two nieces aged 11 to 13 over multiple years.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence predominated in sentencing for child sexual abuse, particularly where the offender abused a position of familial trust and caused lasting psychological harm to multiple complainants.

Although a conditional sentence was legally available because the offences pre-dated current restrictions, the court found no exceptional circumstances making such a sentence fit.

Consecutive six-month sentences were imposed for a total of 12 months, together with DNA, SOIRA, and weapons prohibition orders.

Kemon Edwards was charged with firearm offences.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Detective Scott Ferguson on the characteristics of an armed person based on surveillance video, and from Dr. Robert Gerard on gunshot residue (GSR) found on the accused's clothing.

The court qualified Detective Ferguson as an expert but limited his testimony to general characteristics, prohibiting him from commenting directly on the video's content to avoid usurping the jury's role.

Dr. Gerard's expertise on GSR detection was accepted, but his testimony was restricted from opining on the percentage of particle transfer from an unpublished study, though he could generally comment on the risk of contamination and the significance of particle numbers.

The court emphasized that contamination risks affect the weight of GSR evidence, not its admissibility, and are for the jury to assess.

During a murder trial, the defence brought an application to exclude newly disclosed expert evidence relating to histological slide analysis conducted by a forensic pathologist the day before testifying.

The defence argued the late disclosure breached the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter because cross-examinations of earlier forensic witnesses had already been conducted based on the absence of such evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Bijelland, the court considered whether exclusion was necessary or whether lesser remedies could cure the prejudice.

The court found that admitting the evidence at the end of the Crown’s case would materially prejudice the defence strategy and that an adjournment or recall of witnesses would not remedy the unfairness.

The evidence derived from the late histological review was therefore excluded.

The applicant, who was separately indicted for first-degree murder, sought a partial or delayed publication ban on her anticipated testimony at her co-accused's trial.

She argued that pre-trial publicity and media reports of her evidence would taint the jury pool for her upcoming trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding no real and substantial risk to her fair trial rights.

The court held that reasonable alternative measures, such as the challenge for cause process and strong judicial directions to the jury, were sufficient to ensure an impartial jury.

The Crown sought direction regarding the admissibility of evidence from a physician who recalled observing “rope marks” on a child during a visit in 1992 and being told by the child’s mother that the injuries were caused by a sibling who had since died.

The Crown argued the evidence formed part of a pattern of abusive conduct and was relevant to aggravated assault allegations within the charged timeframe.

The court held that linking the injuries to the accused required introducing evidence surrounding the sibling’s death, which had already been ruled inadmissible as prior discreditable conduct.

The probative value of the physician’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, particularly the risk of propensity reasoning.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct and hearsay ante-mortem statements of his deceased children in a trial for first-degree murder and other offences.

The accused cross-applied to sever an obstruct justice count relating to the earlier death of his son.

The court granted the severance application, finding the evidence surrounding the son's death highly prejudicial.

The court admitted some prior discreditable conduct evidence, including physical abuse and threats, as vital narrative and to show a pattern of abusive control.

Certain ante-mortem statements were also admitted under the state of mind hearsay exception, while others were excluded.

The accused applied for permission to sit at counsel table during a jury trial rather than in the prisoner’s dock, arguing that seating in the dock could undermine the presumption of innocence and hinder communication with counsel.

The court reviewed competing authorities concerning the placement of an accused in the courtroom and emphasized that the traditional position is the prisoner’s dock, subject to the trial judge’s discretion.

The court held that removal from the dock should occur only in exceptional circumstances where necessary to permit full answer and defence and where no security concerns exist.

As no such exceptional circumstances were demonstrated and the courtroom configuration would obscure the accused from the jury if seated behind counsel, the application was refused.

The accused applied during jury selection for an order excluding unsworn prospective jurors from the courtroom while challenge-for-cause questions concerning potential racial bias were asked.

The defence argued that exclusion was necessary to prevent prospective jurors from becoming "schooled" by hearing repeated challenges and tailoring their responses.

The court considered the interaction between the inherent jurisdiction to exclude jurors and the statutory regime in s. 640(2.1) and s. 640(2.2) of the Criminal Code, as interpreted in prior decisions.

Finding that the defence concern related to juror schooling rather than preserving impartiality between the Crown and the accused, the court followed the approach in Sandham and exercised its discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while permitting rotating triers.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his daughter, brought a pre-trial application to exclude expert opinion evidence suggesting starvation as a possible cause of death.

The accused argued the Crown provided late notice of this theory and that the underlying estimates of the victim's pre-death weight lacked scientific validity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that late notice did not warrant exclusion given the time remaining before trial, and that the experts' estimates, based on specialized experience rather than strict scientific testing, met the threshold reliability required for admissibility.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during his transport and subsequent interview regarding the death of his daughter.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 7 and 10(b) Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice found the transport utterances inadmissible because the accused was not informed he was a murder suspect, vitiating his right to make an informed choice to remain silent.

While the station interview did not violate s. 10(b), the court excluded it under its residual discretion, finding its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value due to the accused's repeated requests for counsel and the lack of inculpatory responses to police theorizing.

The accused were jointly tried for fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme using a stolen and forged TD bank draft to obtain approximately $1.9 million in gold bullion from a Montreal dealer.

The Crown’s case was largely circumstantial and relied on telephone records, cell tower data, and evidence concerning the acquisition and subsequent disposition of Perth Mint gold bars.

The trial judge assessed the evidence under the principles governing circumstantial cases and the framework in R. v. W. (D.).

The court rejected the explanations advanced by the accused and concluded that they had acted together to present the fraudulent draft, obtain the gold, and distribute or conceal it afterward.

The applicants, charged with defrauding a bank of over $1.8 million, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total time from charge to trial was approximately four years.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that while the 22 months of institutional delay exceeded the administrative guidelines, the delay was not unreasonable given the complexity of the case, the involvement of multiple accused, and the significant delay caused by the actions of the co-accused.

The court also found no meaningful prejudice arising from the delay itself.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by a jury on two counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving two college students at a campus residence.

The first offence involved forced sexual touching after the complainant repeatedly refused consent, while the second involved forced vaginal intercourse with ejaculation despite the complainant’s protests.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the serious nature of sexual violence and the vulnerability of the victims in a residence setting.

Although the accused was a youthful first offender with family support and rehabilitative prospects, the gravity of the offences and their lasting psychological impact on the victims warranted a penitentiary sentence.

A total sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

Following conviction after trial for a violent home invasion robbery involving firearms, the offender was sentenced for multiple offences including armed robbery, aggravated assault, discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life, unlawful confinement, and several firearms possession offences.

During the robbery three armed assailants entered an apartment, confined the victim, and shot him in the back as he attempted to flee, causing life‑threatening injuries.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives in home invasion and gun crimes.

Considering aggravating factors such as the use of firearms, the grievous injuries inflicted, and the offender’s prior youth record and breach of a firearms prohibition, the court imposed a significant penitentiary sentence within the established range for home invasion offences.

The appellant appealed a family law trial decision to the Divisional Court.

The trial judgment ordered periodic child support and spousal support payments that, in aggregate, exceeded $50,000 annually.

Although the parties agreed the Divisional Court had jurisdiction because only the spousal support (under $50,000) was being appealed, the court held that jurisdiction is determined by the total amount of periodic payments ordered in the judgment, not the amount in issue on appeal.

The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The accused applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a Part VI intercept authorization, alleging a violation of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The investigation stemmed from an armed robbery at a pawn shop where the owner was shot.

The applicants argued the information to obtain (ITO) relied on unreliable confidential informant information and that police failed to exhaust alternative investigative methods.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, even excluding the contested informant information, the remaining evidence—including DNA matches and association evidence—provided reasonable grounds for the authorization.

A supplementary application regarding police obtaining contact information from Ontario Works without a warrant was also dismissed.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Sentencing following jury convictions for aggravated sexual assault, two counts of sexual assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, four counts of assault, and threatening death against a former intimate partner during a prolonged abusive relationship.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount, emphasizing the degrading nature of the sexual violence, the abuse of a spouse or common law partner as a statutory aggravating factor, and the victim's enduring physical and psychological harm.

Finding little mitigation, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of five years.

Mandatory and ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration for life, and no communication with the victim during incarceration were also made.

The sentencing concerned a youthful first offender convicted after trial of dangerous driving arising from a sudden turn in front of a TTC bus while transporting others from the scene of a robbery.

The court accepted that the respondent had been an unwitting participant in the broader events and that his dangerous operation resulted from panic after seeing a sawed off shotgun and the agitation of his passengers.

Applying the discharge provisions in s. 730 of the Criminal Code, the court held that a conditional discharge was in the accused's best interests and not contrary to the public interest despite the usual need for denunciation and deterrence in dangerous driving cases.

A 12-month probation order and parallel one-year driving prohibition were imposed.

The accused were tried for offences arising from a home invasion armed robbery where the victim was shot.

The Crown alleged one accused was one of the three armed robbers and another was the getaway driver.

The court found the first accused guilty of armed robbery, aggravated assault, and firearms offences based on circumstantial DNA and cell phone evidence, but acquitted him of attempted murder.

The getaway driver was acquitted of being an accessory after the fact and failing to remain at the scene of an accident, as his evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding his intent and knowledge, but he was convicted of dangerous driving for turning his vehicle into the path of a bus.