Christi Hunter

The appellant, Haleigh Hutchinson, appealed the length of a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after pleading guilty to dangerous driving causing death.

The collision occurred when the appellant was driving significantly over the speed limit, resulting in the victim's death.

The sentencing judge imposed a conditional sentence, a probation order, and a 10-year driving prohibition.

The appellant argued the judge erred in principle by relying on a benchmark case (R. v. Frickey) and by failing to consider a pre-sentence license suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court affirmed that deterrence and denunciation are paramount sentencing objectives in dangerous driving cases and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the overall sentence.

The court found the distinctions from Frickey were not material enough to warrant a shorter prohibition and that the judge's discretion regarding credit for the pre-sentence suspension was not erred.

The accused was convicted by a jury on two counts of sexual assault arising from incidents involving two college students at a campus residence.

The first offence involved forced sexual touching after the complainant repeatedly refused consent, while the second involved forced vaginal intercourse with ejaculation despite the complainant’s protests.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the serious nature of sexual violence and the vulnerability of the victims in a residence setting.

Although the accused was a youthful first offender with family support and rehabilitative prospects, the gravity of the offences and their lasting psychological impact on the victims warranted a penitentiary sentence.

A total sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a stay of fraud charges, alleging a breach of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court reviewed the procedural history from the laying of charges in May 2011 to the scheduled trial date in September 2013 and assessed competing characterizations of delay, including alleged Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The applicants argued that the Crown improperly laid a breach of trust charge which generated unnecessary disclosure and delay.

The court rejected that argument, finding the Crown had a reasonable prospect of conviction on the breach of trust count and that much of the delay was attributable to the inherent complexity of the case and permissible institutional delay.

Applying the framework from Morin, the court concluded the institutional delay fell within acceptable ranges and that any prejudice suffered by the accused primarily resulted from the charges themselves rather than delay.