5 total
Murder conviction quashed due to undisclosed alternate suspect interview; new trial ordered instead of acquittal.
The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.
The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.
The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.
The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.
The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.
The Court of Appeal upheld a first-degree murder conviction, affirming the admissibility of expert evidence on alternate causes of death.
The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.
The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.
The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.
The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."
Late-disclosed expert pathology evidence excluded to protect accused’s right to full answer and defence.
During a murder trial, the defence brought an application to exclude newly disclosed expert evidence relating to histological slide analysis conducted by a forensic pathologist the day before testifying.
The defence argued the late disclosure breached the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter because cross-examinations of earlier forensic witnesses had already been conducted based on the absence of such evidence.
Applying the framework in R. v. Bijelland, the court considered whether exclusion was necessary or whether lesser remedies could cure the prejudice.
The court found that admitting the evidence at the end of the Crown’s case would materially prejudice the defence strategy and that an adjournment or recall of witnesses would not remedy the unfairness.
The evidence derived from the late histological review was therefore excluded.
Application to exclude expert evidence on starvation as cause of death dismissed; threshold reliability met.
The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his daughter, brought a pre-trial application to exclude expert opinion evidence suggesting starvation as a possible cause of death.
The accused argued the Crown provided late notice of this theory and that the underlying estimates of the victim's pre-death weight lacked scientific validity.
The court dismissed the application, finding that late notice did not warrant exclusion given the time remaining before trial, and that the experts' estimates, based on specialized experience rather than strict scientific testing, met the threshold reliability required for admissibility.
Crown appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to errors in excluding rebuttal evidence and jury instructions.
The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.
At trial, the accused advanced an alternate suspect defence and claimed the police investigation was inadequate.
The trial judge excluded the Crown's proposed rebuttal evidence from the alternate suspect, instructed the jury that they must acquit if they could not decide which of the two men committed the murder, and repeatedly warned the jury about wrongful convictions.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding the rebuttal evidence, in giving the co-principal instruction where there was evidence of joint participation, and in repeatedly referencing miscarriages of justice in the jury charge.
The cumulative effect of these errors warranted a new trial.