K.C.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellant to surrender himself into custody within 48 hours, with reasons to follow.

The appellant challenged a Superior Court of Quebec decision concerning the federal election in the electoral district of Terrebonne.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

A majority allowed the appeal and annulled the federal election held on April 28, 2025, in Terrebonne.

Reasons were reserved, including on costs.

The receiver moved to determine appellate entitlement from receivership-related orders under the BIA.

The court held no appeal as of right under ss. 193(a) or (c), denied leave, and granted the receiver’s motion.

In a criminal appeal involving fraud convictions, the moving party sought additional non-privileged disclosure to support proposed fresh-evidence abuse-of-process claims.

Applying prior case-management directions and existing disclosure rulings, the court found no basis for further compelled production on the issues properly before it and dismissed the motion.

The representative plaintiffs in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy for packaged bread sought to amend their pleadings and the Certification Order to add Maple Leaf Foods Inc. as a certified defendant.

The original Certification Order had refused certification against Maple Leaf on the basis that the pleadings disclosed no cause of action against it, and this decision was not appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the motion, finding that the original refusal to certify was a final order that gave rise to res judicata.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act does not permit relitigation of matters finally decided, and the motion judge did not err in refusing to exercise his limited discretion to bypass res judicata.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg percent, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1)(a), adducing the certificate of the qualified technician and two analyst certificates.

The central issue was whether the Crown must prove, not merely disclose, the target value of the alcohol standard used in the system calibration check in order to rely on the presumption of accuracy.

The majority held that while the target value must be disclosed pursuant to s. 320.34(1)(b), it need not be independently proven at trial as a precondition to the presumption of accuracy, as Parliament did not intend it to be a statutory precondition.

Côté J. dissented, finding that both disclosure and proof of the target value are constitutionally required to preserve the presumption of innocence and the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

In a Crown sentence appeal arising from historical child sexual offences, the Court clarified that appellate intervention requires a legal error affecting sentence or demonstrable unfitness, and that sufficiency of reasons must be assessed functionally and contextually.

The Court held the sentencing judge’s factual findings and reasons were sufficient in light of the jury verdict, record, and submissions.

It further held that contemporary sentencing principles, including Friesen, apply to historical offences, subject to the maximum penalty in force when the offences were committed.

The appellate reduction was set aside, the original six-year concurrent sentence restored, and reincarceration ordered in the interests of denunciation and deterrence.

On an appeal from a conviction quashed for miscarriage of justice arising from Crown non-disclosure, the Court addressed the proper remedy under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that where the Crown seeks an acquittal and undertakes to call no evidence at a new trial, an appellate court may enter an acquittal directly rather than require pro forma retrial steps or impose a judicial stay.

The Court emphasized that acquittal remains distinct from a stay and that a stay is a residual remedy considered only after primary remedies are assessed.

Applying those principles, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings and entered an acquittal.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant was charged with the historical offence of indecent assault arising from an incident in which a five-year-old complainant touched the accused's penis at his invitation after witnessing him masturbate.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that while the element of indecency was established, there was no assault because the accused had not directly and intentionally applied force to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the intentional application of force requirement.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that when an adult intentionally precipitates sexual contact with a child, the elements of sexual assault are satisfied regardless of whose physical movement initiates the contact.

The Court declined to follow the English authority of Fairclough v. Whipp, finding it not authoritative in Canada.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The appellant sought to strike paragraphs from the respondents' judicial review application challenging the issuance of uranium exploration permits, arguing the paragraphs constituted an abuse of process in light of two prior actions.

The Court confirmed that the abuse of process doctrine, while applicable to Indigenous litigants, must be assessed with regard to the unique context of Aboriginal rights litigation.

The status of a stayed prior action is not dispositive of whether the Crown has knowledge of an asserted Aboriginal claim sufficient to trigger the duty to consult.

Overlap between a general duty-to-consult action and a specific judicial review application does not, without more, threaten the integrity of the adjudicative process.

Case management, rather than striking pleadings, is the appropriate remedy where there is a risk of inconsistent outcomes from parallel proceedings.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims of substantial interference with an easement and nuisance against the respondents, while granting a permanent injunction preventing parking in the right-of-way tunnel.

The respondents cross-appealed the scope of the parking injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the easement, application of the substantial interference test, or the tailored scope of the parking injunction.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a sexual assault case, challenging trial rulings on text message evidence and admission of prior sexual history evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed substantially with the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal majority and dismissed the appeal.

Two judges would have allowed the appeal, concluding the trial judge erred in admitting prior sexual history evidence and that the error materially affected the acquittal.

The appellants, pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors of opioid products, challenged the constitutional validity of s. 11 of British Columbia's Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, which authorizes British Columbia to act as representative plaintiff in a class action on behalf of all federal, provincial, and territorial governments in Canada unless they opt out.

The majority held that s. 11 is intra vires, characterizing its pith and substance as a procedural mechanism under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (Administration of Justice in the Province) that facilitates intergovernmental cooperation without creating or altering substantive rights.

The majority further found that s. 11 maintains a meaningful connection to British Columbia and respects the legislative sovereignty of other governments.

Côté J. dissented, finding that the pith and substance of s. 11 engages and derogates from property and civil rights of extra-provincial governments under s. 92(13), that no meaningful connection exists, and that ss. 11(1)(b) and (2) should be severed as ultra vires.

The Crown appealed acquittals on trafficking in persons and receiving a material benefit from trafficking, where the trial judge had characterized evidence of the accused's regular violence and threats of violence toward the complainant as past discreditable conduct evidence, limiting its relevance to a mere contextual backdrop.

The Supreme Court majority held that this was an error of law because such violence, covered by the indictment's time period and locations, was directly relevant to the actus reus of trafficking under s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code — it could establish that the accused exercised control, direction, or influence over the complainant's movements, and could satisfy the definition of exploitation in s. 279.04.

The majority further held this error might have had a material bearing on the acquittals by undermining the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Côté and Rowe JJ. dissented, finding the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittals given the trial judge's detailed credibility findings and the absence of evidence linking the violence to the complainant's provision of sexual services.

The Crown appealed acquittals on trafficking in persons and receiving a material benefit from trafficking, where the trial judge had characterized evidence of the accused's regular violence and threats of violence toward the complainant as past discreditable conduct evidence, limiting its relevance to a mere contextual backdrop.

The Supreme Court majority held that this was an error of law because such violence, covered by the indictment's time period and locations, was directly relevant to the actus reus of trafficking under s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code — it could establish that the accused exercised control, direction, or influence over the complainant's movements, and could satisfy the definition of exploitation in s. 279.04.

The majority further held this error might have had a material bearing on the acquittals by undermining the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Côté and Rowe JJ. dissented, finding the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittals given the trial judge's detailed credibility findings and the absence of evidence linking the violence to the complainant's provision of sexual services.

The appellants, owners of coal-fired electric power generation facilities, challenged the vires of provincial linear property assessment guidelines that denied them additional depreciation on account of an off-coal agreement they had entered into with the Crown.

The appellants argued the guidelines violated the common law rule against administrative discrimination and were inconsistent with the purposes of the enabling statute.

The Court held that the reasonableness standard of review presumptively applies to vires challenges to subordinate legislation, as set out in the companion case.

The Court found the guidelines did discriminate against parties to off-coal agreements but that such discrimination was authorized by necessary implication under the broad ministerial power to establish valuation standards and regulations respecting specifications and characteristics of designated industrial property.

The appeal was dismissed, the guidelines being intra vires and consistent with the statutory purposes of ensuring current, correct, fair and equitable assessments.

The appellant challenged the vires of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, enacted by the Governor in Council under the Divorce Act, arguing that the GIC exceeded its authority because the Guidelines require the payer parent to bear a greater share of child-related costs than the recipient parent.

The Supreme Court held that the reasonableness standard under the Vavilov framework presumptively applies when reviewing the vires of subordinate legislation, and that the 'irrelevant, extraneous or completely unrelated' threshold from Katz Group is no longer good law.

Applying reasonableness review, the Court concluded that the Child Support Guidelines fall within the GIC's extremely broad statutory authority under s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act and are therefore intra vires.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.