Jennifer Penman

The applicant brought a Charter motion challenging the validity of search warrants executed at his residence and vehicle, which resulted in the seizure of a firearm.

The warrants were based almost entirely on tips from two confidential informants, and the Information to Obtain (ITO) was heavily redacted to protect their identities.

The court found that the police failed to adequately corroborate the informants' tips and lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe a firearm would be found at the target address.

Concluding that the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were violated, the court applied the Grant framework and excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2).

The Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a cellphone Health App to show the accused was pacing at home shortly after a fatal fire.

The defence opposed, arguing the underlying science was unreliable.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and found that the Health App data was not reliable for forensic purposes in this case, as there was no independent evidence the accused was walking or running with the phone, and the app could register false positives.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted murder after shooting a stranger multiple times at point-blank range during a public celebration in downtown Toronto.

The court considered the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and difficult background as mitigating factors, balanced against the extreme violence and public danger of the offence.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, reduced by 18 months for exceptionally harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and declined to order delayed parole.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a fatal stabbing of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 10 years' imprisonment, while the offender sought 5 years (time served).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the offender's possession of a knife while on a weapons prohibition, against mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 7.5 years' imprisonment, less 55.5 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 34.5 months to serve.

The accused was found lying in a backyard suffering from a gunshot wound following a gunfight in a residential neighbourhood.

A loaded prohibited firearm was found nearby.

The Crown's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused possessed and discharged the firearm.

The court found significant gaps in the evidence, including unreliable police testimony regarding the exact location of the firearm and the presence of multiple other individuals involved in the shootout.

The court concluded there were reasonable inferences other than guilt, such as the firearm being left by another participant, and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The accused, Tyrelle Lee and Steven MacIsaac, were charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing at a park party.

A verbal altercation escalated into a physical melee, during which the deceased was chased to a hill and stabbed once in the chest by Lee.

MacIsaac was present, armed with a knife, and assisted in preventing the deceased from escaping.

The court found that while Lee caused the unlawful death, the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were found guilty of manslaughter, with MacIsaac convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting.

The accused was charged with two separate first-degree murders in Toronto and Brampton.

During a pre-trial motion, the court previously ruled that the accused's confessions to undercover officers were admissible.

In this motion, the court determined how to edit the confession for the Toronto trial to prevent the jury from hearing overly prejudicial evidence about the Brampton homicide.

The court ruled that explicit references to the Brampton shooting must be edited out, but circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the car and gun used in both incidents remained admissible due to its high probative value regarding identity.

The accused, facing multiple firearm and drug charges, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial, arguing the dock would negatively impact the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the customary position of the accused is in the dock and that juries are adequately instructed on the presumption of innocence to prevent any prejudice.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder after brutally stabbing the victim following a day of drinking.

The Crown sought 15 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

The court weighed the offender's difficult background as a refugee and his efforts at self-improvement against the brutal nature of the prolonged attack and his failure to seek medical help for the victim.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 13 years, along with DNA and firearms prohibition orders.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on motive, opportunity, and after-the-fact conduct.

The reviewing court applied the test for committal, assessing whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The court found that the combined evidence of the accused's motive, presence in the building, and attempts to conceal his identity was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused, a transgender woman charged with murder, sought to introduce expert sociological evidence regarding the prevalence of violence against transgender people to support her claim of self-defence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance to the specific facts of the case, was unnecessary as the expected reactions to violence were not outside the normal experience of a jury, and carried a potential for prejudice that significantly outweighed its minimal probative value.

The accused was charged with manslaughter following a fatal shooting in a barbershop.

The Crown alleged the accused aided or abetted the deceased in confronting the shooter, relying entirely on circumstantial evidence of their interactions before the incident.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The court granted the application, finding no evidence beyond speculation that the accused knew the deceased had a loaded handgun or that he possessed the requisite knowledge and intent for the unlawful act.

This appeal addressed whether informer privilege can protect an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip made to obstruct a police investigation.

The Court held privilege does not apply where, on a balance of probabilities, the caller intended to further criminal activity or interfere with the administration of justice.

It confirmed judges should presume privilege exists and determine applicability through in camera proceedings, often ex parte, with fairness safeguards for the defence.

The Court also confirmed judges may review the tip record and may require a preliminary exclusion or probity showing before full litigation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation, brought a Charter challenge against s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits conditional sentences for serious personal injury offences.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 (overbreadth) and s. 12 (cruel and unusual punishment) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding the provision was rationally connected to its purpose of denunciation and deterrence, and did not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence on the applicant or reasonably hypothetical offenders.

The offender was convicted of four counts of trafficking in cocaine.

At sentencing, he brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of s. 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which eliminated conditional sentences for offences with a maximum penalty of 14 years or life, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the provision did not result in grossly disproportionate sentences and was not overbroad.

The offender was sentenced to 90 days of intermittent imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

During a murder trial, the defence brought an application to exclude newly disclosed expert evidence relating to histological slide analysis conducted by a forensic pathologist the day before testifying.

The defence argued the late disclosure breached the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter because cross-examinations of earlier forensic witnesses had already been conducted based on the absence of such evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Bijelland, the court considered whether exclusion was necessary or whether lesser remedies could cure the prejudice.

The court found that admitting the evidence at the end of the Crown’s case would materially prejudice the defence strategy and that an adjournment or recall of witnesses would not remedy the unfairness.

The evidence derived from the late histological review was therefore excluded.

In a prosecution for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application seeking admission of several out-of-court statements made by the deceased to friends and associates describing a deteriorating relationship with the accused and expressing fear that the accused and his family intended to kill him.

The court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the statements under the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement expressing fear that the accused would kill the deceased with his own guns was admissible under the traditional state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The remaining statements describing prior disputes, business dealings, and a recent altercation between the deceased and the accused were admitted under the principled exception because necessity was established and sufficient indicia of reliability existed through corroborating evidence and contextual circumstances.

The probative value of the evidence relating to animus and motive outweighed any prejudicial effect, including concerns about prior discreditable conduct.

The accused, a Black man charged with the murder of an Asian man, brought a motion to allow multiple-choice questions to be put to prospective jurors during the challenge for cause process, arguing the standard Parks question is insufficient to uncover subconscious racial bias.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the standard question.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the proposed multiple-choice format would be an improvement over the standard Parks question, but directed that jurors be instructed they may provide detailed answers rather than just 'yes' or 'no'.

The Crown sought a ruling that an accused’s inculpatory statement made to a police officer while awaiting medical treatment was voluntary and admissible.

The statement was made after the accused had earlier invoked the right to silence during a recorded interview and after consulting counsel.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, emphasizing gaps in the officer’s notes and inconsistencies in recollection.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness analysis and concluded that uncertainties about the unrecorded portions of the conversation and the officer’s unreliable recollection raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible and the Charter exclusion argument became moot.

The Crown sought direction regarding the admissibility of evidence from a physician who recalled observing “rope marks” on a child during a visit in 1992 and being told by the child’s mother that the injuries were caused by a sibling who had since died.

The Crown argued the evidence formed part of a pattern of abusive conduct and was relevant to aggravated assault allegations within the charged timeframe.

The court held that linking the injuries to the accused required introducing evidence surrounding the sibling’s death, which had already been ruled inadmissible as prior discreditable conduct.

The probative value of the physician’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, particularly the risk of propensity reasoning.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.