A.J. O’Marra

The young person accused was charged with second-degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm after shooting a flea market manager during a robbery.

The accused admitted to the robbery, firearm possession, and manslaughter, but contested the murder charge, arguing a lack of subjective intent for murder due to severe drug intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental health issues.

The court declined to apply the common-sense inference of intent, finding that the cumulative effect of the accused's substance abuse, sleeplessness, and other health issues left the accused without the requisite subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown brought an application to admit the accused's rap music videos and lyrics as prior discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to use the evidence to establish the accused's membership in a street gang and to provide a motive for the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of a relationship between the deceased and the accused, nor any evidence that the deceased was involved in gang activity.

The court concluded that the lyrics were not relevant to an issue at trial and their prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for sex trafficking offences.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an order for committal under the Extradition Act, based on the corresponding Canadian offence of receiving a financial or other material benefit from human trafficking.

The respondent argued that the conduct amounted only to prostitution, which is legal in Canada, thus failing the double criminality requirement.

The court found that the essence of the offence was exploitation and human trafficking, not merely prostitution.

Finding sufficient evidence of the essential elements of the Canadian offence, the court ordered the respondent committed into custody to await extradition.

The accused was charged with robbery and second-degree murder after forcefully kicking the victim during a robbery, causing the victim to fall and strike his head on the pavement, resulting in fatal brain injuries.

The trial proceeded by judge alone on an agreed statement of facts.

The sole issue was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the accused had the subjective intent to cause bodily harm, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had subjective knowledge that the harm was likely to result in death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of manslaughter and robbery.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with manslaughter following a fatal collision with a longboarder.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally veered into the victim in a fit of road rage, while the accused claimed he was unaware of the victim's presence and the collision resulted from a momentary lapse of attention or a mechanical 'bump steer'.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he intentionally steered his taxi into the curb lane knowing the victim was beside him.

The court concluded this conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, finding the accused guilty of manslaughter based on the unlawful acts of assault and dangerous driving.

Sentencing of three offenders for criminal organization and firearms offences, with one offender also sentenced for human trafficking and assault causing bodily harm.

The court imposed a 12-year sentence for the principal offender involved in human trafficking and firearms acquisition for the criminal organization, a 7-year sentence for the second offender recruited to obtain firearms, and a 2.5-year sentence for the third offender who acted as a go-between.

The court applied enhanced pre-sentence custody credits for harsh detention conditions and strict house arrest.

The plaintiff sought to discharge a $220,000 mortgage registered against his property, claiming the funds were never advanced by the defendant.

The defendant counterclaimed for possession, alleging the funds were advanced in cash to the plaintiff's relative in Iran and by paying off credit card debt.

The court found significant credibility issues with all witnesses but relied on documentary evidence showing the defendant received over $220,000 in transfers from Iran, which he acknowledged was sufficient to discharge the mortgage.

The court ordered the mortgage discharged, finding it was effectively redeemed when the defendant received those funds.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining a Mareva injunction but successful in obtaining an order for interim possession of a jewellery set, both parties sought costs.

The court found that success was substantially divided and the costs sought by the plaintiff were excessive.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages after tripping and falling in a parking lot owned by the defendant.

She alleged that she tripped over an insufficiently marked and maintained speed bump.

The court found that the speed bump's markings complied with industry standards and provided adequate warning.

Furthermore, the plaintiff could not objectively prove what caused her fall, relying only on speculation after returning to the scene weeks later.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant, a foreign national subject to a removal order, applied for habeas corpus after being detained in a maximum security provincial jail for over four years pending removal.

The court found that while the length of detention was exceptional, its duration was not uncertain because the applicant's recent cooperation provided a reasonable prospect for removal, thus not violating sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

However, the court held that detaining the applicant in a maximum security facility with frequent lockdowns, rather than an immigration holding centre, was grossly disproportionate to his flight risk and constituted cruel and unusual treatment under section 12 of the Charter.

The court ordered his immediate transfer to an immigration holding centre.

The offender was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to an armed robbery committed by her son, having disposed of a sweater he wore during the crime.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while the defence requested a sentence of less than six months to preserve the offender's right to appeal a potential removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court applied a 1:1 credit for 157 days of pre-trial custody to avoid the draconian immigration consequences, sentencing the offender to one day in jail and 18 months of probation.

The offenders were found guilty of uttering a forged document, obstructing justice, and attempted fraud over $5,000 after presenting a forged civil judgment bearing a judge's signature.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences for both.

The court sentenced the first offender, a paralegal with a related record, to three years in custody.

The second offender, a first-time offender with minimal risk of re-offending, received a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

In a blended voir dire, the Crown sought to admit the accused's confessions regarding two armoured truck robberies, while the accused sought their exclusion under the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and dismissed claims of arbitrary detention and initial right to counsel breaches.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach occurred when police failed to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel after questioning shifted to a separate, earlier robbery, which significantly changed his jeopardy.

Statements regarding the earlier robbery were excluded under s. 24(2).

Following a summary judgment for wrongful dismissal, the parties sought costs.

The plaintiff claimed $33,839.99, while the defendant argued its offer to settle triggered Rule 49.10.

The court found the judgment was as favourable as the defendant's final offer to settle, entitling the plaintiff to partial indemnity costs up to the offer date and the defendant to partial indemnity costs thereafter.

As the respective costs amounts were roughly equal, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs.

The applicant brought a habeas corpus application seeking release from a five-year immigration detention pending deportation, along with a claim for Charter damages under s. 24(1) for alleged violations of his ss. 7, 9, 10, and 12 rights.

During the hearing, the applicant was deported to Jamaica, rendering the habeas corpus application moot.

The court proceeded to hear the Charter damages claim, finding it had jurisdiction to do so without requiring bifurcated proceedings.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the Charter claims, concluding that the lengthy detention was lawful, subject to regular review, and not grossly disproportionate or cruel and unusual, as the delay was primarily caused by Jamaican authorities' failure to issue a travel document.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal, the plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, alleging the defendant engaged in improper conduct by initially offering insufficient severance.

The court found no improper, vexatious, or unnecessary conduct by the defendant that would warrant elevated costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $14,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, noting the straightforward nature of the proceeding.

The accused was charged with trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime after a police surveillance operation.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including intercepted phone calls using coded language between a known buyer and an unknown female, and surveillance observations of a brief meeting between the buyer and the accused in a vehicle.

The court applied the test for circumstantial evidence, finding that the cumulative effect of the evidence excluded any other reasonable alternative to guilt.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

During a murder trial, the defence brought an application to exclude newly disclosed expert evidence relating to histological slide analysis conducted by a forensic pathologist the day before testifying.

The defence argued the late disclosure breached the accused’s right to make full answer and defence under s. 7 of the Charter because cross-examinations of earlier forensic witnesses had already been conducted based on the absence of such evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Bijelland, the court considered whether exclusion was necessary or whether lesser remedies could cure the prejudice.

The court found that admitting the evidence at the end of the Crown’s case would materially prejudice the defence strategy and that an adjournment or recall of witnesses would not remedy the unfairness.

The evidence derived from the late histological review was therefore excluded.

The Crown sought direction regarding the admissibility of evidence from a physician who recalled observing “rope marks” on a child during a visit in 1992 and being told by the child’s mother that the injuries were caused by a sibling who had since died.

The Crown argued the evidence formed part of a pattern of abusive conduct and was relevant to aggravated assault allegations within the charged timeframe.

The court held that linking the injuries to the accused required introducing evidence surrounding the sibling’s death, which had already been ruled inadmissible as prior discreditable conduct.

The probative value of the physician’s testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, particularly the risk of propensity reasoning.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The accused applied for permission to sit at counsel table during a jury trial rather than in the prisoner’s dock, arguing that seating in the dock could undermine the presumption of innocence and hinder communication with counsel.

The court reviewed competing authorities concerning the placement of an accused in the courtroom and emphasized that the traditional position is the prisoner’s dock, subject to the trial judge’s discretion.

The court held that removal from the dock should occur only in exceptional circumstances where necessary to permit full answer and defence and where no security concerns exist.

As no such exceptional circumstances were demonstrated and the courtroom configuration would obscure the accused from the jury if seated behind counsel, the application was refused.