M.A. Code

Sentencing of two offenders convicted of multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

Jason Wisdom, a mature recidivist, was convicted of possessing large quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as a loaded restricted firearm and breaching prohibition orders.

He was sentenced to a total of 17 years imprisonment.

Dae-Shawn Wisdom, a younger recidivist, was convicted of possessing fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and was sentenced to 7 years and 4 months consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.

The court applied the totality principle and Lord Coke's principle regarding subsequent convictions.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against a minor, brought an application to stay the proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 1944 days.

The court deducted delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and apportioned delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability and the systemic shortage of judges.

After deductions, the net delay was 941 days, which exceeded the 30-month (913 days) presumptive ceiling.

The application was allowed and the proceedings were stayed.

The accused was convicted of multiple firearms offences and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after fleeing police and hiding two loaded handguns and 127.75 grams of fentanyl in a residential backyard.

The court considered the accused's serious criminal record, including prior convictions for armed robbery and murder, and the significant danger posed to the public.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 15 years, reduced to 13 years and 2 months after crediting pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The 47-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to break and enter and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The offences were committed while she was suffering from a severe opioid addiction following the death of her partner.

After her arrest, she engaged in extensive rehabilitation and remained drug-free while on bail for over two years.

The court found that her exceptional rehabilitation, early guilty pleas, and lack of prior record justified a conditional sentence of two years less a day, rather than the penitentiary term sought by the Crown.

The accused was charged with trafficking opium, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime following an undercover police operation and the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

While the accused pleaded guilty to the direct trafficking counts, he disputed possession of 809.61 grams of opium and $1,475 in cash found in a basement bedroom.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's access to the house, his ongoing trafficking activities, and personal items in the bedroom, led to the only reasonable inference that he occupied the room and had a measure of control over the drugs.

The accused was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, but acquitted of the proceeds of crime charge regarding the $1,475 due to reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

Prior to sentencing, the court found two Charter violations regarding a wiretap intercept of a solicitor-client call and a breach of the right to counsel upon arrest, but dismissed a challenge to a strip search.

At sentencing, the court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the offences against exceptional mitigating factors, including the accused's complete reformation while on bail, his successful music career, his community service mentoring at-risk youth, and the Charter breaches.

The court concluded that a conditional sentence of two years less a day was appropriate to address denunciation and deterrence while supporting the accused's rehabilitation.

The applicant brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging that police unlawfully intercepted calls between him and his lawyers during a wiretap investigation, violating section 8 of the Charter.

The court found that while two of the three impugned calls did not violate the authorization's minimization terms, one call to the applicant's lawyer was unlawfully intercepted.

However, the court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the wiretap evidence under sections 24(1) or 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was isolated and did not impact trial fairness.

Instead, the court ordered a mandatory injunction requiring the police to implement new protocols for blocking lawyers' phone numbers upon a target's arrest.

The accused was charged with 10 counts relating to the possession of two loaded handguns and 127.75 grams of fentanyl.

The charges arose after a high-speed police chase ended in a collision, from which a man fled on foot, hiding the firearms and drugs in a nearby backyard before being arrested.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the fleeing man.

The court found that the totality of the circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, clothing, and DNA, overwhelmingly established that the accused was the man who fled the vehicle and possessed the contraband.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought pre-trial applications under ss. 276 and 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit text messages and a 31-second video recording of the alleged incident.

The text messages detailed a transactional agreement for sex negotiated on a dating app.

The court found the text messages and video recording had significant probative value regarding the issue of consent that outweighed the danger of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The applications were granted, and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial subject to specific conditions to protect the complainant's privacy.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in the home invasion robbery and murder of the victim.

Wight, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was an active participant in the severe beating, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit.

Hoo-Hing, who was found guilty of second degree murder as a secondary party for facilitating entry and assisting in the robbery plan, received a mandatory life sentence with a 13-year period of parole ineligibility.

The court also ordered the forfeiture of $18,800 seized from Hoo-Hing as proceeds of crime.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and surreptitiously making a visual recording, brought a pre-trial motion under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to admit five video tapes depicting the alleged offences.

The court found the tapes had significant probative value regarding the complainant's level of consciousness and the timing of events.

To mitigate the substantial risk to the complainant's privacy and dignity, the parties agreed to several limits, including the applicant re-electing trial by judge alone, closing the courtroom when playing the tapes, and using an agreed statement of fact.

The court ruled the tapes admissible subject to these conditions.

During deliberations in a lengthy murder trial, the jury sent several notes indicating they had reached unanimous verdicts for two accused and a unanimous verdict on a lesser included offence for the third accused, but were deadlocked on the greater offence for the third accused.

Five majority jurors sent notes attacking the reasoning of the minority jurors, including allegations of racism.

The trial judge declined to conduct an inquiry into the minority jurors' reasoning or declare a mistrial, finding that doing so would violate the common law jury secrecy rule and s. 649 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the unanimous verdicts reached by the jury.

In a trial for first-degree murder involving three co-accused, the Crown and one co-accused sought to admit text messages and prior convictions of another co-accused to establish a drug dealer-purchaser relationship and a disposition for violence and firearms.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in supporting the co-accused's defence of lack of intent outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The court provided mid-trial and final limiting instructions to the jury regarding the permissible and impermissible uses of the disposition evidence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion alleging his statement to police was obtained in violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The police delayed his access to counsel for ten hours while securing search warrants.

When finally offered a call at 2:35 a.m., the accused asked to wait until morning when his lawyer would be awake.

The police nevertheless proceeded to interview him at 4:15 a.m.

The court found the accused was reasonably diligent in exercising his rights and did not waive them.

The police violated their duty to hold off eliciting evidence, and the statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with trafficking fentanyl and possession of proceeds of crime.

During the trial, the accused brought a s. 8 Charter motion seeking to exclude drugs, money, and cell phones seized incident to arrest, arguing that a subsequent warrantless search of a co-accused's cell phone at the police station violated his rights.

The accused also brought a mistrial application alleging the trial judge improperly intervened during witness examination.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding the interventions were merely to clarify evidence.

Assuming a technical s. 8 breach occurred when police used the co-accused's phone to call the accused's phone, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the breach was minor, had little impact on privacy interests, and the evidence was reliable and essential to the prosecution.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit recently disclosed wiretap intercepts as post-offence conduct.

The intercepts allegedly captured the accused attempting to influence co-accused and witnesses to testify under the protection of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the evidence had probative value regarding consciousness of guilt, it was outweighed by significant prejudicial effects, including the need for complex jury instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the Canada Evidence Act, solicitor-client privilege, and bad character reasoning.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias, unconscious bias, and attitudes toward illegal firearms possession.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the court revised its jury selection procedures, determining that the trial judge would ask the challenge questions and pre-instruct the panel.

The court permitted revised questions on racial and unconscious bias, and allowed a narrow question regarding the jurors' ability to follow limiting instructions on the accused's admitted prior possession of illegal firearms.

However, the court rejected proposed questions inquiring into jurors' beliefs about crime rates among Black men.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 99 months.

The court found that the accused had actively evaded arrest in Central America for over four years, characterizing this pre-extradition period as defence delay.

Further deductions were made for defence-requested adjournments and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay was calculated at 24 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused brought two pre-trial motions alleging Charter violations.

The first motion alleged a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court dismissed this motion, finding that after deducting defence delay and discrete exceptional circumstances (including the COVID-19 pandemic and legislative changes to preliminary inquiries), the net delay was below the 30-month ceiling.

The second motion sought to exclude a loaded firearm under s. 24(2) due to admitted violations of ss. 7 and 10(b) during the accused's arrest.

The court dismissed this motion, concluding that the firearm was discovered independently by a civilian witness and was not obtained in a manner that infringed the accused's rights, and that its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of four counts of criminal negligence causing death and one count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm after causing a catastrophic highway collision.

The court found the accused drove on insufficient sleep, falsified log books, and was distracted by his cell phone.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors, including the extraordinary harm caused, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior criminal record and employer pressure.

The accused was sentenced to a total of 8 years imprisonment, a 10-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.