Donna Kellway

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit recently disclosed wiretap intercepts as post-offence conduct.

The intercepts allegedly captured the accused attempting to influence co-accused and witnesses to testify under the protection of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the evidence had probative value regarding consciousness of guilt, it was outweighed by significant prejudicial effects, including the need for complex jury instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the Canada Evidence Act, solicitor-client privilege, and bad character reasoning.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias, unconscious bias, and attitudes toward illegal firearms possession.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the court revised its jury selection procedures, determining that the trial judge would ask the challenge questions and pre-instruct the panel.

The court permitted revised questions on racial and unconscious bias, and allowed a narrow question regarding the jurors' ability to follow limiting instructions on the accused's admitted prior possession of illegal firearms.

However, the court rejected proposed questions inquiring into jurors' beliefs about crime rates among Black men.

The accused, awaiting trial for first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity and racial bias.

The Crown consented to the challenge but disputed the form of the questions regarding race.

The accused called expert evidence to propose new, multi-part questions to uncover racial bias.

The court rejected three purely attitudinal questions but permitted a modified version of the fourth question that incorporated the behavioural component of partiality required by law.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit two bodies of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence related to the accused's alleged prior possession of two handguns used in the homicide.

The first body of evidence consisted of cell phone photographs showing the accused with a revolver similar to one of the murder weapons.

The second body of evidence involved the accused's presence at a prior shooting where the second murder weapon was discharged.

The court ruled both bodies of evidence admissible, finding that their probative value in establishing the accused's identity and access to the murder weapons outweighed their prejudicial effect as prior discreditable conduct, subject to potential editing and admissions to limit prejudice.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after his pregnant wife drowned in a bathtub.

Because the jury's route to the verdict was ambiguous, the court was required to make findings of fact for sentencing.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused surreptitiously administered lorazepam to his wife to incapacitate her, allowing him to pursue an extramarital affair and access pornography.

The court rejected the defence theory that the victim knowingly took the drug, concluding the accused's actions directly contributed to her incapacitation and death.

The offender was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to an armed robbery committed by her son, having disposed of a sweater he wore during the crime.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while the defence requested a sentence of less than six months to preserve the offender's right to appeal a potential removal order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court applied a 1:1 credit for 157 days of pre-trial custody to avoid the draconian immigration consequences, sentencing the offender to one day in jail and 18 months of probation.