Laura Remigio

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and assault with a weapon against his stepdaughter and sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by treating the appellant's silence during a police interview as a "tacit admission" of guilt on the charges he did not explicitly deny.

This error was foundational, materially affecting the trial judge's assessment of both the appellant's and the complainant's credibility.

The court held that the right to silence, protected under s. 7 of the Charter, prohibits drawing an inference of guilt from an accused's choice to remain silent on some allegations while denying others.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed S.B.’s sentencing appeal and upheld an adult sentence for first degree murder under s. 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The majority held the Court of Appeal erred on the standard of proof by not applying beyond a reasonable doubt to rebuttal of diminished moral blameworthiness, but found no impact on outcome because the presumption was rebutted on the record and no reviewable error occurred in the accountability analysis, including treatment of social context evidence and rehabilitative potential.

Concurring judges agreed the appeal should be dismissed but disagreed that beyond a reasonable doubt is the proper standard for rebuttal under s. 72(1).

The appellant was convicted of trafficking a person under 18, procuring, advertising sexual services, and publishing child pornography, but acquitted of administering a noxious substance.

She appealed the convictions, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence of two years less a day, arguing it was demonstrably unfit for sexual offences against a child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence supported the verdicts despite the jury rejecting the complainant's drugging allegations.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the Friesen framework and that the offender's significant mental disabilities and history of exploitation constituted exceptional circumstances justifying a conditional sentence.

The procuring conviction was stayed on consent under the Kienapple principle.

The two accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences involving trafficking in firearms, cocaine, and fentanyl.

The Crown and defence agreed on the base sentences but disagreed on the extent of credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court determined the fit sentences to be 6 years for the first accused and 7 years for the second accused, then quantified the 'Duncan' credit as a 1-year reduction for each accused due to the deplorable conditions, including frequent lockdowns and overcrowding.

After applying the 1.5:1 'Summers' credit, the remaining sentences were calculated.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit recently disclosed wiretap intercepts as post-offence conduct.

The intercepts allegedly captured the accused attempting to influence co-accused and witnesses to testify under the protection of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the evidence had probative value regarding consciousness of guilt, it was outweighed by significant prejudicial effects, including the need for complex jury instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the Canada Evidence Act, solicitor-client privilege, and bad character reasoning.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias, unconscious bias, and attitudes toward illegal firearms possession.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the court revised its jury selection procedures, determining that the trial judge would ask the challenge questions and pre-instruct the panel.

The court permitted revised questions on racial and unconscious bias, and allowed a narrow question regarding the jurors' ability to follow limiting instructions on the accused's admitted prior possession of illegal firearms.

However, the court rejected proposed questions inquiring into jurors' beliefs about crime rates among Black men.

The accused, facing multiple firearm and drug charges, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial, arguing the dock would negatively impact the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the customary position of the accused is in the dock and that juries are adequately instructed on the presumption of innocence to prevent any prejudice.