Patrick Quilty

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, sought bail pending a second appeal after his first appeal to the Superior Court of Justice was dismissed.

The applicant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's participation in sexual activity prior to penetration, affecting the defence of honest mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the bail application, finding the grounds of appeal were arguable but not strong, and that the enforceability interest outweighed the reviewability interest, particularly given the seriousness of the offence and the failure of the first appeal.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on an 'over 80' charge.

The trial judge had found that the police officer lacked an objectively reasonable suspicion that the respondent had operated his vehicle within the preceding three hours when she made an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach and exclusion of the breath evidence under s. 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the circumstantial evidence of the time of driving was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.

Although the trial judge erred in her analysis of the second Grant factor by not following binding precedent, a re-weighing of the factors still supported exclusion due to the seriousness of the officer's systemic misunderstanding of her legal obligations.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The offence occurred before the enactment of Bill C-46, but the trial took place after the amendments came into effect.

The appellant argued that the presumption of identity in former s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code was no longer available in transitional cases and that the Crown was required to present expert evidence relating the breath test results back to the time of driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, following binding precedent that the presumption of identity remains available in transitional cases.

The accused was arrested for impaired care and control after police responded to a call about individuals drinking and smashing bottles in a parking lot.

A search incident to arrest revealed a loaded firearm.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), seeking to exclude the firearm and his refusal to provide a breath sample under s. 24(2).

The court found minor breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but concluded the evidence was either not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter or should not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The Crown's application to admit the accused's statements regarding his identity was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the second information, which added an impaired driving charge, was a nullity because the swearing officer relied solely on a presumption of good faith from the Crown's request rather than objective facts.

The Superior Court found that while the officer inadvertently swore a false oath, binding jurisprudence dictates the information is not a nullity.

Although the practice breached section 7 of the Charter and warranted a stay of the impaired driving charge, the remedy was moot as the appellant had been acquitted of that charge at trial.

The appeal against the over 80 conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had found a section 9 Charter breach due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest and excluded the breath samples under section 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the over 80 charge, finding the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the officer lacked reasonable grounds or why the evidence was excluded, thereby foreclosing appellate review.

A new trial was ordered for the over 80 charge, while the acquittal for impaired driving was upheld.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for an 'over 80' offence.

The trial judge had excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding two breaches of s. 10(b) because the police did not allow the respondent to call a police officer friend to get a lawyer's name, and because the police told him he could call his own lawyer, duty counsel, or no lawyer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the trial judge erred in law.

The police had no obligation to facilitate a call to a third party when the detainee did not explain the reason, and the information provided about the right to counsel was not misleading.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mgs.

At trial, the judge excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the traffic stop was arbitrary.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge relied on extraneous information regarding the arresting officer's receipt of awards for apprehending impaired drivers, which was not entered into evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on this extraneous information, as it did not meet the test for judicial notice and could have affected the assessment of the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.