Jason Bogle

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend a Mareva injunction related to an alleged $1.4 million renovation fraud.

A defendant brought a cross-motion to discharge the order against him, and a non-party sought relief from an order compelling his examination under oath.

The court extended the Mareva order, dismissed the defendant's cross-motion as premature due to missing financial disclosure, and suspended the examination order against the non-party due to lack of service and reliance on implausible hearsay evidence.

The court also provided strict directions regarding the proper use of CaseLines and hyperlinking for future attendances.

The plaintiff, an experienced private lender, brought an action against a law clerk and two lawyers for negligence, fraud, and conspiracy arising from defaulted mortgage investments.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and lacked evidentiary support.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the material facts supporting her claims well beyond the two-year limitation period.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to provide expert evidence on the standard of care for the professional negligence claims and offered no evidence to support the allegations of fraud and conspiracy.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge made a W.(D.) error in assessing credibility.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence as 'not believable' and accepted the police officer's evidence where it conflicted with the appellant's.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the credibility contest, improperly treating it as an either/or choice between the two versions of events.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Revised Amended Statement of Claim for non-compliance with the rules of pleading.

The court found that many paragraphs contained evidence or irrelevant allegations rather than material facts.

Instead of striking the pleading without leave to amend, the court conducted a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, striking the non-compliant paragraphs and assembling the remaining compliant paragraphs into a new Amended Statement of Claim, which the plaintiff was granted leave to deliver.

The defendant was successful on a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim in its entirety, with leave granted to the plaintiff to plead a claim for breach of contract.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $9,929.48.

The plaintiff, despite being unsuccessful, sought costs of $12,966.56, arguing it achieved substantial success by being granted leave to amend.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, finding no special circumstances to justify awarding costs against the successful party.

The court awarded the defendant its requested costs of $9,929.49, payable in any event of the cause.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety.

The plaintiff, a courier service, sued the defendant medical laboratory for various claims including negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract following the termination of their contract.

The court found the pleading to be a gross violation of the rules of pleading, as it contained evidence, was vague, and included untenable claims.

The court struck the Amended Statement of Claim in its entirety but granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim confined solely to a cause of action for breach of contract.

In a blended voir dire, the Crown sought to admit the accused's confessions regarding two armoured truck robberies, while the accused sought their exclusion under the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and dismissed claims of arbitrary detention and initial right to counsel breaches.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach occurred when police failed to re-advise the accused of his right to counsel after questioning shifted to a separate, earlier robbery, which significantly changed his jeopardy.

Statements regarding the earlier robbery were excluded under s. 24(2).

Following a successful motion by the plaintiff, the parties submitted written arguments regarding costs.

The defendant insurer sought costs against the plaintiff's counsel personally for allegedly unnecessary court appearances.

The court declined to award costs against counsel personally but significantly reduced the plaintiff's costs award to $1,750 due to the plaintiff's responsibility for delay and unnecessary expense.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and robbery, sought a bail review after being detained by a justice of the peace.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new plan of release constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court found no procedural unfairness or error of law in the initial hearing, noting the strong Crown case on the tertiary ground.

The court also rejected the new plan of release, finding the proposed sureties unsuitable due to evasiveness and inability to properly supervise the accused.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused brought a Garofoli application alleging a s. 8 Charter breach and seeking to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant.

As a preliminary step, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and several sub-affiant police officers regarding the Information to Obtain supporting the warrant.

The court reviewed the governing test from Garofoli and Pires and emphasized that cross-examination is permitted only where it is reasonably likely to assist in determining whether the issuing justice had sufficient grounds.

Most proposed areas of questioning were rejected as speculative, irrelevant, or risking disclosure of confidential informant identities.

Limited cross-examination was permitted on specific issues relating to informant independence, the meaning of “successful result” in relation to informant compensation, certain TPS disclosure materials, and errors in the ITO.

Two accused were charged with possession of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered drugs and alleged trafficking paraphernalia hidden throughout the unit.

Both accused denied knowledge of the drugs and asserted that a third individual, who allegedly lived in the apartment and was known by the nickname “Stinky,” was responsible.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven knowledge and possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code through circumstantial evidence, applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

Given that the drugs were concealed, not in plain view, and that multiple individuals had access to the apartment, the evidence did not establish knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the accused and supporting witness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew of the drugs or trafficking activity.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing approximately 474 grams of liquid cocaine into Canada concealed in bottles in luggage.

The offender denied knowledge of the cocaine, asserting the bottles contained honey, but the jury rejected the explanation and found knowledge or wilful blindness.

At sentencing, the court considered the applicable sentencing ranges established by the Ontario Court of Appeal for cocaine importation offences and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives.

Mitigating factors included employment, family responsibilities, and limited criminal history, while aggravating factors included planning and deception involved in concealing the drugs.

Applying the two‑to‑five‑year range for importation of approximately 500 grams of cocaine, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 2.5 years.

The two accused were stopped by police while driving in a vehicle owned by the driver.

Both were arrested for breaching their bail conditions.

During the arrest, an officer spotted the handle of a loaded handgun protruding from under a floor mat in the back seat.

The driver brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the seizure, which was dismissed as the court found the gun was in plain view.

At trial, the driver was found guilty of all firearms and breach charges, as his knowledge and control of the weapon were inferred from his ownership and control of the vehicle.

The passenger was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge and control of the firearm.

The three accused were arrested while exiting an apartment building and entering a taxi, and each was found in possession of a loaded handgun.

They brought a Charter motion alleging violations of their rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10, arguing they were unlawfully detained and searched.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and pat search based on the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area, a recent shooting, and the accused's behaviour.

The Charter motions were dismissed, the firearms were admitted into evidence, and the accused were found guilty.