David Mitchell

The accused was arrested for attempted murder and firearm offences following a shooting in downtown Toronto.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's post-arrest statements, including an 80-minute video interview, arguing breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to an unjustified three-hour delay in facilitating access to duty counsel while gunshot residue tests were conducted.

The court also found the statements were involuntary due to police threats to lay additional charges, inducements, and the 18-year-old accused's learning disabilities and physical distress.

All post-arrest statements were excluded.

The two accused were stopped by police while driving in a vehicle owned by the driver.

Both were arrested for breaching their bail conditions.

During the arrest, an officer spotted the handle of a loaded handgun protruding from under a floor mat in the back seat.

The driver brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the seizure, which was dismissed as the court found the gun was in plain view.

At trial, the driver was found guilty of all firearms and breach charges, as his knowledge and control of the weapon were inferred from his ownership and control of the vehicle.

The passenger was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge and control of the firearm.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on charges of attempted murder and overcoming resistance to the commission of an offence.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, particularly regarding the specific intent to kill, such as the nature of the weapon, the vital area of the stab wound, and the respondent's actions after the stabbing.

The application was granted, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to commit the respondent for trial on those charges.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender, appealed his 8-month sentence for sexual interference against a child and challenged the constitutionality of the 14-day mandatory minimum sentence under s. 15(1) and s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenges, finding that the mandatory minimum did not disproportionately disadvantage Aboriginal offenders in a discriminatory manner and did not create institutional bias.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to 90 days intermittent custody followed by three years' probation, citing fresh evidence of the appellant's remorse and the significant delay in the proceedings.

The appellants appealed their summary convictions and sentences arising from a group assault and robbery at a massage parlour.

Liang argued his conviction was unreasonable and his sentence unfit; his appeal was dismissed as the verdict was supported by evidence and the sentence was appropriate for a violent group attack.

Loi argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer conceded his liability without instructions.

The court found that Loi's counsel made an unauthorized concession equivalent to a guilty plea, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

Loi's appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had excluded the Intoxilyzer certificate, finding the tests were not conducted 'as soon as practicable' due to an unexplained 14-minute delay.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by treating the 'as soon as practicable' requirement as a precondition to admissibility rather than the presumption of identity, and by misinterpreting the requirement to demand an exact accounting of every minute.

A new trial was ordered.