Julie Battersby

The offender, a 29-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in carfentanil.

One of the sales resulted in the overdose death of the purchaser.

The court considered the lethal nature of carfentanil and the offender's profit motive as aggravating factors, balanced against his guilty plea, genuine remorse, and restrictive bail conditions.

The court accepted the joint submission and sentenced the offender to four years in prison, less 12 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The offenders were sentenced for their roles in the home invasion robbery and murder of the victim.

Wight, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was an active participant in the severe beating, was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit.

Hoo-Hing, who was found guilty of second degree murder as a secondary party for facilitating entry and assisting in the robbery plan, received a mandatory life sentence with a 13-year period of parole ineligibility.

The court also ordered the forfeiture of $18,800 seized from Hoo-Hing as proceeds of crime.

During deliberations in a lengthy murder trial, the jury sent several notes indicating they had reached unanimous verdicts for two accused and a unanimous verdict on a lesser included offence for the third accused, but were deadlocked on the greater offence for the third accused.

Five majority jurors sent notes attacking the reasoning of the minority jurors, including allegations of racism.

The trial judge declined to conduct an inquiry into the minority jurors' reasoning or declare a mistrial, finding that doing so would violate the common law jury secrecy rule and s. 649 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the unanimous verdicts reached by the jury.

In a trial for first-degree murder involving three co-accused, the Crown and one co-accused sought to admit text messages and prior convictions of another co-accused to establish a drug dealer-purchaser relationship and a disposition for violence and firearms.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding that its probative value in supporting the co-accused's defence of lack of intent outweighed the prejudicial effect.

The court provided mid-trial and final limiting instructions to the jury regarding the permissible and impermissible uses of the disposition evidence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion alleging his statement to police was obtained in violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The police delayed his access to counsel for ten hours while securing search warrants.

When finally offered a call at 2:35 a.m., the accused asked to wait until morning when his lawyer would be awake.

The police nevertheless proceeded to interview him at 4:15 a.m.

The court found the accused was reasonably diligent in exercising his rights and did not waive them.

The police violated their duty to hold off eliciting evidence, and the statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, applied to sit at counsel table rather than in the dock during his trial.

The court balanced the interests of a fair trial and courtroom security.

Given the accused's in-custody status, criminal record, and institutional infractions, along with the critical need for the jury to have an unobstructed view of the accused for identification purposes, the application was dismissed.

The accused struck a pedestrian with his vehicle in a strip mall parking lot following a verbal altercation and drove away without stopping.

He was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and breach of recognizance.

The court found the accused guilty of failing to stop and breach of recognizance, but acquitted him of the assault and dangerous driving charges, finding reasonable doubt as to whether the collision was intentional or if the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused sought a bail review after a justice of the peace ordered detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds in relation to multiple alleged sexual assaults and robberies against sex workers.

The applicant argued that the justice of the peace erred by undermining the presumption of innocence and misapplying the tertiary ground, and that new evidence regarding GPS or RF ankle monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that the justice of the peace properly applied the presumption of innocence and was entitled to comment on the strength of the Crown’s case.

Applying the principles from St-Cloud, the court found no error in the tertiary ground analysis and concluded that the proposed electronic monitoring did not constitute a material change affecting the detention decision.

The bail review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with 14 offences, including assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats against his former spouse.

The trial was a credibility contest between the accused and the complainant, with no independent corroborating evidence of the alleged violence.

Applying the W(D) framework, the court found that the conflicting evidence left it in a state of reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The offender pleaded guilty to sexual assault and criminal harassment after following a young woman from a bus late at night, pursuing her to her residence, and squeezing her buttocks before fleeing.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim’s age, the frightening circumstances of the stalking behaviour, and the offender’s prior criminal record including a previous sexual assault conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, supportive family, employment stability, compliance with strict bail conditions, and a psychological assessment indicating low to moderate risk manageable in the community.

Applying the proportionality principle under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code and emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court concluded the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors.

A suspended sentence with three years’ probation and ancillary orders was imposed.