Anna Tenhouse

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role as a lookout in a planned armed robbery of a drug dealer, during which an accomplice shot and killed the victim.

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence, while the defence sought less than 5 years.

The court considered the offender's lower level of culpability (objective foresight of risk), his early guilty plea, remorse, and mental health challenges.

The court also applied significant mitigation for the harsh conditions of his presentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic and the collateral consequences of his vulnerability to assault in custody due to his plea.

The offender was sentenced to 6.5 years' imprisonment before statutory credit.

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim to a friend.

The Crown conceded necessity but argued the statement lacked threshold reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found that the statement met substantive reliability based on its inherent trustworthiness, corroborated by other evidence.

The court ruled the statement admissible, noting that admitting it also served the interests of trial fairness.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and two firearms offences following a nightclub shooting, brought a motion for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown's case.

The applicant argued there was no evidence of planning and deliberation for the intended target, and no basis for liability regarding the unintended victims.

The court agreed there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, directing verdicts of second-degree murder on the homicide counts.

However, the court found sufficient evidence of co-principal liability and transferred intent to leave the charges relating to the unintended victims to the jury.

The offender, a youthful first offender, was convicted of manslaughter following a trial for the stabbing death of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 11 years' imprisonment, while amicus curiae sought time served (69 months).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the use of a concealed knife and the vulnerability of the victim, against mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years' imprisonment, less 69 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months to serve.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a fatal stabbing of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 10 years' imprisonment, while the offender sought 5 years (time served).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the offender's possession of a knife while on a weapons prohibition, against mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 7.5 years' imprisonment, less 55.5 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 34.5 months to serve.

The accused, Tyrelle Lee and Steven MacIsaac, were charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing at a park party.

A verbal altercation escalated into a physical melee, during which the deceased was chased to a hill and stabbed once in the chest by Lee.

MacIsaac was present, armed with a knife, and assisted in preventing the deceased from escaping.

The court found that while Lee caused the unlawful death, the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were found guilty of manslaughter, with MacIsaac convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting.

The applicants, charged with two counts of second-degree murder following a nightclub shooting, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence.

The police had obtained the applicants' names and contact information from their banks without a warrant, claiming exigent circumstances due to the fleeing armed suspects.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, noting the applicants had a diminished expectation of privacy in the 'tombstone' banking information.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith with an honest belief in exigent circumstances and that exclusion would significantly harm the administration of justice.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the self-represented accused brought multiple applications for a mistrial, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused alleged the judge called him a liar, favoured the Crown, withheld reasons on a Charter application, and made adverse evidentiary rulings.

The trial judge dismissed the applications, finding his actions were directed at controlling an ungovernable litigant who refused to abide by rulings, and that a fair-minded observer would not conclude there was bias.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the defence requested a jury instruction that the accused's after-the-fact conduct of attempting to collect the deceased's life insurance and death benefits had no probative value.

The Crown argued the conduct was relevant to the financial motive for the murder.

The court dismissed the defence's request, finding that the post-offence conduct was directly relevant to motive, which in turn was circumstantially relevant to the identity of the killers.

The court declined to give a 'no probative value' instruction.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found that the net delay was justified by the complexity of the case, which involved international extradition, voluminous disclosure, and significant defence-caused delays.

Furthermore, applying the transitional exceptional circumstances framework, the court determined that the delay was within the Morin guidelines and dismissed the application.

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's alleged 'high-risk' lifestyle, including his use of gay dating and fetish websites, to suggest an unknown third party committed the murder.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the evidence was extremely low and based on conjecture.

The court held that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value, as the proposed evidence relied on discredited myths and stereotypes about gay men and would distract the jury from the real issues.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce ante-mortem statements made by the deceased to demonstrate his state of mind and the accused's motive to kill.

The defence objected to the viva voce evidence of five witnesses and a Facebook thread, arguing they failed the test of necessity and were not material to motive.

The court ruled the statements admissible, finding they fell under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were not introduced for the truth of their contents.

The court also held the statements were material to establishing motive and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to minor redactions.

The accused applied for a bail review after a justice of the peace denied release.

The application relied on an alleged change in circumstances, namely the availability of a new surety.

The court accepted that the proposed surety was well-meaning but found she was unaware of the full extent of the accused’s criminal record and the allegations against him.

Given the seriousness and extreme violence alleged, the court concluded the proposed release plan failed to address the secondary ground and also engaged the tertiary ground.

The bail review application was therefore dismissed.