Richard Posner

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit murder, brought an application to exclude evidence seized during multiple warrantless searches.

The court found the warrantless entry at 10 York Street was justified by exigent circumstances to prevent a planned shooting.

The warrantless entry at 88 Harbour Street and the seizure of a vehicle breached section 8 of the Charter, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

However, the search of a bedroom at 15 Danum Road involved egregious Charter breaches, including a violation of the right to counsel and an invalid consent, leading the court to exclude the drugs and cash found there.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and two counts of assault against his wife.

The complainant alleged the offences occurred on New Year's Eve 2017 but did not report them to police until October 2018, during a marital separation and concurrent family court proceedings for sole custody of their child.

The court found the timing and circumstances of the disclosure, along with inconsistencies in the complainant's accounts, provided a powerful motive to fabricate and raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

The applicants, charged with two counts of second-degree murder following a nightclub shooting, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence.

The police had obtained the applicants' names and contact information from their banks without a warrant, claiming exigent circumstances due to the fleeing armed suspects.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, noting the applicants had a diminished expectation of privacy in the 'tombstone' banking information.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith with an honest belief in exigent circumstances and that exclusion would significantly harm the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assaulting a peace officer and attempting to disarm a peace officer.

The charges arose after police forcibly entered his home without a warrant in response to a 911 call regarding a domestic dispute.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police had reasonable alternatives to a forced entry, as required by the Godoy framework.

The court concluded the police were not acting in the lawful execution of their duties, quashed the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent after accepting expert evidence that the absence of a value for 'uncertainty of measurement' raised a reasonable doubt about the proper functioning of the approved instrument.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that uncertainty of measurement is not required by law and that speculative evidence regarding potential instrument malfunction is insufficient to constitute 'evidence tending to show' under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care or control and driving with excess alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, in exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias by preparing reasons before hearing submissions, in failing to exclude breath readings due to a s. 2(a) Charter breach involving the removal of his turban, and in rejecting his evidence of bolus drinking.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his s. 11(b) analysis, his s. 2(a) analysis, and his credibility findings regarding the appellant's bolus drinking defence.

A new trial was ordered on both counts.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from an RCMP reverse‑sting operation.

Before arraignment, the accused sought stays of proceedings alleging violations of s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay and s. 7 based on abuse of process, including allegations that police misled superiors in obtaining authorization and intentionally withheld disclosure.

The court conducted an extensive analysis of the delay from arrest in 1997 through retrial in 2014, finding that most delay was attributable to the accused, inherent time requirements, or periods when the accused was outside the jurisdiction.

The court rejected allegations that police misconduct or nondisclosure amounted to an abuse of process and concluded the reverse‑sting operation was properly authorized and executed.

Both Charter applications were dismissed and the accused was convicted.

The applicants, charged with drug offences following a warrantless search of their residence, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging breaches of their s. 7, s. 8, and s. 11(b) Charter rights.

The s. 7 claim arose from the principal police witness failing to disclose that his personal counsel was also representing one of the applicants at the preliminary inquiry.

The court found a s. 7 breach but held it did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

However, the court found that the applicants' s. 11(b) rights were violated due to an unreasonable delay of 28 months, largely stemming from the conflict of interest issue and institutional delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging his section 8 rights were violated by a warrantless search of a vehicle.

The search warrant authorized the search of a black Acura, but the police searched a dark green Honda Accord bearing the same license plate.

The court found that the make and model of the vehicle were relevant identifiers, especially since license plates are easily transferable.

The court concluded that the failure to search the vehicle specified in the warrant was a substantive defect, rendering the search warrantless.