LAW SOCIETY TRIBUNAL
HEARING DIVISION
Tribunal File No.: 25H-136, 25H-137, & 25H-138
BETWEEN:
Law Society of Ontario
Applicant
- and -
Sachin Moudgil, Victor Ryan Lacaria,
and Christina Fiorita Guadagnoli
Respondents
Before: Natalia Rodriguez (chair), Paula Callaghan, Michelle Richards
Heard: In writing
Appearances:
Owen Minns and Ellisif Harris, for the applicant
Lisa Freeman, Richard Posner, and Neil J. Perrier, for the respondents
MOUDGIL – LACARIA – GUADAGNOLI – Costs – Having earlier dismissed the Law Society’s motions for interlocutory suspension against the Paralegals as being unwarranted the panel considered the issue of costs – The motions were not based on any evidence of misconduct – The panel found the Law Society’s case was not arguable – The Law Society was ordered to pay costs to the Paralegals in the amounts of $15,000 for Mr. Moudgil, $20,000 for Mr. Lacaria and $18,000 for Ms. Guadagnoli.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON COSTS
1Natalia Rodriguez (for the panel):– In Law Society of Ontario v Moudgil, Lacaria, and Guadagnoli, 2025 ONLSTH 168, we dismissed the Law Society’s motion for an interlocutory order under s 49.27 of the Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8.
2The sole issue in these reasons is whether costs should be ordered against the Law Society and, if so, how much.
3For the reasons that follow, we conclude that costs against the Law Society are appropriate in the amounts set out in the order.
BACKGROUND AND UNDERLYING MOTION
4In its motion for an interlocutory order, the Law Society alleged that the three paralegals, Victor Lacaria, Christina Guadagnoli, and Sachin Moudgil (the Paralegals), were involved in a scheme of filing hundreds of meritless appeals of Highway Traffic Act guilty pleas to delay recording the conviction and accrual of demerit points (the Scheme). With respect to Mr. Lacaria only, the Law Society also alleged that he may have misappropriated trust funds.
5The Scheme involved a sustained pattern of guilty pleas and frivolous appeals in approximately 240 Provincial Offences Act matters. The Paralegals entered the guilty pleas; their then-employer, Ticket Justice, or a non-licensee filed appeals asserting the guilty pleas were improper. Nothing would be done to advance the appeals, and they would sit there, clogging up the system. The Scheme attempted to delay the convictions and demerit points from being recorded on the person’s driving record.
6The Paralegals’ position was that there was no evidence that they knowingly participated in the Scheme. They maintained that they were instructed by their superior, Adelin Mocanu – the principal at Ticket Justice and the alleged mastermind of the Scheme – to enter these guilty pleas on behalf of Ticket Justice clients. They were unaware of the subsequent appeals from these guilty pleas, which was the crux of the Scheme. The Paralegals argued they had done nothing wrong, as there was nothing improper about entering the guilty pleas as instructed. Mr. Lacaria denied the allegation of misappropriation and the evidence indicated the monies in question went to Mr. Mocanu, not to him.
7We concluded there was no evidence the Paralegals had any knowledge of the Scheme. This was conceded by the Law Society. There was no evidence the Paralegals ought to have known about the Scheme or that it could be said they were wilfully blind or reckless. There was also no evidence that the guilty pleas were not instructed. In each case, the court accepted the guilty pleas.
8We characterized the Law Society’s submission that the investigation could uncover evidence of these facts in the future as speculation. In our reasons, we stated that the Law Society’s evidence on the motion, at its highest, was “nothing more than mere speculation.”
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
The Paralegals
9The Paralegals were all separately represented at the motion but filed joint costs submissions.
10They submit that we should order costs against the Law Society on a full indemnity basis, meaning, on a 100% recovery basis.
11The Paralegals’ position is that the Law Society has investigated the allegations and has not uncovered any evidence that they had any knowledge of the Scheme. The Law Society has interviewed two of the Paralegals, has received written representations from all three of them, and has received and reviewed Ticket Justice client files.
12The Paralegals argue that, in each case, the Paralegals – through their counsel – told the Law Society that there was no evidence establishing their knowledge of the Scheme. Two of the three did so ahead of the hearing. They say the lack of evidence was glaring and that the Law Society ought to have known this.
13Ahead of the hearing, counsel for Mr. Moudgil cautioned that she would be seeking costs against the Law Society if it did not withdraw the “unmeritorious and unwarranted application”. Counsel for Mr. Lacaria told the Law Society its motion was “devoid of merit” and “should never have been brought.” He told the Law Society Mr. Lacaria would be seeking costs “given the unnecessary/meritless motion”. Counsel for Ms. Guadagnoli wrote to Law Society counsel after the motion was dismissed but before our reasons were released to say that the Law Society’s position was “based on speculation, conjecture and innuendo.”
14The Paralegals also argue that they offered to enter into reasonable practice restrictions to settle the motion and obviate the need for a hearing. However, the Law Society insisted on a practice restriction that would have prohibited the Paralegals from practising in Provincial Offences Court, which is the core of their practices. In their view, this restriction would have been tantamount to a suspension. By not accepting the reasonable restrictions they offered – prohibition from working on Ticket Justice matters, written instructions for guilty pleas, and supervision – the Law Society forced the Paralegals to expend significant resources to respond to a meritless motion.
15They rely on Rule 15.1(1) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Rules), which provides that costs may be awarded against the Law Society in a licensing or conduct proceeding where the proceeding was unwarranted. The Paralegals submit that this threshold has been met. They ask for full indemnity costs, or in the alternative, costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.
Law Society submissions
16The Law Society submits that there should be no costs order against it. It points to Rule 15.1(1)(b) of the Rules which limits costs awards against the Law Society to matters in which the Law Society “caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default”. The Law Society argues this is a high threshold that is not met in this case.
17In the alternative, the Law Society argues that we should apply the Tribunal’s Tariff to the time claimed by the Paralegals. Since the Paralegals did not provide dockets in support of their request for costs, we should order only a fraction of the costs requested, in accordance with the tariff rates provided in Appendix A of the Rules.
18The Law Society argues that there was unshaken evidence that the Paralegals entered the guilty pleas, which were an integral component of the Scheme. It points to correspondence showing the Paralegals were willing to consider accepting some practice restrictions to settle the motion as evidence that the Law Society’s case was not entirely without basis.
19It also argues that, although maintaining a firm stance on the motions, the Law Society was not inflexible and considered the possibility of practice restrictions instead of an interlocutory suspension.
ANALYSIS
Which standard applies under the Rules?
20Rule 15.1(1) states:
15.1 (1) Costs may only be awarded against the Law Society,
a. in a licensing, conduct, capacity, competence or non-compliance proceeding, where the proceeding was unwarranted, or where the Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default; or
b. in a proceeding not mentioned in clause (a), where the Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default.
21The first question is whether we are operating under Rule 15.1(1)(a) or 15.1(1)(b). The parties disagree on this point. The Paralegals apply the “unwarranted” standard in Rule 15.1(1)(a) in their arguments, while the Law Society submits that the standard under Rule 15.1(1)(b) applies.
22The wording of Rule 15.1(1) indicates it applies to “licensing, conduct, capacity, competence or non-compliance” proceedings. In this case, we are dealing with a motion for an interlocutory suspension or practice restrictions. The question is whether a motion for an interlocutory suspension falls within the meaning of Rule 15.1(1).
23This same question arose in Law Society of Upper Canada v Siziba, 2017 ONLSTH 114. The Law Society brought a motion for an interlocutory suspension which the licensee successfully defended. The licensee then sought costs from the Law Society arguing that the motion fell under the “unwarranted” standard, despite not being one of the enumerated types of proceedings.
24Siziba was decided under a slightly different rule relating to costs against the Law Society. At that time, the applicable rule was Rule 25.01(1), and it read as follows:
25.01(1) Costs may only be awarded against the Society,
(a) in a licensing, conduct, capacity, competence or non-compliance proceeding,
(i) where the proceeding was unwarranted; or
(ii) where the Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default; and
(b) in a proceeding not mentioned in clause (a), where the Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default.
25The panel in Siziba declined to decide the issue of whether an interlocutory suspension fell under the test set out in Rule 25.01(1)(a) or 25.01(1)(b). At paras 5-6, the panel said that under either standard, the licensee had not made out the test:
We do not have to address that jurisdictional issue, because even if the provision were available to the respondent, we have no basis on which to view the motion as unwarranted. That is a high hurdle, which the respondent would only meet by demonstrating that the Law Society acted without reasonable justification in bringing the motion. To the contrary, the Law Society brought a motion that we dismissed following a difficult analysis of the evidence before us. We had to locate the point along the spectrum of alleged conduct at which our intervention would be appropriate where criminal charges are laid against a licensee.
For similar reasons, we do not accept the respondent’s second contention, that the Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause, or to be wasted by its default. He asserts that the Law Society took “legal positions that [had] no reasonable chance of success or [continued] the proceeding once it [had] become clear that it [was] doomed to fail.”
26To determine whether a motion for an interlocutory suspension or practice restrictions falls within Rule 15.1(1), it is helpful to review the applicable principles that relate to motions for costs against the Law Society. In Law Society of Ontario v. Schulz, 2023 ONLSTA 1, the appeal panel summarized Appeal Division guidance on this issue:
10The appeal panel has summarized the general principles applicable to motions for costs against the Law Society as follows:
The cost regimes must be interpreted in a manner that recognizes and respects the Law Society’s public interest mandate and that it must not be deterred by the risk of costs from vigilantly fulfilling its mandate to protect the public interest. Further, the public interest also requires self-governing professions to publicly air serious cases, in order to maintain public confidence in the regulation of the profession.
The Law Society should not proceed to a hearing unless there is a reasonable prospect that the misconduct will be proven.
The public interest jurisdiction of the Law Society does not oust its parallel duty of procedural fairness to its members. This duty of procedural fairness has been described as involving the “very highest standard of justice.”
27What all the proceedings mentioned in Rule 15.1(1)(a) have in common is that they are originating or main proceedings: licensing, conduct, capacity, competence or non-compliance. They are the main proceeding, within which there may be one or more interlocutory decisions, such as a motion for production. It seems that the intent of Rule 15.1(1)(a) and 15.1(1)(b) is to separate main proceedings from pre-hearing or interlocutory proceedings.
28This makes sense. If a main proceeding is unwarranted, that can meet the high bar of a costs award against the Law Society. To bring a licensee into a regulatory proceeding without justification has serious consequences for that licensee. This principle is reflected in para 10(2) of Schulz: The Law Society should not proceed to a hearing unless there is a reasonable prospect that the misconduct will be proven.
29If, on the other hand, the Law Society brings a motion to, for example, quash a summons, it is the second standard that applies. There may have been no reason to bring the motion to quash a summons, but, if the Law Society did not cause costs to be “incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default”, then no costs against the Law Society will be awarded. This is because the Law Society is bringing such a motion within a conduct or other proceeding that is deemed to be warranted. It is entitled to bring motions as it needs to within the confines of that proceeding – even if the motions ultimately fail – as long as it does not cause costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted. This notion is in line with the principle set out in para 10(1) of Schulz, which speaks to respecting the Law Society’s public interest mandate and allowing it to vigilantly fulfill this mandate without being deterred by the risk of costs.
30Given this reasoning, what then of motions for interlocutory suspensions?
31Motions for interlocutory suspensions are not regular motions, in the sense that they may be untethered from an underlying “main” proceeding. In fact, there may never be a conduct application that is authorized at all with respect to the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the motion for interlocutory suspension.
32The special status of these types of motions is reflected in the Rules: there is a rule for motions (Rule 8) and a separate rule for interlocutory suspension or restriction motions (Rule 12). It is the only kind of motion with its own set of rules.
33Rule 2.3 defines “originating process” as including a “Notice of Motion – Interlocutory Suspension of Restriction.” The Rules therefore recognize this type of motion as being one that can bring a licensee in contact with the Tribunal for the first time.
34In this case, the “originating process” that first brought the Paralegals in contact with the Tribunal was the motion for an interlocutory suspension. There has been, to date, no conduct proceeding authorized in respect of the Paralegals, and there may never be. In our view, there is a good possibility that these motions will be the only proceedings in relation to these matters as against the Paralegals.
35In our view, there is no principled difference in this case between a conduct application and a motion for an interlocutory suspension in relation to Rule 15.1. That is, there is no reason why they should be treated differently for the purposes of assessing whether costs against the Law Society are appropriate. Both have the effect of bringing a licensee to the Tribunal in the first instance. Both have detrimental effects on a licensee when they are brought without “reasonable prospect” of success. Given that there may never be a conduct application in this matter, the motion effectively stands in its stead for the purposes of Rule 15.1(1)(a) and this costs motion. We treat bringing an interlocutory suspension/restriction motion as bringing a conduct (or capacity) application where there is not yet a formal application.
36Whether or not an interlocutory suspension or restriction motion in the context of an existing or expected conduct application also fits within Rule 15.1(1)(a) is not a question we need to answer. Suffice it to say that, in the context of this interlocutory motion, the standard under Rule 15.1(1)(a) applies.
The motions were unwarranted
37Under Rule 15.1(1)(a) costs may be awarded against the Law Society if the proceeding at issue is “unwarranted” or if, in the context of the proceeding, the Law Society caused “costs wasted or incurred without reasonable cause”. In Watson v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 ONLSTA 3 at para 21, the panel summarized the legal test as follows:
The Branch 1, “unwarranted proceeding” test is intended to apply to pre-hearing conduct. The case law has established a high threshold for a finding that a proceeding was unwarranted. There must be much more than a failure to prove the case. The licensee bears the onus of demonstrating that a proceeding was undertaken without justification, patently unreasonable, taken in bad faith or for a collateral purpose. Where the allegation is made that there was no reasonable basis to proceed to a hearing, that assessment will be made on the totality of the evidence available at the time the decision was made to proceed.
The Branch 2, “costs wasted or incurred without reasonable cause” test is intended to focus on in-hearing conduct, where the Law Society has caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other fault. The licensee bears the onus of identifying and proving the costs that were wasted or incurred unreasonably during the course of proceedings through some fault of the Society. Branch 2 also includes a consideration of whether initially warranted proceedings became unwarranted at some point following the commencement of the hearing.
Finally, even where a licensee satisfies either the Branch 1 or the Branch 2 test, a panel retains a residual discretion not to award costs against the Law Society based on the circumstances of the case.
38In Law Society of Upper Canada v DeMerchant, 2017 ONLSTA 5, at para 29 the Appeal Division indicated that “[a] conduct proceeding is only unwarranted if it is brought for reasons other than the Law Society’s public interest mandate or if it is doomed to fail.”
39In Law Society of Ontario v Suh, 2024 ONLSTA 20, at para 66 the Appeal Division reviewed Tribunal jurisprudence and stated,
… there are situations where the panel can and should order costs when it determines that allegations should not have been referred to a hearing. … the Law Society should assess a case for a reasonable prospect of success before proceeding with a hearing. Where the evidence establishes that the hearing was unwarranted, costs should be awarded.
40In this case, the Paralegals argue the motions for interlocutory suspensions were unwarranted, that they were doomed to fail, and that there was no reasonable basis to proceed to a hearing. The Law Society says there was some basis for proceeding to a hearing, namely, the uncontroverted fact that the Paralegals entered the guilty pleas which were the crux of the Scheme.
41In our view, the uncontroverted fact of the guilty pleas does not assist the Law Society. As the Law Society conceded at the hearing, there was nothing inherently wrong about the guilty pleas on their own. While the Law Society argued these were uninstructed guilty pleas, it then admitted there was no evidence that any client’s guilty plea was uninstructed. We are therefore left with the uncontroverted fact that there was no evidence that there was anything improper about entering the guilty pleas alone. In other words, the fact of entering the guilty pleas provides no basis for any finding of misconduct or wrongdoing. That the guilty pleas were an integral part of the Scheme is irrelevant if the guilty pleas were not improper and if the Paralegals were unaware of the Scheme, such that they were not entering the guilty pleas for the purpose of furthering the Scheme.
42The Law Society also argues that the fact the Paralegals were willing to enter into practice restrictions is evidence that the motions were not unwarranted. We disagree. There are many reasons a licensee may wish to settle a motion for an interlocutory suspension unrelated to the strength of the Law Society’s case. Even as they offered to enter into what they viewed as reasonable practice restrictions, the Paralegals continued to make clear to the Law Society that they viewed its case as speculation. The correspondence demonstrates that the Paralegals took the position that the proceedings were unwarranted.
43In our view, these motions were unwarranted. With respect to the Scheme, the motions were not based on any evidence of misconduct. Our reasons for decision make clear that we viewed the Law Society’s case as “doomed to fail.” To use the words in Watson, the proceedings were “patently unreasonable”. There was simply no reasonable prospect that the Law Society would succeed based on the evidence it presented, or lack thereof. The Law Society’s case was not arguable.
44With respect to Mr. Lacaria only, as we indicated in our reasons for decision on the motions, there was some evidence Mr. Lacaria once failed to deposit client money into a trust account. The allegation against him, however, was framed as “misappropriation”, of which there was no evidence. Even though there was some evidence of failing to deposit client monies into trust, it was thin, not serious, and wholly insufficient for any panel to conclude that an interlocutory suspension was required in those circumstances. It does not change our conclusion that every part of the motions was unwarranted and doomed to fail.
45This case is distinguishable from Suh, which was relied on by the Law Society. In that case, the Appeal Division determined that the proceedings were not unwarranted because there were credibility issues that did not come to light until the hearing was already underway. The appeal panel questioned how the Law Society could have known about the credibility issues given the evidence available to the Law Society prior to the hearing. On that basis, it overturned the hearing panel’s assessment that the proceedings were unwarranted.
46In this case, there was no live evidence at the hearing. There was no cross-examination on affidavits and no need for assessments of credibility. The hearing proceeded on a paper record and with submissions of counsel. We find that the Law Society had all necessary information prior to the hearing to realize that the proceedings were unwarranted and doomed to fail.
47We acknowledge that a finding that a proceeding was unwarranted is a high bar. However, that bar has been met in this case.
The Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted
48If we are wrong that the “unwarranted” standard applies in this case, we would also find that the Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other fault. The Paralegals have met the burden of identifying and proving that costs were wasted or incurred unreasonably during the course of proceedings through some fault of the Law Society.
49In this case, the Law Society received correspondence from counsel for two of the Paralegals ahead of the hearing of the motions. Counsel made it clear that proceeding with a hearing was unreasonable given the lack of evidence. Counsel for Mr. Lacaria told Law Society counsel in no uncertain terms what he thought of the Law Society’s case: “The Law Society’s motion is devoid of merit… I strongly urge you to abandon.” Likewise, counsel for Mr. Moudgil wrote, “I do not think the Law Society is even close to establishing that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a significant risk of harm … There is simply no evidence that my client knew about this improper scheme.”
50The Law Society also had the opportunity to settle the motions with the Paralegals’ offers of practice restrictions. These proposed restrictions should have assuaged any of the Law Society’s regulatory concerns. Inexplicably, the Law Society rejected these offers to settle and moved forward with a hearing.
51Certainly during the hearing, it ought to have been obvious to the Law Society that it had no prospect of success. As noted in our reasons, our questions to the Law Society during the hearing elicited responses that were unhelpful to its case and made it clear that the Law Society did not have any evidence of misconduct, but was instead relying on the possibility that further investigation could uncover such evidence. As noted in Watson, the “costs wasted or incurred without reasonable cause” test “includes a consideration of whether initially warranted proceedings became unwarranted at some point following the commencement of the hearing.” While we have found that the proceedings were unwarranted before the hearing, even if that were not the case, they certainly became unwarranted during the hearing, as the lack of evidence became evident.
52In Law Society of Upper Canada v Feldman, 2013 ONLSHP 51, at para 33, the panel explained what wasting costs by “other defaults” could include:
In our view, the requirement to show that the Society has caused costs to be “wasted” by “other defaults” requires costs caused by some fault on the part of the Society. Such fault could include procedural misconduct or taking legal positions that, based on existing law, were without any chance of success. There is no “wasting” of costs or “other default” in simply advancing the losing argument.
[Emphasis added.]
53In this case, and as noted in our reasons on the motion, there was no rule or common law principle that was breached by the Paralegals when they entered the guilty pleas. With respect to Mr. Lacaria, there was no evidence of misappropriation. In order to succeed on the motion, the Law Society needed to demonstrate, as a threshold issue, that there was an objective basis, grounded in credible and compelling information, to believe there is a significant risk of harm to members of the public or to the public interest in the administration of justice: Law Society of Upper Canada v Ejidike, 2016 ONLSTH 69 at para 54.
54In the absence of any evidence, it was unreasonable for the Law Society to take the position that there was such a risk and to pursue these motions. In doing so, and in failing to withdraw the motions at any point during the hearing, the Law Society caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be wasted by other default.
Conclusion
55Having found that costs may be ordered against the Law Society under branch 1, the “unwarranted proceeding” test and branch 2, the “costs wasted or incurred without reasonable cause” test, we nevertheless retain a residual discretion not to award costs against the Law Society based on the circumstances of the case.
56In our view, this is not the appropriate case to exercise our discretion to not award costs. As previously noted, a licensee should not be brought to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal without some foundation. For the Law Society to bring someone into the Tribunal process without foundation may cause that licensee unnecessary and significant reputational and other harm.
57In this case, two of the Paralegals were young, recently licensed paralegals. In the case of Mr. Moudgil, he was 21 years old at the time of the hearing of the motions and had been licensed for exactly one year. His very first position as a paralegal was with Ticket Justice. These proceedings – including the Law Society’s unfounded allegations against him – could very well follow him throughout his career.
58Given the totality of circumstances, we conclude that the Law Society should pay and the Paralegals should receive the costs of defending against this unfounded motion. We therefore order costs against the Law Society.
Quantum of costs
59The Law Society argues we should confine costs to those amounts set out in the tariff under the Rules.
60The reference to the tariff of fees is found at Rule 15.2:
15.2 When a panel awards costs, it shall consider, but is not bound by, the tariff of fees for services (Appendix A).
61While we have indeed considered these tariffs, we are not bound by them and are not limited by the fees set out therein.
62The Law Society also argues that we should not award the full amounts being sought, as they are not accompanied by dockets for work performed by the various counsel. What we have are costs outlines for all three counsel, setting out their hourly rates, a general breakdown of the fees, and the total hours spent. All three have included amounts representing full and partial recovery at various percentages.
63We agree that dockets would have been more useful. That said, the number of hours spent, the hourly rates, and the breakdown of services rendered provide a solid basis on which to assess the costs sought.
64There are various factors in determining the amount of costs, including the following:
the amount involved in the proceeding;
the complexity of the proceeding;
the importance of the issues;
the duration of the hearing;
the conduct of any party that tended to shorten or to lengthen unnecessarily the duration of the proceeding;
whether any step in the proceeding was improper, vexatious or unnecessary, or taken through mistake or excessive caution;
the ability of the party to pay a costs award;
reasonable expectations of the parties;
the costs awarded in other cases;
the principle of proportionality; and
the circumstances of the proceeding.
65Many of these issues have been canvassed already in these reasons.
66In our view, the totality of the circumstances warrants a significant costs award, including:
the Law Society’s decision to proceed with a hearing despite no evidentiary foundation;
our finding that the proceedings were doomed to fail;
the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the pre- and post-hearing communications between the parties;
the import of the proceedings on the Paralegals’ professional reputation; and
the importance of the proceedings, which involved the potential indefinite loss of livelihood for the Paralegals.
CONCLUSION
67For these reasons, we award the Paralegals’ costs against the Law Society as follows:
Mr. Moudgil: $15,000.
Mr. Lacaria: $20,000.
Ms. Guadagnoli: $18,000.
68By way of comparison, limiting costs to the tariff under the Rules based on the total hours expended by counsel, would have produced the following amounts:
Mr. Moudgil: $10,203.90.
Mr. Lacaria: $17,354.54.
Ms. Guadagnoli: $10,283.
69In our view, a costs award above the tariff amount is warranted for the reasons previously stated. We are guided by the tariff amount in concluding that the costs awarded are reasonable in all of the circumstances.
ORDER
70We therefore order as follows:
The Law Society shall pay costs to the respondent Sachin Moudgil in the amount of $15,000.
The Law Society shall pay costs to the respondent Victor Lacaria in the amount of $20,000.
The Law Society shall pay costs to the respondent Christina Guadagnoli in the amount of $18,000.
All costs shall be payable by March 30, 2026.
Interest at the rate of 4% per year will accrue on any overdue portion of these costs.
