Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 18254/TSSEA

In the matter of an appeal from a refusal to renew a Tow Operators’ Certificate and Vehicle Storage Certificate under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c.26, Sched. 3 (the “Act”).

Between:

Profix Auto Collision Inc.

Appellant

And

Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL

VICE-CHAIR: Kevin Kovalchuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Richard Posner, Counsel

For the Respondent: Patrick Moore, Counsel

Heard in writing: February 12, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Profix Auto Collision Inc. (the “appellant”) appeals from a refusal to renew its Tow Operator and Vehicle Storage Certificates issued by the Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards (the “respondent”) on January 29, 2026.

2The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the refusal order with the Licence Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) on January 30, 2026.

3On January 30, 2026, the appellant filed a Notice of Motion with attached Schedule A, requesting that the Tribunal order a stay of the decision to refuse to renew its Tow Operator and Vehicle Storage Certificates pending the appeal of this order. In its Notice of Motion, the appellant also sought an order issuing interim certificates pending appeal on such terms as the Tribunal deems just in all the circumstances.

4The Tribunal ordered that the motion be heard in writing.

5The appellant filed with this motion the affidavit of Gurdev Jammu the owner and operator of the appellant, sworn February 2, 2026, and Reply Submissions dated February 11, 2026.

6The respondent filed submissions on February 10, 2026, as well as an affidavit of Daniel Armstrong Senior Compliance Administrator in the Towing and Vehicle Storage Office of the Commercial Safety and Compliance Branch of the Ministry of Transportation, sworn February 10, 2026.

ISSUE

7The issues to be decided are:

a) Whether pursuant to section 37(3) of O. Reg. 167/23 (the “Regulation”) under the Act the Tribunal should order a stay of the decision of the Director of Towing and Storage Standards refusing to renew the Tow Certificate and Vehicle Storage Certificate of the appellant pending the appeal of its order

b) Whether the Tribunal should order the respondent to issue interim certificates on such terms as the Tribunal deems just, pending the appeal of its order.

RESULT

8For the reasons set out below, I dismiss the appellant’s motion.

ANALYSIS

The Order for a Stay of the Director’s Refusal to Issue the Certificates

9Section 37(3) of the Regulation stipulates that filing an appeal with respect to a decision of the Director of Towing and Storage Standards refusing to renew Tow Operator and Vehicle Storage Certificates under the Act does not stay the decision unless the Tribunal orders otherwise.

10It is well established that the 1994 Supreme Court of Canada decision in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 (“RJR”). sets out the test to be applied on a motion for a stay. In summary, the party seeking the stay must prove on a balance of probabilities that:

a. The appeal raises a serious issue;

b. If the stay is not granted, the party will suffer irreparable harm; and

c. The balance of convenience favours granting the stay.

11No one criteria of the three is determinative; they must be considered cumulatively on the question of whether the justice of the case merits or does not merit a stay.

12I will consider these factors below in light of the evidence, submissions and the case law submitted by both parties.

Is There a Serious Issue to be Tried?

13I find that there are serious issues to be tried.

14The Supreme Court in RJR at pages 337 and 338, has stated that: “There are no specific requirements which must be met to satisfy this test. The threshold is a low one … Once satisfied that the application is neither vexatious or frivolous, the motion judge should proceed to consider the second and third tests even if of the opinion that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed at trial. A prolonged examination of the merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable.”

15The appellant submits that its pending appeal raises very real and serious triable factual and legal issues because the pending appeal is de novo in nature and that the allegations that underpin the respondent’s decision have not been tested in any forum, and that the refusal to renew the certificates is a “draconian sanction”.

16The respondent submits that no serious issue has been raised by the appellant. However, it also submits that the affidavit of Daniel Armstrong, filed, deposes that the appellant and its drivers have been convicted 45 times of violations of the Act as well as the Highway Traffic Act R.S.O. 1990, c.H.8 (the “HTA”) between February 12, 2024, and February 11, 2026.

17I am sensitive to the appellant’s submissions that it seeks to defend its interests in relation to the allegations contained in the respondent’s decision. However, I am persuaded by the respondent’s submissions that the respondent’s decision is founded on the appellant’s safety performance and contraventions of the HTA and the Act and its regulations.

18I have reviewed the grounds for appeal. I find that they are neither frivolous or vexatious or doomed to fail. As a result, I find that there are serious issues to be determined on the appeal.

19It is not for me to determine whether the appeal is likely to succeed or not. As the Supreme Court of Canada has observed unless I find that the case on its merits is frivolous or vexatious I must as a general rule consider the second and third branches of the test.

20I therefore find that this branch of the test has been met by the appellants.

Irreparable Harm

21I find that the appellant has not established that there is significant risk of it experiencing irreparable harm if a stay is not granted.

22The appellant submits that “a suspension will cause irreparable harm to the [appellant’s] business, and many jobs will be lost”.

23The respondent relies on the case of Sazant v. College of Physicians and Surgeons (Ontario), 2011 CarswellOnt 15914 (Ont. CA) where LaForme J.A. states: “evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative, and it must be supported by evidence that [the appellant], would suffer it.”

24I take guidance from the Sazant decision that evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and not speculative and must be supported by evidence. I find the appellant has not provided any specific evidence of irreparable harm. In his affidavit Gurdev Jammu does not provide any documentary or other evidence to support how his business is being affected by the respondent’s refusal to issue the certificates at issue. He simply deposes that his trucks are parked, that he is not operating his business, that he cannot pay his drivers or operating expenses and that his business will close permanently if he is not granted “an interim certificate”. The appellant did not quantify or describe the extent of his financial losses.

25I find that the appellant has not met its onus in demonstrating that not granting a stay will result in irreparable harm to the appellant.

The Balance of Convenience

26I find that the balance of convenience favours a denial of the stay.

27The final element of the RJR test requires me to balance the interests of the appellants against the public interest. The public interest includes consumer protection as well as public confidence in the regulatory process.

28The appellant submits that this branch of the test requires the Tribunal to weigh the interests of the appellant against the public interest.

29The appellant submits that “the interests of justice and the balance of convenience conclusively weigh in the applicant’s favour”. The appellant submits that the towing company has operated for a number of years and that the appellant has hired a safety compliance consultant before the refusal to renew was issued to ensure that the appellant is completely compliant and entirely safe.

30In his affidavit, Mr. Jammu deposes that in December of 2025, he hired Raj Walia of Trux Solutions as a safety and compliance consultant. Mr. Jammu also deposed that, at Mr. Walia’s suggestion, he hired Ubaid Khan who is now the appellant’s in-house safety and compliance officer. However, the appellant has not submitted any evidence as to what steps that either Mr. Walia or Mr. Khan are taking, or will take, to keep road users safe in the course of the appellant’s intended business operations.

31The respondent relies upon the case of GFL Environmental Inc. v Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 2014 ONSC 2728 (Div. Ct.) (“GFL”) where the court stated at paragraph 46: “Turning now to the balance of convenience , in RJR-Macdonald the Supreme Court accepted that public authorities will suffer irreparable harm if their regulatory authority is interfered with and that thus in cases involving a public authority, it will be necessary to balance the irreparable harm suffered by the party seeking a stay with the inevitable irreparable harm suffered by the public authority”.

32The respondent also submits that the public interest, in particular highway safety, outweighs any harm to the appellant by refusing a stay.

33I find that the respondent will suffer irreparable harm if its regulatory authority is interfered with, as it is in the best position to regulate towing and storage under the Act. I find that public confidence in the respondent should be maintained and take guidance from the Divisional Court in the GFL case that inevitable harm will be suffered by a public authority if a stay is granted.

34I find that harm to the public interest, in particular highway safety, outweighs any harm to the appellant by refusing to grant the stay. It is unclear what steps the appellant will take to ensure that public road users will be safe from the appellant’s drivers. However, if a stay is granted and the appellant does not take steps to ensure that public road users will be safe if the appellant is permitted to continue operations pending the appeal, the harm to public road users could be significant given the appellants apparent record of contraventions of the HTA and the Act. The fact that the appellant’s latest contravention occurred on February 11, 2026, (less than seven weeks ago), causes me to be concerned about the efficacy of the steps that Mr. Jammu deposes he has taken to keep road users safe.

35Because I find that the public interest, in particular highway safety, outweighs the interest of the appellant in obtaining a stay of the decision of the respondent, I therefore find that this branch of the test has not been met by the appellant.

Conclusion

36Considering all of the RJR factors above as well as the evidence and submissions of both parties I find that the appellant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that it meets the test for a stay of the Decision as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in RJR.

Does the Tribunal have jurisdiction to order the respondent to issue interim certificates on such terms as the Tribunal deems just, pending the appeal of its order?

37The appellant submits that section 3 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999 (“LAT Act”) provides the Tribunal with such powers as are “necessary and expedient to carry out its duties”. The appellant submits that a straightforward and common sense reading of s. 3 strongly suggests that the Tribunal has the authority to order the Director of Towing and Vehicle Storage Standards (the “Director”) to issue interim certification.

38The respondent submits that the Tribunal has only the authorities granted to it by statute or regulation. The respondent further submits that the powers granted to the Tribunal in respect of decisions under the Act are found in subsection 37(3) and (4) of Ontario Regulation 167/23 which states:

37(3) Despite the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the filing of an appeal under subsection (1) does not stay the decision, unless the Licence Appeal Tribunal orders otherwise.

(4) The Licence Appeal Tribunal may confirm, modify or set aside the decision of the Director.

39The respondent submits that the only interim order that the Tribunal can make is a stay order under subsection 37(3). It further submits that section 37 does not provide the Tribunal with the power to make an interim order issuing certification where there has been a refusal to issue or renew certification.

40The respondent relies upon this Tribunal’s decision in Ontario Line Clearing & Tree Services 2010 Ltd. (Re) [2012] OLATD No.159 (“Line Clearing”).

41In the Line Clearing case, the Tribunal considered an appeal under the HTA from an order of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to issue a Commercial Vehicle Operator’s Registration (“CVOR”). The applicant in that case brought a motion for an order from the Tribunal that it be allowed to operate until such time as the matter was finally disposed of by the Tribunal.

42In the Line Clearing case the Tribunal stated at paragraphs 6-7: “The right of appeal … is by way of s. 50 of the [HTA]. Pursuant to s. 50(2) the Tribunal may ‘confirm modify or set aside the decision of … the Registrar”. “For the Tribunal, at this stage of the regulatory proceedings, to order the issuance of the certificate it would effectively be usurping the authority of the registrar in a regulatory regime. There is no jurisdiction to do so. Further, even if there was jurisdiction, there was no evidence before it on which to base any such decision.”

43While not bound by previous decisions of the Tribunal, I take guidance from Line Clearing since it deals with a similar right of appeal to the one in this case. I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction on a motion to order the respondent to order interim certificates on terms and that by doing so it would be usurping the authority of the respondent.

44In my view, a full hearing is required in order to have a more fulsome record on which to base a decision.

ORDER

45For the reasons set out above I dismiss the appellant’s motion for a stay of the respondent’s refusal to issue the Tow Operator and Vehicle Storage Certificates.

46For the reasons set out above I dismiss the appellant’s motion for an order that the respondent issue interim certificates on such terms as the Tribunal deems just, pending the appeal of the respondent’s order.