Stephen Byrne

The offender pleaded guilty to attempted murder after shooting a stranger multiple times at point-blank range during a public celebration in downtown Toronto.

The court considered the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and difficult background as mitigating factors, balanced against the extreme violence and public danger of the offence.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, reduced by 18 months for exceptionally harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, and declined to order delayed parole.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and cocaine, and multiple counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences.

The charges arose from a police investigation into two other individuals, during which the accused was observed associating with them and visiting a storage locker and driving a vehicle where drugs and guns were found in secret traps.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought an application for a directed verdict.

The court granted the application and discharged the accused on all counts, finding there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and guns, or that he was part of a conspiracy.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter challenging tracking warrants and telewarrants executed on a vehicle and his temporary residence.

The court found the tracking warrants and the telewarrant for the vehicle were validly issued, and a minor post-seizure reporting breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence found in the vehicle under s. 24(2).

However, the court found there were insufficient grounds to issue the telewarrant for the residence, constituting a serious Charter breach, and excluded the evidence seized from the residence.

The accused was tried for trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following a major drug investigation involving intercepted cell phone communications.

The Crown relied on expert evidence to interpret guarded language and slang used by the accused and others to establish that the drug being trafficked was cocaine.

The court accepted the expert's opinion that terms like 'half B' and specific pricing structures referred exclusively to cocaine, rejecting the defence argument that the communications could have been about marijuana.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The offender was convicted by a jury of robbery arising from a violent street attack against a stranger in which the victim was punched and robbed of personal property.

The court considered aggravating factors including the random and brutal nature of the assault and the lasting psychological harm to the victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s status as a first offender, Indigenous background considered under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, and personal rehabilitation efforts.

Applying the principles from Gladue and Ipeelee, the court imposed a custodial sentence at the low end of the range and credited the offender for pre‑sentence custody and lengthy strict house arrest.

After credit, the remaining custodial term was ordered to be served intermittently with a probation order and ancillary orders.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision granting bail to a young person committed for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued that under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and the Criminal Code, only a superior court judge has jurisdiction to grant bail once a young person is committed for trial on a section 469 offence.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the term 'proceeding' in sections 13(2) and 13(3) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act encompasses bail applications, and that the superior court has exclusive jurisdiction over bail once the young person is deemed to have elected trial by judge and jury.

The provincial court judge's decision was quashed, and the young person was ordered into custody pending a proper bail hearing before a superior court judge.

The accused was charged with four counts of possessing explosive substances and one count of counselling mischief not committed, arising from his activities prior to the G20 Summit in Toronto.

Police found various chemicals and laboratory equipment in his home, which the Crown alleged were intended to make explosive substances.

The accused maintained the chemicals were for innocent purposes, including amateur rocketry, gardening, and testing the security system.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to create explosive substances, accepting that his interest in rocketry and other hobbies raised a reasonable doubt.

On the counselling charge, the court found the accused's tweets about design flaws in the G20 security fence merely described how mischief could be committed but did not actively induce or advocate the commission of the offence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused brought a global application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence obtained during the investigation, including chemicals and equipment seized from his home pursuant to valid search warrants.

The court found multiple Charter breaches throughout the investigation, including arbitrary detention, right to counsel violations, and search and seizure violations.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was not in bad faith or part of a systemic disregard for Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, arrested in relation to the G20 summit, was interviewed by intelligence officers before being permitted to speak to counsel, resulting in a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

He subsequently gave two videotaped statements to an investigating detective.

The court held that the first videotaped statement was not tainted by the earlier Charter breach and was voluntary, despite a breach of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for failing to bring him before a justice within 24 hours.

However, the court found that a portion of the second videotaped statement was involuntary and inadmissible because the detective offered a quid pro quo regarding bail for the accused's wife and created oppressive circumstances by suggesting the accused was being investigated by national security forces.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found on computers seized from his residence, arguing his s. 8 rights were infringed.

The search warrants authorized a search of computers for records relating to the production of explosives but did not expressly authorize the seizure of the computers.

The police seized the computers and searched the entire hard drives off-site.

The court found that the seizure of the computers violated s. 8, as the police could not rely on the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court held that the cursory search of the entire hard drives was reasonable and not overbroad.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had little impact on the accused's protected interests, and the evidence was reliable and important to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.