Joseph Di Luca

The applicants challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at an apartment where firearms and drugs were found, arguing inadequate disclosure and failure to comply with the Criminal Code requirements for a nighttime search.

The court found the warrant presumptively invalid due to the failure to request a nighttime search under s. 488 of the Criminal Code.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court admitted the evidence, concluding the breach was technical, had no practical impact on the applicants' rights, and excluding the evidence would undermine the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The accused was charged with four counts of possessing explosive substances and one count of counselling mischief not committed, arising from his activities prior to the G20 Summit in Toronto.

Police found various chemicals and laboratory equipment in his home, which the Crown alleged were intended to make explosive substances.

The accused maintained the chemicals were for innocent purposes, including amateur rocketry, gardening, and testing the security system.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to create explosive substances, accepting that his interest in rocketry and other hobbies raised a reasonable doubt.

On the counselling charge, the court found the accused's tweets about design flaws in the G20 security fence merely described how mischief could be committed but did not actively induce or advocate the commission of the offence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused brought a global application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence obtained during the investigation, including chemicals and equipment seized from his home pursuant to valid search warrants.

The court found multiple Charter breaches throughout the investigation, including arbitrary detention, right to counsel violations, and search and seizure violations.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was not in bad faith or part of a systemic disregard for Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found on computers seized from his residence, arguing his s. 8 rights were infringed.

The search warrants authorized a search of computers for records relating to the production of explosives but did not expressly authorize the seizure of the computers.

The police seized the computers and searched the entire hard drives off-site.

The court found that the seizure of the computers violated s. 8, as the police could not rely on the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court held that the cursory search of the entire hard drives was reasonable and not overbroad.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had little impact on the accused's protected interests, and the evidence was reliable and important to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

In a criminal proceeding, the defence sought exclusion under section 24(2) of Charter evidence obtained through production orders for credit-card and phone records.

After Garofoli-related excisions and limited amplification, the court held the information to obtain did not support the TD Visa production order and found a section 8 breach for those records.

Applying R. v. Grant, the court found good-faith state conduct and a moderate informational-privacy impact, while emphasizing the reliability and trial importance of the records.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court declined to exclude the Visa records.

The defence exclusion application was dismissed, subject to the broader global section 24(2) ruling.

The accused, arrested in relation to the G20 summit, was interviewed by intelligence officers before being permitted to speak to counsel, resulting in a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

He subsequently gave two videotaped statements to an investigating detective.

The court held that the first videotaped statement was not tainted by the earlier Charter breach and was voluntary, despite a breach of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for failing to bring him before a justice within 24 hours.

However, the court found that a portion of the second videotaped statement was involuntary and inadmissible because the detective offered a quid pro quo regarding bail for the accused's wife and created oppressive circumstances by suggesting the accused was being investigated by national security forces.

The accused challenged the facial validity of two search warrants executed at his residence following a Garofoli ruling that some offences listed in the warrants were unsupported by the Information to Obtain.

The accused argued that the entire warrants must be quashed because the unsupported offences rendered the warrants invalid and could not be cured by severance.

The Crown submitted that the unsupported portions could be severed, leaving valid authorizations.

The court reviewed the doctrine of severability in the context of search warrants and held that where the invalid portions are clearly separable and not vital to the authorization, they may be excised without invalidating the remainder.

The court concluded that the unsupported offences and related items could be severed and that the remaining portions of the warrants constituted valid authorizations.

The accused brought a Charter s. 8 application following a Garofoli review seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants executed at his residence.

The court addressed two reserved issues: whether the Information to Obtain properly supported a charge of intimidation of a justice system participant by “watching” police officers, and whether computers were properly included as items to be searched in a second warrant.

The court held that public online posts concerning dismantling G20 security fencing, combined with derogatory postings of police photographs, could reasonably support an inference that the accused intended to provoke fear in the general public.

The court further held that the discovery of chemical precursors, laboratory equipment, documents, and the accused’s extensive internet use provided reasonable grounds to search computers for records relating to the production of explosives.

The warrants were therefore properly supported.