Laskin

The plaintiff was injured when she fell off an elevated dance floor at a nightclub.

She sued the nightclub, but later learned during discoveries that the landlord may have been involved in renovating the dance floor.

She subsequently sued the landlord, who moved for summary judgment arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The motion judge found the claim was not discoverable until the discovery of the nightclub's representative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the landlord's appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the plaintiff had not shown a lack of diligence in investigating the claim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The convictions rested primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who had pleaded guilty but had not yet been sentenced.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to exercise necessary caution in accepting the accomplice's evidence and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the accomplice's subsequent sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it lacked cogency, and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness and made no reversible error in assessing credibility.

The appellants' son, a British soldier, was killed in a helicopter crash in Afghanistan.

The appellants brought a negligence action in the Ontario Superior Court against the federal Crown and others.

The motion judge struck the claim against the federal Crown for lack of jurisdiction under s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, finding the claim arose in Afghanistan.

On appeal, the appellants argued the 'real and substantial connection' test should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific statutory language of s. 21(1) governs and the substance of the claim arose in Afghanistan.

The appellants appealed their convictions for various firearms offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in identifying them from video surveillance footage, ignoring the lack of evidence from a search warrant, rejecting exculpatory witness testimony, and finding that the objects they carried were loaded restricted firearms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the principles for video identification, adequately considered the search warrant evidence, reasonably assessed witness credibility, and drew a logical inference that the firearms were loaded given the circumstances of the altercation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

The appellant School Board appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's finding that it failed to accommodate the respondent employee's disability and ordering her reinstatement.

The employee had developed a psychiatric impairment due to the stress of her position and was unable to return to her previous role.

The Tribunal found that the School Board failed to accommodate her by not placing her in available alternative positions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decisions on both liability and the remedy of reinstatement were reasonable and entitled to deference.

In 1931, the respondent's predecessor conveyed land to the appellant's predecessors solely for gravel extraction, with an agreement granting a 'first option to purchase' the land for $1.00 once all gravel was removed.

The appellant brought an application to declare the agreement void under the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the agreement created a right of first refusal rather than an interest in land.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the true intent of the parties was to create an option to repurchase, which gave rise to an immediate equitable interest in the land.

Because the option was not exercised within the perpetuity period, it was declared void.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police found 50 marijuana plants in her car trunk during a search incident to arrest.

The trial judge found that the police violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights by conducting a dangerous, masked takedown at gunpoint, and violated her s. 10(b) rights by failing to fully inform her of her right to counsel and delaying her access to counsel for over five hours.

The trial judge also found the arresting officers lied under oath, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in concluding that Charter breaches occurring after the discovery of evidence could not satisfy the 'obtained in a manner' requirement of s. 24(2).

The Court reassessed the Grant factors, found the breaches to be extremely serious, and excluded the evidence, entering an acquittal.

The appellants sought to appeal an October 1 order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order in question was interlocutory.

Under the Courts of Justice Act, the Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of interlocutory orders.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction with no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation claims for failure to comply with the notice provision in s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants had sent a notice to the respondent newspaper regarding articles that alleged the appellants fabricated criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider the notice in the context of all surrounding circumstances.

The Court held that the notice sufficiently conveyed the essence of the matter complained of, allowing the respondents to take appropriate steps to mitigate damages.

The appellant retained a motor carrier to transport cargo, which was subsequently destroyed in a collision.

After obtaining a default judgment against the carrier for the full value of the cargo, the appellant sought payment from the carrier's insurer under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The insurer denied coverage, alleging the carrier made a material misrepresentation on its insurance application regarding contracts superseding its standard bill of lading.

The application judge agreed and voided the policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer failed to prove a misrepresentation because it never produced the carrier's standard bill of lading into evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding an oral contract for a condominium.

The appellants argued the contract was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, void for illegality due to alleged tax avoidance, and that the amount owing should be reduced under the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that part performance took the contract out of the Statute of Frauds, the contract was not illegal on its face, and the limitation period defence was not properly raised.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal varied the judgment to remove the Banyan defendants, leaving the judgment solely against the remaining corporate defendant.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $2,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for unpaid structural consulting services.

The motion judge's endorsement merely stated that there was no genuine issue for trial, without providing any factual findings or legal analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reasons were so deficient that they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The court declined to decide the summary judgment motion itself due to unresolved factual disputes and directed the parties to seek an expedited hearing on the merits.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its action for unpaid legal fees under a contingency fee retainer agreement.

The client had accepted the law firm's repudiation of the agreement and directed the firm to take no further steps.

The Court of Appeal held that by accepting the repudiation and directing the firm to stop work, the client cancelled the services within the meaning of the agreement's termination provision, thereby becoming liable to pay the value of services performed to date.

The appeal was allowed and judgment granted for the law firm.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing in an apartment building.

On appeal, he argued that the eyewitness identification was irredeemably flawed and tainted by the witness's own investigation and improper police video identification procedures, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

He also challenged the jury instructions on identification evidence, the lack of a W. (D.) instruction regarding a witness's testimony, and the instruction on the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification evidence, when combined with strong circumstantial evidence including elevator security footage and phone records, reasonably supported the conviction.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.