Melanie de Wit

Application by Syl Apps Youth Centre and Dr. Rod Evans for a 180-day extension of secure treatment commitment for a 17-year-old with complex mental health diagnoses and severe self-harming behaviors.

The respondent opposed the extension, arguing that no appropriate plan for care upon release had been established.

The court granted the extension, finding that while the plan lacked specificity and detail, it was reasonable given the circumstances, including the child's complex needs, limited community resources, and the strong planning process and contingency plans in place.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a psychiatrist’s finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic and related medications.

The appeal concerned the statutory test for incapacity under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act and whether the Board’s findings were reasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held the Board reasonably concluded that the patient could not understand relevant treatment information or appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment due to a mental disorder.

The Board was entitled to rely on the psychiatrist’s evidence and aspects of the patient’s testimony demonstrating lack of insight into the illness.

No basis existed for judicial interference.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on ethnic origin and disability against a police services board and a hospital.

The applicant missed a connecting flight, exhibited unusual behaviour, and was arrested by police for public intoxication and assaulting an officer.

He was subsequently taken to a hospital where he underwent an involuntary psychiatric assessment.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found no evidence that the decisions of the police officers or the doctor were based on discriminatory stereotypes or prejudices rather than the applicant's own conduct.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the decision not to transfer him from a Medium Secure Unit to a General Unit was unreasonable and that the Board failed to recognize a treatment impasse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions reasonable based on evidence that the appellant refused to cooperate with programs and continued to demonstrate delusions.

The Court noted the upcoming annual review would assess any progress or need for an independent assessment.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found NCR for First Degree Murder and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, stopped taking his medication and his mental health deteriorated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant lacked insight into his illness and could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit, arguing it was inappropriately restrictive and he should have been placed in a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal applied the standard of review from R. v. Owen and found the disposition was not unreasonable, as the Board did not misapprehend evidence or make unsupported material findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him from Ontario Shores to Waypoint.

The appellant conceded he represented a significant threat to public safety and required a custodial order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to transfer the appellant was reasonable, based on the correct legal test, and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety.

The Court also found the Board's decision to detain the appellant on a secure unit rather than a general unit or via a hybrid order was reasonable given concerns about her risk of going AWOL and assaultive behaviour.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant chose not to attend the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a minimum security facility.

She sought an absolute discharge or unsupervised community access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant posed a danger to the public and that the disposition was the least onerous and least restrictive option.

Fresh evidence regarding the appellant's absence without leave and refusal to take medication was admitted but ultimately supported the Board's decision.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a medical negligence action arising from the death of a patient in hospital.

The plaintiffs commenced the action more than two years after the deceased’s death and argued that discoverability and fraudulent concealment should extend the limitation period because the alleged negligence was not discovered immediately.

The court held that s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act imposes a strict two‑year limitation period running from the date of death with no discoverability exception.

As the action was commenced outside that period, the estate’s claim was statute‑barred.

The derivative claims under the Family Law Act were also barred.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order lifting a stay of the plaintiff's constructive dismissal action.

The defendants argued the action was barred because the Public Hospitals Act provides a comprehensive code for disputes over hospital privileges.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the motion judge's conclusion that the hospital failed to demonstrate the decision to substantially alter the plaintiff's privileges was made pursuant to the Act or hospital by-laws.

A physician brought a motion to lift a stay of a civil action alleging constructive dismissal against a hospital and department head.

The defendants argued that disputes concerning revocation or alteration of hospital privileges must be resolved through the statutory review and appeal process under the Public Hospitals Act, which provides a comprehensive code for such matters.

The court held that although the impugned “double coverage” scheduling requirement may have substantially altered the physician’s hospital privileges, the evidentiary record did not establish that the decision was made under the hospital’s bylaws as required to trigger the statutory appeal regime.

Because the hospital bylaws were not before the court, the court could not conclude that the statutory process applied.

The stay was therefore lifted and the constructive dismissal action was permitted to proceed.