Laskin

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their defamation claims for failure to comply with the notice provision in s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants had sent a notice to the respondent newspaper regarding articles that alleged the appellants fabricated criminal charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider the notice in the context of all surrounding circumstances.

The Court held that the notice sufficiently conveyed the essence of the matter complained of, allowing the respondents to take appropriate steps to mitigate damages.

The appellant retained a motor carrier to transport cargo, which was subsequently destroyed in a collision.

After obtaining a default judgment against the carrier for the full value of the cargo, the appellant sought payment from the carrier's insurer under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act.

The insurer denied coverage, alleging the carrier made a material misrepresentation on its insurance application regarding contracts superseding its standard bill of lading.

The application judge agreed and voided the policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer failed to prove a misrepresentation because it never produced the carrier's standard bill of lading into evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding an oral contract for a condominium.

The appellants argued the contract was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, void for illegality due to alleged tax avoidance, and that the amount owing should be reduced under the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that part performance took the contract out of the Statute of Frauds, the contract was not illegal on its face, and the limitation period defence was not properly raised.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal varied the judgment to remove the Banyan defendants, leaving the judgment solely against the remaining corporate defendant.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $2,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for unpaid structural consulting services.

The motion judge's endorsement merely stated that there was no genuine issue for trial, without providing any factual findings or legal analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reasons were so deficient that they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The court declined to decide the summary judgment motion itself due to unresolved factual disputes and directed the parties to seek an expedited hearing on the merits.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its action for unpaid legal fees under a contingency fee retainer agreement.

The client had accepted the law firm's repudiation of the agreement and directed the firm to take no further steps.

The Court of Appeal held that by accepting the repudiation and directing the firm to stop work, the client cancelled the services within the meaning of the agreement's termination provision, thereby becoming liable to pay the value of services performed to date.

The appeal was allowed and judgment granted for the law firm.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing in an apartment building.

On appeal, he argued that the eyewitness identification was irredeemably flawed and tainted by the witness's own investigation and improper police video identification procedures, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

He also challenged the jury instructions on identification evidence, the lack of a W. (D.) instruction regarding a witness's testimony, and the instruction on the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification evidence, when combined with strong circumstantial evidence including elevator security footage and phone records, reasonably supported the conviction.

The court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The appellant, a secondary insurer, paid for a claimant's expensive prescription drug after the respondent, the primary insurer, denied coverage.

The appellant later sued the respondent for reimbursement.

The motion judge found the appellant's claim was partially statute-barred because it was discovered when the appellant first learned of the denial in October 2009.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the appellant could not have reasonably discovered its claim until the respondent finally produced the policy wording in September 2011.

The appeal was allowed and the respondent was ordered to fully reimburse the appellant.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and sought to introduce fresh evidence, arguing their failure to file defending material was their lawyer's fault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding that the appellants' failure to comply with numerous court orders was due to their own intransigence.

The court agreed with the motion judge that this was one of the rare cases where striking a statement of defence was appropriate.

The appellant appealed a committal order made pursuant to section 49 of the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The applicant sought judicial review of a surrender order made by the Minister of Justice under the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the applicant's bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for judicial review as abandoned.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The parties cohabited for over thirteen years and jointly operated motel properties.

Following their separation, the trial judge awarded the respondent a half interest in the properties based on a joint family venture and unjust enrichment, as well as compensation for unaccounted joint account withdrawals.

The appellant appealed, arguing the properties were held on a resulting trust and disputing the financial contributions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusions regarding the joint family venture, equal contributions, and the accounting of joint funds.

The appellant was convicted of importing narcotics after a 26-month delay between his arrest and trial.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The appellant contended that the 15.5-month delay caused by his efforts to retain counsel of choice, exacerbated by Legal Aid Ontario's refusal to transfer his certificate, should be characterized as institutional or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was part of the inherent time requirements of the case and that a s. 11(b) application is not the proper forum to review the reasonableness of Legal Aid Ontario's decisions.