Laskin

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for his participation in a robbery where a co-assailant shot and killed the victim.

The trial judge sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, treating the use of a firearm as an aggravating factor despite the mandatory minimum under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation and held that his failure to cooperate with police was not an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the sentence to six years' imprisonment, balancing the aggravating circumstances of the robbery with the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee and discriminated against her based on family status.

Upon returning from maternity leave, the respondent was demoted, had her hours reduced, and faced reprisals when she objected, culminating in her termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no just cause for dismissal, the 12-month notice period was reasonable, and the $20,000 human rights damages award for family status discrimination was justified.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on unlawful confinement as a basis for first-degree murder, and in relating the evidence of his intoxication and cocaine withdrawal to the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial restraint of the victim was a distinct act from the subsequent killing, and that the trial judge's instructions on intent and the evidence were adequate.

The appellant, found NCR in 2007, appealed an Ontario Review Board order transferring him from a general forensic unit to a secure forensic unit.

The hospital recommended the transfer because the appellant's repeated breaches of the anti-smoking policy and drug use resulted in the suspension of his indirectly supervised passes, making his detention on the general unit more restrictive due to staffing limitations.

The secure unit offered better access to necessary substance abuse programming.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition reasonable as it would enhance the appellant's rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how intoxication relates to planning and deliberation, and unfairly commented on the defence toxicologist's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions contained all essential legal elements and properly directed the jury to consider intoxication separately for intent and for planning and deliberation.

The court also found the trial judge's comments on the expert evidence were supported by the record and not objected to by trial counsel.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a sawed-off shotgun on a public street.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission for a conditional sentence, finding it woefully inadequate and imposing a custodial sentence instead.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, agreeing that possession of deadly prohibited firearms requires a denunciatory sentence.

The appeal was allowed only to vary the terms of the s. 109 prohibition order to clarify the lifetime prohibition.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.

Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after the respondent's counsel made improper comments during his closing address, by giving an inadequate correcting instruction, by allowing an expert to testify beyond his report, and by refusing to order an assignment of statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's correcting instruction adequately addressed the improper comments, the evidentiary ruling was fair, and the appellant failed to prove the jury's future care award mirrored the respondent's uncertain accident benefits entitlement.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

The accused was charged with driving over 80.

Upon arrest, the police informed him of his right to counsel.

When asked if he wanted to call a lawyer, the accused replied, 'No, not right now.' He subsequently provided breath samples at the police station without requesting to speak to counsel.

The trial judge found no violation of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, concluding he had not invoked his right to counsel, and convicted him.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the accused did not unequivocally waive his right to counsel.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the issue of waiver only arises after a detainee has invoked their right to counsel.

The trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the accused had not invoked his rights.

The appellant landlord appealed a motion judge's decision deducting an amount from its claimed relief for a defaulting tenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord provided unchallenged evidence of hiring a commercial real estate agent to re-let the premises, thereby taking reasonable steps to mitigate its loss.

The judgment was varied to award the full amount claimed.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits well beyond the policy's time limits.

The appellant insurer denied the claim and moved for summary judgment.

The motion judge granted the respondent relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding minimal prejudice to the insurer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the motion judge reasonably applied the three-part test for relief from forfeiture given the abundance of medical information available and the insurer's failure to request independent assessments.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding the distribution of funds following the breakdown of a business relationship involving a proposed land development.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings and distribution of funds.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding a water heater purchase, as it would not have changed the result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of her appeal.

The court was advised that she had gone absent without leave from the hospital and was deemed discharged under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for criminal harassment and assault of his former partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, sentencing him to a penitentiary term for treatment, and imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in denying the 1.5:1 credit based on the likelihood of bail denial, applying the Summers principle to grant the enhanced credit.

However, the court dismissed the other grounds, finding the penitentiary sentence was not imposed solely for treatment and the four-year total sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider Gladue principles and the jump principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record, breach of probation, and the risk posed to a police officer.

The Court also held that the sentence increase was measured and did not violate the jump principle.

The appellant appealed his five-year sentence for firearms trafficking, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not giving credit for his bail conditions and that the sentence was unfit due to the potential unconstitutionality of the three-year mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bail conditions were not stringent and the trial judge reasonably exercised her discretion not to grant credit.

The court presumed the mandatory minimum was constitutional as it was not challenged, and held the five-year sentence was fit given the appellant's profit motive and knowledge the guns would be used for criminal purposes.

The appellants, former lawyers at a firm where the principal misappropriated trust funds, appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside or vary a garnishment order against the firm's professional liability insurer.

The respondents, who were owed $3.6 million, sought to exhaust the $1 million policy limits.

The appellants argued they needed the policy for defence costs against threatened claims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to require the respondents to release any claims against the appellants relating to the trust funds as a condition of receiving the garnished insurance proceeds, noting the respondents could not articulate any substantive claim against the appellants.

The appellant mother appealed an order reducing child and spousal support and dismissing her constructive trust claim.

The motion judge had refused the mother's request for an adjournment to complete previously ordered questioning, concluding the issues could be bifurcated and decided without it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge denied the mother a fair hearing by jumping to the erroneous conclusion that questioning was unnecessary and by failing to allow full submissions on the issue.

A new hearing was ordered.