Jessyca Nicole Greenwood

Dallas Ly was found guilty of second-degree murder of his mother.

This ruling determines his parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the nature of the offence, the offender's character, jury recommendations, and sentencing objectives.

Aggravating factors included the brutal domestic homicide, desecration of remains by decapitation, and discarding the body by the roadside.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, undiagnosed mental health issues, and rehabilitation potential.

The court set the parole ineligibility period at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

Shelly-Ann James was charged with second-degree murder for the stabbing death of her mother.

The trial, heard without a jury, focused on whether Ms. James was Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, specifically if her illness rendered her incapable of knowing her conduct was morally wrong.

The court heard evidence of Ms. James's long history of schizophrenia, marked by delusions, disorganized thinking, and paranoia, including a fixed belief in an entity called "Jigsaw" and fears of being harmed or surveilled.

While expert opinions diverged on her capacity for moral wrongfulness, the court found no rational or reality-based motive for the killing.

Instead, it concluded that Ms. James acted in response to a delusional belief that she and her children were in danger.

The court accepted the opinion that her extensive symptom burden at the time of the killing prevented her from assessing the moral wrongfulness of her actions against societal norms.

Consequently, Ms. James was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application for a mistrial and other relief following the late disclosure that undercover officers placed in his cell had audio-monitored their communications.

The accused sought further disclosure, challenged the Crown's claim of investigative privilege over the monitoring device, and argued the monitoring violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the Crown properly asserted public interest privilege over the device's specifics.

The court also held that the audio monitoring was lawfully conducted for officer safety under section 184.1 of the Criminal Code and did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of text messages extracted from the accused's cell phone during a first-degree murder trial.

The defence argued the texts were irrelevant and constituted impermissible disposition evidence.

The Crown sought to admit them to corroborate the credibility and reliability of statements made by the accused to undercover officers, particularly regarding his lifestyle and interests.

The court found the majority of the texts relevant for supporting the officers' testimony, concluding their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded texts referring to violent consensual sex, masturbation, and a nude photograph, deeming them either too prejudicial or irrelevant.

The accused, Kalen Schlatter, applied for an order declaring his right to silence under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was infringed by statements made to Toronto Police Services undercover officers placed in cells adjacent to his upon arrest, and to exclude these statements under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed the police conduct, including the decision not to record the interaction surreptitiously without judicial authorization, and the nature of the conversation between the accused and the undercover officers.

The court found that the police did not actively elicit the statement in a manner akin to interrogation and that the accused had not met the onus of establishing a Charter violation.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including violent sexual images, search terms, and viva voce evidence of consensual choking sex, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence intended to assert an alternate suspect (James Gardiner) and an inadequate police investigation defence.

The court ruled that the discreditable conduct evidence was not admissible generally, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, not being sufficiently distinctive to constitute a signature.

However, the evidence would become admissible if the defence adduced evidence of the alternate suspect's bad character or raised an inadequate investigation/tunnel vision defence, to prevent a distorted picture for the jury.

Certain highly prejudicial evidence, such as a specific video, would need to be excised or altered if admitted.

The Member, a principal and sole director of a private school, pleaded guilty to professional misconduct.

He failed to refund tuition and tuck fees to a student's parent despite a settlement agreement, and misrepresented the school's financial situation.

He also continued to collect fees from other parents while knowing the school was in financial difficulty and likely to close, ultimately giving only one day's notice before ceasing operations.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a written reprimand and a 22-month suspension of his Certificate of Qualification and Registration.

The Member also resigned and undertook not to teach in Ontario.

The appellant, who had a 30-year history of predatory sexual offences against young males, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with a weapon and designated a dangerous offender.

He appealed the designation, seeking to introduce fresh evidence regarding his voluntary use of anti-androgen medication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence would not have affected the result and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable possibility of controlling the appellant's risk in the community given the voluntary nature of the medication.

A nineteen-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to four counts of robbery but admitted to six knifepoint robberies of young women committed over a two-month period in winter 2013-2014.

The offender drove the getaway vehicle while his co-accused committed the robberies.

The Crown sought eighteen months to two years less a day imprisonment, while the defence sought six to nine months with potential credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions.

The court imposed ninety days intermittent imprisonment on each count, three years probation with strict conditions, 240 hours community service, and an increased victim surcharge of $8,000, balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation prospects for a youthful first offender with no prior record.

The accused brought numerous pre‑trial motions in a prosecution alleging forgery‑related offences, money laundering, and income tax fraud arising from a business producing false identification cards.

The motions included challenges to the Crown’s addition of counts under s. 574 of the Criminal Code, Charter claims concerning warrantless seizure of telephone subscriber information and production orders, delay under ss. 11(b) and 7 of the Charter, applications for particulars, certiorari to quash the committal, and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of process.

The court held that the Crown lawfully added additional charges disclosed by the preliminary inquiry evidence and rejected the Charter challenges to subscriber information and production orders.

Delay claims were dismissed because most delay was attributable to inherent case complexity and defence availability rather than the Crown, and no significant prejudice was shown.

The court also rejected allegations of abuse of process and prosecutorial misconduct, finding they lacked an evidentiary foundation and did not justify an evidentiary hearing.

During the execution of a search warrant for firearms, the accused was detained but not immediately advised of her right to counsel due to officer safety concerns.

After the residence was secured, there was a further delay before she was advised of her rights.

Upon finally being advised of her rights and asked if she wished to call a lawyer, she spontaneously stated, 'I use it for protection' in reference to a firearm found in a briefcase.

The court found a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter due to the delay, but admitted the statement under s. 24(2), concluding it was voluntary, spontaneous, and would have been made regardless of the breach.