Bonnie J. Wein

The parties separated and the husband obtained a divorce and corollary relief in Singapore.

The wife commenced a competing proceeding for divorce and corollary relief in Ontario.

On a motion to determine jurisdiction, the court held that the Singapore divorce, equalization, and spousal support orders were valid and Ontario lacked jurisdiction to review them.

However, the court found that Ontario had jurisdiction over custody, access, and child support, as the children were habitually resident in Ontario and had a real and substantial connection to the province.

During a trial for child pornography offences, the accused brought a mistrial application after the Crown introduced an unannounced in-court demonstration by a police technical analyst to rebut evidence elicited during the cross-examination of the Crown's computer forensics expert.

The accused argued the analyst gave unqualified expert evidence and the demonstration constituted trial by ambush.

The court held that the analyst's testimony was factual, not expert opinion, but ruled the demonstration inadmissible due to the lack of prior disclosure.

The mistrial application was dismissed, with the court finding that excluding the demonstration and allowing the defence to recall witnesses or call their own expert was a sufficient remedy.

The applicants sought equitable relief and rectification of a second mortgage registered against a property.

Due to a Land Titles office error during conversion from the Registry System, the property owner's name was incorrectly recorded on three of four property identification numbers (PINs), leading to the applicants' mortgage being registered against only one PIN.

The Minister of National Revenue (NR), a subsequent lienholder, argued that the applicants should pursue other remedies like suing their lawyer or claiming against the Land Titles Assurance Fund.

The court found a clear common intention for the mortgage to cover the entire property and granted the equitable relief and rectification, allowing the applicants to enforce their mortgage against all four parcels, thereby maintaining their priority over NR's later-registered liens.

The accused, facing charges of fraud and forgery, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings pending the appointment of state-funded counsel on the morning his trial was scheduled to commence.

The court reviewed the extensive procedural history, noting the accused's repeated changes of counsel and previous adjournments.

Applying the Rowbotham criteria, the court found the accused failed to demonstrate that he had been denied Legal Aid, failed to prove indigence given evidence of substantial assets, and failed to show that the charges were sufficiently complex to require counsel for a fair trial.

The application was dismissed as a final attempt to delay the trial.

The accused was convicted following a jury trial of possession of prohibited or restricted firearms with readily accessible ammunition and careless storage of firearms and ammunition after police discovered three handguns and numerous long guns in a farmhouse used for drug trafficking activity.

The court found the accused had been wilfully blind to the presence of the handguns stored in a safe brought into the home by his stepson and had facilitated the dangerous environment by permitting drug use and trafficking in the residence.

Although the accused did not personally handle the handguns and his long guns were generally stored properly, the court emphasized the serious risks created by the combination of drugs and firearms.

Credit was granted for lengthy pre‑trial house arrest conditions.

A custodial sentence was imposed to meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

The plaintiff brought a solicitor’s negligence action alleging that his former lawyer failed to properly advise him of settlement offers and improperly accepted a settlement without instructions in litigation arising from a mortgage dispute.

The court conducted a credibility assessment regarding whether the plaintiff was present during a court‑brokered settlement discussion and whether the solicitor acted on valid instructions when accepting a later settlement.

The court found that the plaintiff had been present and had rejected the earlier settlement offer despite legal advice to accept it.

The court further found that the solicitor accepted the later settlement based on clear instructions before the plaintiff attempted to withdraw them.

In any event, the plaintiff failed to establish any compensable loss resulting from the alleged negligence.

The applicant, sought for extradition to the United States on drug conspiracy charges, brought an application for an order requiring the Attorney General of Canada to obtain and disclose materials in the possession of U.S. authorities regarding their delay in seeking his extradition.

The applicant argued the ten-year delay amounted to an abuse of process violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding it lacked jurisdiction to order disclosure from foreign authorities at the committal stage.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish an air of reality to the claim that the delay prejudiced the fairness of the extradition hearing itself, as opposed to the trial in the requesting state, which is a matter for the Minister at the surrender stage.

The applicant brought a constitutional motion in advance of sentencing challenging s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code insofar as it denied enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to offenders detained under s. 524(4) or (8) after a bail breach.

The court held that the provision engaged liberty and offended the principle of proportionality in sentencing because it made the ultimate period of incarceration depend on the offender's ability to obtain bail, a factor irrelevant to a fit sentence.

The court rejected the Crown's position that gross disproportionality was the governing standard, relied on appellate authority recognizing proportionality in sentencing as a principle of fundamental justice, and found the provision arbitrary in its operation.

Applying s. 1, the court held the provision was not rationally connected in a constitutionally sufficient way, did not minimally impair liberty, and produced deleterious effects outweighing any benefits.

The impugned words were declared of no force and effect to the extent they barred enhanced credit for detention under s. 524(4) or (8), and the applicant was not precluded from seeking enhanced credit for all pre-sentence custody.

The accused sought exclusion of firearms and drug-related evidence seized during execution of telewarrants at a rural farmhouse, arguing the warrants lacked sufficient grounds, the nighttime authorization was unjustified, the use of tear gas rendered the search unreasonable, and the telewarrant process was improperly used.

Applying the Garofoli review standard and the Debot framework for confidential informant reliability, the court held that the informant's detailed first-hand information was sufficiently corroborated and that any errors or exaggerations in the ITO did not amount to bad faith or invalidate the warrants.

The court further held that a nighttime dynamic entry was justified given the reported presence of multiple firearms and drugs, and that the planned use of tear gas was not excessive force on the facts.

No breach of s. 8 was established, and the seized items were ruled admissible at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an order dismissing its construction lien action for failure to set the action down for trial within the time required under the Construction Lien Act.

The delay resulted from failures by the plaintiff’s in‑house counsel, who had misinformed the plaintiff about the status of the case.

The defendant opposed restoration of the action, arguing prejudice due to the death of a key witness and lack of merit in the plaintiff’s claim.

The court held that dismissal orders may be set aside where a fair trial remains possible and no substantial prejudice arises from delay.

Finding that the dispute would primarily turn on expert evidence and that documentary records could substitute for the deceased witness’s testimony, the court concluded that the defendant would not suffer irreparable prejudice and restored the action.

The accused was tried on allegations of historical sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, and threats of death involving a child complainant.

The court found the complainant credible and forthright, with some confirmatory support from other evidence, but held that credibility alone did not resolve the case.

Defence evidence concerning opportunity, contradictions on material surrounding circumstances, memory concerns, and the absence of potentially confirmatory witnesses left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action seeking damages after her checked luggage went missing during international air travel from Canada to Togo.

She claimed extensive expenses, medical costs, emotional distress, and punitive damages following delays in recovering the baggage.

The court held that liability for lost or delayed baggage in international carriage by air is governed by the Montreal Convention, 1999, incorporated into Canadian law by the Carriage by Air Act, which limits recovery to 1,000 Special Drawing Rights unless additional insurance was purchased.

Claims for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and punitive damages were barred by the Convention.

The court awarded the capped compensation amount for delayed baggage together with reimbursement of an improperly charged airline upgrade fee.

The plaintiff credit card issuer sued to recover outstanding balances on a Home Depot credit card account.

The primary cardholder admitted the underlying purchases but argued that interest should be limited to the statutory rate under the Courts of Justice Act rather than the contractual rate.

The secondary defendant disputed liability, claiming he had not been proven to be a co-applicant or authorized cardholder.

The court found that circumstantial evidence established he was a secondary cardholder and jointly liable.

The court also held that, absent exceptional circumstances, contractual interest rates govern both pre‑ and post‑judgment interest, rejecting the request to apply the lower statutory rate.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude statements overheard by a border officer while the accused was speaking on a cell phone in an airport baggage area.

The defence argued that admission of the statements would infringe the accused’s privacy rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court reviewed jurisprudence on expectations of privacy and investigative practices at border crossings.

It held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking on a cell phone in a public airport area where the conversation could be overheard.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible at trial.

In a matrimonial proceeding involving a lodge business subject to a court‑appointed receivership, the respondent husband moved to remove the receiver, stay payments, and seek contempt findings against the applicant wife.

The wife cross‑applied for transfer of the property into her name and other interim relief including support.

The court held that removal of a receiver requires strong evidence of bad faith or misconduct and found no basis to discharge the receiver despite disputes over expenditures and alleged bias.

The court declined to transfer ownership of the property or make certain enforcement orders but granted modest interim spousal support and ordered financial disclosure.

Several ancillary requests, including contempt findings and other relief, were denied pending trial.

The applicant sought exclusion of drug evidence discovered during a warrantless vehicle search, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police stopped the vehicle after observing evasive driving in a neighbourhood known for drug activity and seeing the driver make movements inside the car.

The court held that the circumstances amounted only to suspicion and did not provide reasonable grounds to arrest or search.

Additional questioning after the applicant requested counsel constituted further Charter breaches.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the trafficking charge.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that breath samples were invalid because the breath technician failed to wait 17 minutes after an invalid sample and that the trial judge improperly relied on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code when the Crown had also called the technician to testify viva voce.

The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the technician’s evidence that a waiting period was unnecessary where the invalid sample resulted from inadequate blowing rather than residual mouth alcohol.

The court further held that the Crown was not barred from relying on the certificate and presumption of accuracy merely because the technician also testified.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary raising doubt about the reliability of the readings, the presumption applied.

The conviction for driving over 80 mg was therefore upheld.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after stabbing his landlord to death.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused should be found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under section 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified that the accused suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or a delusional disorder, and that his actions were driven by persecutory delusions.

The court applied the test from R. v. Oommen and concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the accused's mental illness prevented him from knowing that his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The accused was found not criminally responsible.

In a criminal trial arising from a shooting at a house party, the complainant initially identified the accused as the shooter but later refused to confirm the identification at trial.

The Crown sought to admit five prior statements made to police, including statements at the scene, at hospital, a hospital photo identification, a later written statement, and a formal photo line-up.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. KGB and subsequent jurisprudence, the court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness recanted or claimed lack of memory.

The court held that threshold reliability was met, particularly due to the videotaped photo line-up and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination at trial.

The prior formal statement and photo line-up were admitted as substantive evidence, while earlier statements were admitted to provide contextual background.

The appellant appealed a conviction for common assault and the sentence imposed following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to address inconsistencies between the complainant and a police witness, and inadequately explained the rejection of the appellant’s evidence.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and reasonably relied on the independent observations of a police officer who witnessed the incident.

The court found that the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof consistent with the framework in R. v. W.D. and made no error in principle in sentencing.

The appeal from both conviction and sentence was dismissed.