Court File and Parties
Court File No.: CR-24-10000077-00AP Date: 2025-12-12 Superior Court of Justice -- Ontario
Summary Conviction Appeal
Re: Jasmine Worrell, Appellant And: His Majesty the King, Respondent
Before: Mainville J.
Counsel: Trevor Lau and Ryan Handlarski, for the Appellant Patrick A. Harris, for the Respondent
Heard at Toronto: November 19, 2025
On appeal from the findings of guilt made on December 11, 2023, by Justice L. Favret of the Ontario Court of Justice.
Reasons for Judgment
1Ms. Worrell was found guilty after trial of assault and assault causing bodily harm in relation to Ebonie Beckford. She argued self-defence. Ms. Worrell was granted a conditional discharge but appeals the findings of guilt on the basis that the trial judge's reasons for judgment, rendered several months after verdict, should not be considered on this appeal as they are or appear to be divorced from the reasoning that led to the verdict.
2After closing submissions were heard on August 31, 2023, the trial judge indicated that she would provide her judgment on November 6, 2023. Judgment was not in fact ready on this date, and the matter was twice adjourned before being set for December 11, 2023. On that date, the trial judge rendered verdicts of guilt, along with brief oral reasons. She informed the parties that her written reasons would follow shortly.
3Ultimately, the judge's reasons were provided to counsel on November 4, 2024, well over a year after the trial was completed, one year after the reasons were first promised, and approximately 11 months after the verdicts were rendered.
4The issue raised on appeal is whether the written reasons ultimately delivered can be said to be a true articulation of the reasoning that led to the guilty verdicts, or whether they are in effect an after-the-fact justification for the verdicts rendered almost a year earlier. If the latter, they should not be considered on this appeal: R. v. Teskey, 2007 SCC 25, [2007] 2 SCR 267.
5The Crown concedes that without the written reasons, the oral reasons provided on December 11, 2023, are insufficient on the standard set out in R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 SCR 869, and a new trial should be ordered.
6In all the circumstances of this case, I find that a reasonable person could not be confident that the written reasons reflect the reasoning that led the trial judge to her decision. As a result, I can only consider the brief reasons provided upon delivery of the verdict, which I agree are insufficient to permit appellate review. The findings of guilt are set aside, and a new trial is ordered.
Factual Overview
7The charges arose out of an altercation that took place at a downtown hotel following a dinner out for a friend's birthday. Several people gathered in a hotel room booked for the occasion, and the festivities continued well into the night.
8There is no question that Ebonie Beckford was assaulted by Ms. Worrell and that several people were involved in this incident. The extent, purpose and timing of Ms. Worrell's involvement and whether she acted in self-defence were the central issues at trial. This also turned on the actions of Ebonie and of other persons who were present and who engaged in the altercation, which was not captured on video.
9Ms. Worrell testified that she intervened in the fight to break it up and to protect her friend Caroline Nguyen, but that Ebonie grabbed her, ripped off her wig which had been "cemented on", and struck her. She then began assaulting Ebonie by punching her, and a struggle ensued. They each were on top of the other at some point in time. She agreed that she punched Ebonie multiple times but denied kicking her. The fight was ultimately broken up and she did not re-engage physically.
10Evidence was heard over the course of five days. Several witnesses testified to what they saw of the argument that led up to the fight, the fight itself, and/or its aftermath. A paramedic and hotel employee testified about their observations and interactions with some of the hotel guests immediately following the fight. Pictures of the scene and of injuries, both as it relates to Ebonie and the Appellant, were filed in evidence.
11Ms. Worrell was a close friend of the birthday girl, Caroline. Ebonie had been invited by another friend of Caroline's. Ms. Worrell and Ebonie did not know each other prior to this evening.
12The fight broke out after a man in attendance casually used the N-word in conversation with Ebonie and others. Both Ebonie and Ms. Worrell are Black. Ebonie took issue with the use of the word, eventually leading Caroline to ask her to leave. At some point, Caroline threw vodka in Ebonie's eyes.
13Ebonie testified that Ms. Worrell then attacked her physically and was joined by others. There is no need to review the various accounts of what assaults took place and by whom. Suffice it to say that a central issue at trial was Ebonie's differing accounts of what happened and of who was involved in the assault. This included different accounts of whether Ms. Worrell only punched her above the shoulders, or whether she also kicked her legs.
14An important aspect of the evidence was in relation to Ms. Worrell's wig, given its centrality to her claim of self-defence. Ebonie first acknowledged in cross-examination that it was possible she had ripped off the wig. She later testified more vaguely that it was possible that the "wig was taken off" during the altercation.
The Guilty Verdicts and Related Reasons
15During closing submissions on August 31, 2023, the trial judge made several comments that the defence submits are indicative of her intention to convict, and of her moral disapproval of the Appellant's actions in not having sided with Ebonie in the face of a racial slur.
16Judgment was set for November 6, 2023. On that date, the judge wrote to counsel indicating that the reasons were not yet ready, and that they would be ready for November 10th. The matter was adjourned to this date to receive judgment.
17On November 10th, judgment was still not ready, and the matter was adjourned to November 28th. The same occurred on November 28th and the matter was adjourned to December 11th.
18On December 11, 2023, the trial judge found Ms. Worrell guilty. She indicated that she was going to provide summary reasons that day so that everyone would know her conclusion. She added that she would provide written reasons early the following week. She proceeded to give an overview of the facts, effectively setting out her main findings of fact without any substantive analysis relating to credibility and reliability or referencing other bases for those factual findings. She indicated that she would state the frailties in Ms. Worrell's evidence more clearly in the written reasons to come. The matter was adjourned to February 16, 2024, for sentencing.
19The written reasons were not provided the week after the verdicts, as promised. Nor were they provided prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing. Sentencing was therefore adjourned to March 1, 2024, with the written reasons to be provided in the interim.
20By that date, the trial judge's reasons still had not been provided. The matter was again adjourned, with the trial judge on March 28th committing to finishing them that weekend. She remanded the parties to April 8th, ahead of a rescheduled sentencing date set for April 18th, to ensure that the parties had the reasons in hand. On April 8th, the reasons had still not been provided, nor were they provided at that time. The trial judge however informed the parties that they were finished and with her assistant for formatting. She anticipated sending them the reasons the next day.
21That again did not occur, nor did the parties receive the reasons prior to April 18th -- the thrice-scheduled sentencing date. Defence counsel had previously advised the court that she could not proceed to sentencing without having first received and reviewed the reasons.
22The trial judge did not appear on the sentencing date of April 18th, reportedly because she was ill. The matter was again adjourned several times, with the parties learning at some point that the trial judge was off on a medical leave as of May 2024. Upon her return, the trial judge informed the parties that the leave was the result of an injury suffered on April 23, 2024. It is unclear from the record when the trial judge resumed her duties, but she informed the parties on November 5, 2024, that it was her third day presiding in court since returning from leave. The November 5th sentencing date had been rescheduled from September 2024 as the trial judge was still on leave at that time.
23Ultimately, the reasons were sent to counsel on November 4, 2024, a day prior to the sentencing hearing set for November 5th. The defence needed time to consider the reasons and sentencing was adjourned to November 14, 2024. On this date, Ms. Worrell was granted a conditional discharge. She then filed a Notice of Appeal as a self-represented litigant.
24The reasons are lengthy. They comprise 359 paragraphs or 64 pages, single-spaced. The bulk of that is a recounting of the evidence. The key portion, the analysis, mostly relates to the trial judge making findings of fact regarding what transpired that night. She cites frailties and inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence and acknowledges "significant weaknesses" in Ebonie's evidence. She accepts that these undermine the reliability of Ebonie's evidence "somewhat" and that there are "details of the incident which are not reliable".
25The trial judge accepts that Ebonie's evidence is not consistent with a third-party witness on several points and proceeds to reject Ebonie's evidence on these points. But she finds that "Ebonie's evidence that Jasmine was the main aggressor, straddled and punched her repeatedly was not undermined". She points out that Jasmine agreed that she was on top of Ebonie and punched her in the face, such that that evidence is reliable.
26The trial judge ultimately accepts that "there is an air of reality to the defendant's position she acted in defence of Caroline". But she proceeds to make additional findings of fact that undermine that defence. Ultimately, she rejects the defence not on the basis that unreasonable force was used, but on the basis that Ms. Worrell "did not have reasonable grounds to believe Ebonie would use force against Caroline". She finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Worrell assaulted Ebonie and caused her bodily harm.
Positions of the Parties
27The Appellant argues that the trial judge had already decided to convict at the time of closing submissions. Counsel points to comments made by the trial judge during exchanges with counsel that were dismissive of the defense being advanced, and that suggested disapprobation of Ms. Worrell's conduct in asking Ebonie to leave rather than siding with her in the face of a racial slur.
28The Appellant argues that those comments, along with the passage of time between verdicts and reasons, as well as the nature of the evidence and the final product including gaps in the analysis, demonstrates result-based reasoning. In all the circumstances, she argues not merely that a reasonable observer would be concerned that the written reasons do not reflect the pathway to the verdicts, but that the judge's comments and actions show that she in fact did engage in result-based reasoning.
29The Crown argues that the presumption of integrity has not been displaced. The trial judge also intervened during the Crown's closing submissions, and there was nothing improper about those interventions or that suggest that she had already decided to convict by that point in time. Further, the delay between verdict and reasons is informed by the trial judge's lengthy sick leave, which is an exceptional circumstance. Trial counsel did not ask for an explanation for the delay, and the Notice of Appeal was not filed until after sentencing, such that the reasons could not have been tailored to anticipated grounds of appeal.
30The Crown submits that the written reasons should therefore be considered and are sufficient to enable appellate review.
Law and Analysis
The Legal Framework
31Trial judges benefit from a presumption of integrity. It flows from that that reasons proffered in support of a trial judge's decision are presumed to reflect the reasoning that led the judge to this decision: Teskey, at para. 19.
32This presumption can be displaced. As set out in Teskey, at para. 21"[t]he onus is ... on the appellant to present cogent evidence showing that, in all the circumstances, a reasonable person would apprehend that the reasons constitute an after-the-fact justification of the verdict rather than an articulation of the reasoning that led to it." This is because "fairness and impartiality must not only be subjectively present but must also be objectively demonstrated to the informed and reasonable observer": Teskey, at para. 21.
33At para. 23, the Supreme Court in Teskey made clear that inordinate delay in and of itself will not suffice to rebut the presumption. But in all the circumstances of that case, the Court found that "a reasonable person would apprehend that the trial judge's written reasons, delivered more than 11 months after the verdict was rendered, did not reflect the real basis for the convictions": para. 2. This severed the requisite link between the verdict and the reasoning that led to that verdict. In such a circumstance, the reasons provided no opportunity for meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the decision.
34While the delay in this case is similar to the one at issue in Teskey, many circumstances differ. An important consideration in that case was the fact that the trial judge had obvious difficulty in arriving at a verdict in the months following the completion of the evidence and indicated a willingness to reconsider the verdicts as soon as they were rendered: para. 23. The Notice of Appeal had also been filed prior to the written reasons being delivered, but this was not a significant factor in the final analysis given the Court's finding that the reasons were not tailored to the grounds raised in the Notice: para. 22.
35Still, the Court made clear that the circumstances may vary. The ultimate issue is whether the presumption of integrity has been rebutted: would a reasonable person apprehend, in light of all the circumstances, that the reasons do not reflect the real basis for the convictions?
Application to this Case
36In the present case, the concern is not that the trial judge struggled at arriving at a verdict, but that she struggled in arriving at reasons for it -- or stated differently, in demonstrating the pathway to conviction. Given that the verdicts were rendered well before the reasons, and that it took far longer than the trial judge herself anticipated needing to provide the reasons, there is a real concern that the verdicts were arrived at before ascertaining the pathway to conviction, such that the analysis was ultimately driven by the result that had already been announced.
37I conclude, based on several considerations, that a reasonable observer would apprehend that the written reasons do not reflect the reasoning that led to the guilty verdicts.
38This concern does not arise based merely on the post-verdict delay in providing the reasons. The delay itself is certainly concerning, and I address the circumstances surrounding it below. But the bigger concern is the trial judge repeatedly promising the reasons in short order, but failing to deliver, coupled with the absence of any satisfactory explanation to address the repeated delays.
39This was a feature of all three leading appellate authorities on this issue: see Teskey, at paras. 7, 10, 23; R. v. Cunningham, 2011 ONCA 543, at paras. 38-39; and R. v. Artis, 2021 ONCA 862, at paras. 4-6.
40In Teskey, an important factor was that no explanation had been provided for the post-verdict delay in releasing the reasons.
41In Cunningham, the trial judge's suggestions that the reasons were ready were undermined by actual events. The judge first indicated that the reasons would be ready later the same day as the oral reasons and decision were delivered. They were also promised several times over the course of the months that followed. And yet, they were not forthcoming at the times indicated by the judge. In that context, and in the absence of any real explanation for the delay, the Court inferred that the written reasons were crafted after, and probably some considerable time after, the announcement of the decision. This contrasted with the trial judge's representation at the time the decision was rendered that the reasons existed at that time. This is akin to this case.
42Judgment in Ms. Worrell's case was first set for November 6, 2023, more than two months after the trial had completed. At that time, the reasons were not ready, and the trial judge promised them for four days later. This suggests they were near-ready. The judge then again promised them for just over two weeks later. Again, the trial judge was not ready to provide her reasons and gave herself another two weeks. When she then delivered the verdicts, on December 11, 2023, she once again made clear that the written reasons would be made available shortly thereafter, early the following week.
43That scenario continued in a manner that required the sentencing hearing to go over three times. It continued until the judge apparently went on leave, several months after she first promised the reasons.
44On December 20, 2023, the trial judge asserted that she "had not yet finished her reasons with her assistant", but that it was her top priority. To the extent this implies that the reasons were in their final stage, being formatted with her assistant, this is undermined by the trial judge's later comment in March of 2024, referenced below, that she was committed to finishing the reasons that weekend. Clearly, they were not completed at that time.
45On December 29th, the trial judge told the parties that they would get them in advance of February 16th, which had been set for sentencing. This timeline suggests that the reasons were not merely being polished or with the assistant for formatting at this time but had not yet been completed.
46When the reasons were not ready for the February 16th sentencing date, the trial judge apologized and adjourned to a new sentencing date of March 1st. The reasons were again not ready to proceed with sentencing, which -- in light of the judge's assertions that proceeding with sentencing in a timely manner was a priority -- suggests they were still not completed. On February 16th, the trial judge nevertheless asked the parties if she could look at the sentencing materials including a presentence report that she had received in the interim.
47On March 28, 2024, the trial judge expressly committed to finishing the reasons that weekend. This makes clear that the reasons were not yet complete. At this time, the trial judge again committed to providing the reasons in short order. Sentencing was set for April 18th, but she insisted that an interim return date be set for April 8th to confirm that counsel had received the reasons. They did not.
48On April 8th, the trial judge did not provide the reasons but now indicated that they were finished and with the assistant to be formatted. She added that "there isn't much to do" and she would look at them that evening and expected to send them out the next day. Yet they were still not sent that following day, that week, or in advance of the sentencing hearing now set for April 18th. This would again occasion the postponement of the sentencing hearing for a third time.
49On April 18, 2024, the date set for the sentencing hearing that already could not proceed, the trial judge was absent. This must have been for a reason unrelated to the sick leave given the information provided later that the leave was occasioned by an injury suffered on April 23, 2024.
50The parties eventually learned sometime in May that the judge was on a leave of absence. The matter was adjourned a few times as there was no clear information regarding her anticipated return date. Eventually, sentencing was scheduled for September, but this was adjourned to October as the judge had not yet resumed her duties. Finally, the parties were advised that sentencing could be scheduled, and it was set for November 5, 2024. The reasons were issued the day prior, on November 4th. This did not provide the parties with sufficient time to prepare, so sentencing was again adjourned.
51The Crown argues that the delay issue is mitigated by the fact that a substantial portion of it resulted from the trial judge's sick leave.
52While that may be the case, it is far from clear that it was. There was no indication by the trial judge that the reasons had been ready for release but that this was delayed by the unanticipated leave of absence. The idea that they were ready prior to the leave of absence is undermined by the chronology of events.
53In my assessment, the assertion made on April 8, 2024 that the reasons were ready and expected to be released the next day cannot be relied on in the face of similar earlier indications that the reasons would be released imminently, and the fact that they were still not sent out during the two subsequent weeks that preceded the injury-related leave, including in the face of the sentencing hearing set for April 18th.
54There was no subsequent indication of when the reasons were in fact completed, or any explanation offered for the repeated failure to provide reasons within the promised timelines despite repeated adjournments for this purpose.
55And if the reasons were complete, it is unclear why they could not have been sent out prior to or even during the leave of absence.
56Rather, the timing of the release supports the inference that the reasons were at least in part crafted after the judge took a leave of absence: see Cunningham, at para. 43.
57In any event, the delay relating to the leave of absence does not dispel my concerns relating to the initial delay, in the context of the trial judge repeatedly indicating -- like in Teskey and Cunningham -- that the reasons would imminently be ready: Cunningham, at paras. 39 and 42-43; Teskey, at paras. 7 and 23. Ultimately, she did not provide any explanation for the overall delay or for the repeated adjournments for the purpose of providing the reasons, including why the reasons were not ready in short order as repeatedly anticipated.
58I note that the reasons throughout contain references to transcript pages, both in the fact section and the analysis. The parties did not refer to transcripts at the time of closing submissions, which took place right at the close of the evidence. Rather, everyone referred to their notes of the evidence. It is apparent that at some point during the preparation of her reasons, the trial judge obtained and did a detailed review of the trial transcripts. Given the time constraints the judge referenced she had immediately following the trial, it is unlikely that this entire exercise was completed prior to verdict.
59These factors are relevant to assessing when the reasons were completed in relation to the verdicts, as that informs whether they faithfully represent the judge's thought process in arriving at them.
60Another important consideration is the nature of the evidence and analysis the trial judge had to undertake to arrive at the verdicts.
61The reasons at issue in Cunningham related to the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The credibility of almost all the witnesses had been in issue, and the lengthy written reasons contained express credibility findings against police officers. The Court of Appeal considered as relevant the fact that the central issues in the case, as here, were questions of credibility and findings of fact. It found the two-year delay concerning given how difficult it would be, after the passage of time, to conduct the difficult credibility assessments that were required in that case. The Court ultimately overturned the acquittal because the reasons, released long after brief oral reasons were provided, could not be said to reflect the reasoning that led the trial judge to the decision: Cunningham, at paras. 36(v), 48 and 49.
62The nature of the analysis to be performed and the findings made are also an important consideration in this case. The court heard five days of evidence and there were many different versions of events to contend with, in addition to physical evidence to consider in order to resolve the various narratives and inconsistent statements. The credibility and reliability of several witnesses was in issue and had to be contended with before the defence raised could be properly considered. As in Teskey"the nature of the evidence ... called for a detailed consideration and analysis before any verdict could be reached": para. 23. See also Artis, at para. 20.
63In fact, when the parties attended for sentencing on November 5, 2024, immediately after the reasons were released, the trial judge observed that "the analysis portion is not long", contrasting this with "going through the evidence, which unfortunately, I thought this required because of the different points of view or memory -- memories that everyone had about what occurred".
64In other words, the factual analysis and ultimate findings of fact were critical to the judge's rejection of the defence's claim of self-defence, and her finding that this defence did not raise any reasonable doubt. This case did not turn on the analysis of a discrete legal issue. It required contending with the facts and the many versions of events, inconsistencies, reliability and credibility issues, and objective pieces of evidence.
65In this context, there is added danger in rendering a verdict with reasons to follow, in particular in the case of a finding of guilt. As stated in Teskey, at para. 18:
[H]aving already announced the verdict, particularly a verdict of guilt, a question arises whether the post-decision review and analysis of the evidence was done, even subconsciously, with the view of defending the verdict rather than arriving at it. It is most important in a criminal case to guard against any result-driven consideration of the evidence because the accused is presumed innocent and entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is not always obvious. Its presence may be far more subtle and only discernible through the eyes of the person who keeps an open mind. [Emphasis added. See also Cunningham, at para. 43.]
66Extensive written reasons were eventually delivered, again as in both Teskey and Cunningham, and they did contain a detailed consideration of the facts including the various factual discrepancies between the many witnesses and with the physical evidence. The key question is whether the trial judge conducted this lengthy and detailed analysis prior to rendering the verdicts -- or whether a reasonable observer aware of all the circumstances would apprehend that she may not have, and instead reasoned backward from the result.
67The trial judge did convey some of her findings of fact in her brief oral reasons, but these were limited and did not touch on any analysis of the basis for these findings. This again parallels the circumstances that existed in Cunningham, where Doherty J.A. observed that:
Although one can readily infer in broad terms the essential credibility findings made by the trial judge from her oral comments, those comments offer no insight as to the basis upon which she reached those findings. This is not a case where the subsequent written reasons can be seen as supplementary to the briefer oral reasons given at the time the decision was announced. The absence of any analysis in the brief oral comments makes it more difficult to draw any connection between the decision and the ultimate reasons. [Cunningham, at para. 41; see also Artis, at para. 6].
68A further concern in the present case is that the reasons were incomplete and disjointed in some respects, including on one of the central issues at trial: whether Ebonie ripped off Ms. Worrell's wig.
69Indeed, the trial judge first referenced the fact that Ebonie acknowledged she may have removed Ms. Worrell's wig while defending herself. She then stated that "the evidentiary record does not support a finding that Ebonie 'ripped' the wig off. I find Ebonie pulled Jasmine'". The sentence is cut short.
70The finding is left unclear as it appears to be potentially contradicted by the incomplete sentence, found at para. 321 of the reasons. The trial judge does not address the Crown's acceptance that the accused's evidence that it would be "quite difficult to remove the wig" was relatively unchallenged at trial, nor does she acknowledge the fact that Ebonie herself acknowledged that she may have "ripped" off the wig.
71Similarly, at para. 348 of her reasons, the trial judge accepts that Ms. Worrell's nail and wig were removed, but notes that she did not indicate how the injury to her tooth and ear occurred. She accepts that Ms. Worrell received bruising and scratches during the incident, but then notes "[s]he did not ask the paramedic or [hotel employee] to help her with these. The Instagram Post is inconsistent with these injuries." It is unclear which injuries she is referring to, considering that she has just accepted that Ms. Worrell did in fact suffer bruises and scratches.
72As the trial judge herself acknowledged, the analysis section is not long. In my view, it is also lacking in some respects. While many findings of fact are made, the bases for these findings are not always readily apparent. The reasons are disorganized and do not in my assessment provide a clear and cogent pathway to the verdicts of guilt.
73This is not to say that the written reasons are themselves insufficient on the Sheppard standard. Nonetheless, these issues amongst others relating to the cogency of the reasons are of concern on a Teskey analysis because they raise questions regarding whether the reasons can truly represent the articulation of the reasoning that led to the decision. If the later articulation is unclear or incomplete, can it be said to correspond to the earlier pathway followed by the trial judge to find guilt?
74Justice Abella expressed concern in dissent in Teskey that, on the majority's analysis, perfectly cogent or well-crafted reasons would be disregarded, stating:
It would be inconsistent with the presumption of integrity and with this Court's cases establishing the high threshold that must be met before such a presumption is displaced, for judges -- and litigants -- to be told that the reasons came too late to be meaningfully reviewed, regardless of their quality. [Teskey, at para. 39]
75At para. 45, she added that running a courtroom effectively "may involve stating a result right away with the explanation for the result to follow when the judge has the time to craft the explanation properly" [emphasis added]. See also Teskey, at para. 46.
76Conversely, when the reasons appear rushed -- in spite of their length -- the substantial post-verdict delay in providing them raises concerns about their integrity and whether the verdict was "not thought through before it was delivered": Teskey, at para. 44. This concern arises here. In the context of the time taken to obtain this work product, a reasonable person would not in my view have confidence that the case was properly adjudicated.
77I do not however accept that there was anything untoward with the trial judge's interventions and comments during closing submissions, as argued by the Appellant. Asking pointed questions of counsel is not prejudging the matter. It can in fact be helpful to litigants to hear the judge's thoughts and be challenged on certain points of evidence, as the judge did here. The Appellant argues that the trial judge's interventions in this case went further: they demonstrated that she had already decided to convict, and that the ensuing reasons were therefore result-driven.
78I am unable to draw this inference from the tenor or substance of the judge's interventions during the defence's or indeed the Crown's closing submissions. She certainly seemed inclined to disbelieve the Appellant, but it is the ensuing events that in my view would lead one to believe that the trial judge was quick to convict, without having first completed the analysis and reasoning process to get there.
79In fact, the judge asked several questions of counsel during submissions, asking about findings that should be made and trying to reconcile the various versions of events on several points. There were many instances where it was clear that she would need to go back to the evidence and consider how witness testimony could or could not be reconciled with the objective evidence, and whether the evidence of the different witnesses was credible or reliable.
80To be sure, the fact that a judge may have determined that they are convicting or acquitting before putting pen to paper is not in and of itself a problem, so long as the reasons ultimately reflect the true pathway to this verdict, and so long as the judge keeps an open mind should the full articulation of that pathway lead them to reconsider. As Doherty J.A. stated in Cunningham, at para. 34"[d]ecisions are naturally made before the reasons are fully formulated, much less articulated". On the other hand, trial judges have a "duty to consider the matter with an open mind and an indifference to the result", such that the judge must avoid "result-driven reasoning": Artis, at para. 15.
81This is of course the danger in rendering a verdict with reasons to follow. As stated in Teskey, at para. 15, in relation to the lack of concomitance between the announcement of the verdicts and the delivery of the written reasons"[h]ad the verdicts been announced only at the time the written reasons were delivered, even -- as here -- more than 14 months after the conclusion of the evidence, the requisite link between the decision and reasons that led to it could not be questioned."
82The Court added that while it is often necessary to provide later reasons in the interest of achieving trial efficiency, including to proceed with scheduling sentencing in a timely way"a trial judge should be mindful of the importance that justice not only be done but that it appear to be done": Teskey, at para. 17.
83That is the issue here. Altogether, a reasonable person would not in my view be confident that the written reasons, delivered almost a year after the announcement of the verdicts of guilt, reflected the reasoning that led the trial judge to her decision.
84The inordinate delay in issuing reasons that had repeatedly been promised much earlier, in combination with the lack of any explanation for these repeated adjournments, the relative brevity of the trial, the nature of the evidence that needed to be considered and reconciled prior to arriving at a verdict, and the content of the actual reasons ultimately issued, together constitute cogent evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of integrity. They create an apprehension that the reasoning therein does not reflect the pathway to the verdicts rendered much earlier. The requisite link between the two is missing.
85As in Teskey, the written reasons should therefore not be considered on this appeal. Again as in that case, it is not disputed that the oral reasons rendered at the time of verdict do not pass the test of sufficiency set out in Sheppard.
86The appeal is therefore allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial is ordered.
Christine Mainville J.
Date: December 12, 2025
