Benjamin William Janzen

Sentencing of a 52-year-old repeat offender who pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm against his intimate partner while on probation prohibiting contact with her, and to uttering death threats against a fellow inmate while in pre-trial custody.

The prolonged and degrading attack involved dragging the victim by her hair and stomping on her head, causing injuries requiring stitches and leaving permanent scarring.

The court weighed extensive aggravating factors including intimate partner violence, breach of multiple probation orders, a 125-conviction criminal record spanning 36 years, and the severity of the assault against mitigating factors of guilty pleas, rehabilitative programming in custody, and harsh conditions of incarceration at the Toronto South Detention Centre including frequent lockdowns and triple-bunking.

John Nanibush, an Indigenous man facing multiple Criminal Code and CDSA charges, including weapon and drug offences, and with a history of non-compliance with court orders, applied for judicial interim release.

The Crown sought his detention, citing secondary ground concerns.

The court, acknowledging the reverse onus, considered Mr. Nanibush's traumatic background, Indigenous identity (Gladue principles), and the inhumane conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC).

The judge found that the proposed community support plan, including culturally appropriate programming and mental health/addiction support, adequately addressed the secondary ground concerns, and released Mr. Nanibush on his own recognizance without a surety.

Justin Barrett pleaded guilty to failing to comply with a release order, possession of cocaine, fentanyl, a prohibited loaded firearm, and an oversized magazine.

The sentencing hearing was delayed for a 'Morris' report.

Both Crown and defence sought a conditional sentence, differing on its legal basis and length.

The court considered aggravating factors (loaded, modified firearm in public, flight from police, breach of house arrest, drug possession) and significant mitigating factors, including social context evidence (trauma, poverty, racism, lack of support, positive rehabilitation efforts).

The court found Mr. Barrett's moral blameworthiness significantly reduced.

A conditional sentence of two years less one day was imposed for the firearms charges (concurrently with a 60-day conditional sentence for other offences), followed by one year of probation, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The sentence included a de-escalating house arrest and curfew period.

Saffira Andrews pleaded guilty to common assault for repeatedly punching a stranger at a baseball game.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court had to determine a fit sentence, resolve a contested aggravating factor related to post-offence conduct (leaving the victim after a subsequent assault by a co-accused), and separate the impact of Andrews' assault from the co-accused's more severe assault.

The court granted a conditional discharge, finding it was in the defendant's best interest and not contrary to public interest, considering her mental health crisis, indigenous heritage, and rehabilitative efforts.

The accused was charged with driving while over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood and impaired driving following an incident at a fire station parking lot.

The Crown's case relied on observations by firefighters and police officers, as well as breath sample analysis.

The central issue was whether the Crown could prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt given the "bolus drinking" defence—the possibility that the accused consumed large quantities of alcohol while driving rather than before.

The court found reasonable grounds for arrest but acquitted the accused on both counts because the evidence established a reasonable inference of bolus drinking, which undermined a necessary precondition of the toxicology expert's opinion.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested entirely on breath test results obtained following the accused's arrest.

The defence raised three Charter applications: (1) a section 8 breach based on the arresting officer's chemically impossible articulation of the legal BAC limit; (2) a section 8 breach for failure to "transfer grounds" to the breath technician; and (3) a section 10(b) breach regarding the implementation of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found a section 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach fell on the lower end of the seriousness spectrum despite its significant impact on the accused's protected interests.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was found passed out in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with a running engine and breath readings of 217 and 201 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

She was charged with impaired driving and having over 80 mg of alcohol while in care and control of a motor vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's testimony discharged the statutory presumption of care and control.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care and control while impaired.

The court found that the defendant had no intention to drive, had entered the driver's seat only to close the open door and subsequently became ill, and had a credible backup plan to use Uber if necessary.

The court acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant failed to provide an adequate breath sample during roadside screening.

The defendant testified that she attempted to comply with the demand but was unable to generate a sufficient exhalation.

The court found that the totality of evidence, including inconsistencies between police officers' accounts, the defendant's credible testimony, and video evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant intended to fail to comply with the demand.

The court acquitted the defendant.