Meiszko Wlodarczyk

Following findings of guilt for uttering threats, the accused sought to bring an application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court previously declined to hear the application because it was not brought proactively before the end of the trial.

The accused requested a reconsideration based on a recent appellate decision confirming that a trial judge is not functus officio to hear such applications before sentencing.

The court dismissed the request, holding that while it had jurisdiction, the application was properly declined due to the accused's failure to raise the delay issue in a timely manner as required by the Jordan framework.

Following findings of guilt on two counts of uttering threats, the defendant sought to schedule a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The court declined to hear the application, holding that the defendant failed to comply with her duty to raise delay proactively and in a timely manner, having made a tactical decision to await the trial outcome before pursuing the application, contrary to the principles established in R. v. J.F. and R. v. MacLaughlin.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause bodily harm to her son and threatening to burn her daughter-in-law's business property.

Both threats arose from a single voicemail message left on August 25, 2023, following the accused's exclusion from her other son's funeral.

The accused admitted leaving the voicemail.

The defence argued the language was figurative, referring to civil litigation rather than literal threats.

The court found that a reasonable person would perceive the voicemail as containing threats of physical harm and property damage, and that the accused subjectively intended to intimidate and be taken seriously.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

This sentencing decision concerns Corey Fulford, found guilty of sexually assaulting a 10-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a 12-month carceral sentence, while the defence proposed a 3-6 month conditional sentence.

The court, considering the offender's developmental delay, lack of prior record, remorse, and the lower end of the physical conduct spectrum for the offence, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate despite the gravity of child sexual assault.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation, along with mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, a 10-year firearm prohibition, and a 5-year order prohibiting contact with persons under 16.

Corey Fulford was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 10-year-old complainant.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused, who has a learning disability.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, concluding that the "cuddling" on the bed, which occurred after a kiss and while the accused was aroused, constituted a sexual assault, as the relationship was not familial.

The accused was acquitted of sexual interference, as the alleged hand touching was not found to be for a sexual purpose.

S.S. was convicted of multiple offences, including sexual assault, and the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

S.S. applied to re-open the trial and for habeas corpus based on a recanting affidavit from the complainant.

The court applied the rigorous test for re-opening a defence case after conviction, focusing on the cogency of the new evidence.

The complainant testified that she signed the affidavit under pressure and that its contents were largely untrue, reaffirming her trial evidence.

The court found the recantation lacked sufficient cogency to warrant re-opening the trial, as the complainant's credibility was already thoroughly assessed at trial and there was corroborating evidence.

The applications were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an impaired driving charge against the respondent.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the identity of the offender because there was no in-court dock identification.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by concluding the identification evidence was insufficient.

The uncontroverted circumstantial evidence, including the arresting officer's lifelong knowledge of the respondent and the signing of a Promise to Appear, was sufficient to prove identity.

The matter was remitted for a new trial.