Dan Baker

This sentencing decision concerns Corey Fulford, found guilty of sexually assaulting a 10-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a 12-month carceral sentence, while the defence proposed a 3-6 month conditional sentence.

The court, considering the offender's developmental delay, lack of prior record, remorse, and the lower end of the physical conduct spectrum for the offence, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate despite the gravity of child sexual assault.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence followed by 18 months of probation, along with mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, a 10-year firearm prohibition, and a 5-year order prohibiting contact with persons under 16.

Corey Fulford was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 10-year-old complainant.

The trial involved conflicting testimony from the complainant and the accused, who has a learning disability.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, concluding that the "cuddling" on the bed, which occurred after a kiss and while the accused was aroused, constituted a sexual assault, as the relationship was not familial.

The accused was acquitted of sexual interference, as the alleged hand touching was not found to be for a sexual purpose.

This decision concerns a blended voir dire where the Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police, and the accused sought to exclude it due to an alleged breach of his Charter right to counsel.

The court found the statement was given voluntarily and admissible under the confessions rule.

While an eight-to-nine-minute delay by police in contacting duty counsel constituted an unreasonable breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right, the court determined that the breach was not serious and had minimal impact.

Consequently, admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, Mallorie Makara, a night staff member at a residential care facility, was charged under Section 215(2)(b) of the Criminal Code for failing to provide the necessaries of life to Rhonda McClenaghan, a severely disabled resident who drowned in a bathtub.

The Crown alleged that Makara's conduct, specifically leaving the resident unattended, constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The defence argued that leaving residents to soak was a common practice, even verbally directed by a primary support worker, and that Makara's actions did not meet the high threshold of a marked departure required for criminal fault.

The court found that while the actus reus of the offence was proven, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Makara's conduct represented a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable caregiver in the same circumstances, leading to an acquittal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment motion in favour of the respondent bank for recovery of $58,126.03 on an outstanding line of credit account.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge relied on a 1988 line of credit agreement when the statement of claim referenced a 1994 agreement; (2) the respondent's affiant relied on hearsay evidence and failed to provide proper notice of business records; and (3) the motion judge failed to provide reasons for awarding post-judgment interest at a rate higher than the statutory rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the summary judgment.