Mieszko Jozef Wlodarczyk

The appellant, Ann Marie Ahola, appealed her conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance by drug.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge’s reasons did not adequately address the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis—specifically, whether the appellant’s evidence, though rejected, nevertheless left the court with a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence.

The decision reviews the evidence, the law on misapprehension of evidence, the standard for an unreasonable verdict, and the requirements for reasons in credibility cases.

The appellant, William Peters, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding the reliability and credibility of a key civilian witness.

The appellant argued that inconsistencies in the witness's testimony, including details about the vehicle, her property ownership, her level of impairment, and animosity towards the appellant, rendered the verdict unreasonable.

The court found these alleged inconsistencies to be minor or irrelevant, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the witness's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that any misapprehension of evidence must demonstrably influence the trial judge's reasoning process to warrant setting aside a judgment.

This decision concerns a blended voir dire where the Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police, and the accused sought to exclude it due to an alleged breach of his Charter right to counsel.

The court found the statement was given voluntarily and admissible under the confessions rule.

While an eight-to-nine-minute delay by police in contacting duty counsel constituted an unreasonable breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right, the court determined that the breach was not serious and had minimal impact.

Consequently, admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge ordered the NCR assessment without any evidentiary basis.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Superior Court of Justice held the proviso did not apply because the error was not harmless and the evidence of NCR was not overwhelming without the improperly ordered assessment.

The NCR finding was set aside, convictions were entered, and the appellant was sentenced to one day in jail, having already spent nine years in custody.