Ian Bingham

The appellant, Ann Marie Ahola, appealed her conviction for impaired operation of a conveyance by drug.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered because the trial judge’s reasons did not adequately address the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis—specifically, whether the appellant’s evidence, though rejected, nevertheless left the court with a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offence.

The decision reviews the evidence, the law on misapprehension of evidence, the standard for an unreasonable verdict, and the requirements for reasons in credibility cases.

The accused sought an order severing sexual offence counts involving three complainants into separate trials, or alternatively into two trials separating older allegations from newer ones.

Applying the severance factors under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code, the court held that the applicant had not shown on a balance of probabilities that severance was required in the interests of justice.

Overlapping narrative evidence, direct overlap between two complainants' evidence, the real possibility of successful similar fact admissibility, and delay concerns tied to trial scheduling all favoured joinder.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, William Peters, appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's alleged misapprehension of evidence regarding the reliability and credibility of a key civilian witness.

The appellant argued that inconsistencies in the witness's testimony, including details about the vehicle, her property ownership, her level of impairment, and animosity towards the appellant, rendered the verdict unreasonable.

The court found these alleged inconsistencies to be minor or irrelevant, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the witness's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming that any misapprehension of evidence must demonstrably influence the trial judge's reasoning process to warrant setting aside a judgment.

Cara Mortensen was found guilty of impaired driving and driving while prohibited, her second impaired driving offence within five months, which involved an accident and an attempt to flee the scene.

The Crown sought a 90-day sentence, while the defence proposed 30-45 days intermittently.

The court imposed a 75-day concurrent sentence, a 3-year driving prohibition, and 18 months' probation.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles and rejected the intermittent sentence request, citing the lack of appropriate accommodation (Temporary Absence Passes not constituting actual imprisonment) and the need to uphold Parliament's intent for custodial sentences in such cases.

A youth was charged with six counts arising from allegations of sexual abuse of a young child over a two-year period when the accused was approximately 15-16 years old and the complainant was 3-5 years old.

The Crown alleged three separate incidents of sexual abuse.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court applied the W.D. framework for assessing credibility and found the accused's evidence vague, internally inconsistent, and self-serving, while finding the complainant's evidence detailed, straightforward, and compelling despite her young age at the time of the incidents and at trial.

The court rejected arguments that the complainant's evidence was unreliable due to lack of detail, inconsistencies regarding anatomical terminology, or the absence of observable injuries.

The court found the Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges.