Robert S. Gee

The applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to quash a search warrant for their residence and exclude evidence under s. 8 of the Charter.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable and probable grounds, relied on stale information, and omitted material facts regarding a vehicle's registration to a construction company.

The court found that while the affiant ought to have disclosed the vehicle registration information, the omission did not amount to bad faith or subversion of the authorization process.

After amplifying the ITO to include the omitted information, the court concluded the issuing justice could still have reasonably found sufficient grounds based on the totality of the surveillance evidence.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, a teacher, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against three Grade 6 students.

The complainants alleged the accused touched their buttocks in crowded school hallways.

The Crown sought to admit the evidence of each complainant as similar fact evidence across all counts, which the court allowed, finding the similarities highly probative of intent.

However, applying the W.(D.) framework and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Berg, the court concluded that while the complainants were credible and the touching occurred, the crowded hallway conditions and the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the contact was intentional.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude drugs and cash seized by police at a hospital after he was treated for a gunshot wound.

The court found that hospital staff were not acting as state agents when they collected the accused's belongings during emergency treatment.

The subsequent police seizure of the items was lawful, and a minor administrative breach regarding post-seizure reporting did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking the exclusion of a loaded firearm discovered during a search incident to arrest for impaired driving.

The accused was found unresponsive in a running vehicle in the middle of an intersection.

The court found that the initial investigative detention and subsequent arrest were lawful, and that the police complied with their obligations under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court concluded there were no Charter breaches, and alternatively, that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment following the end of an intimate relationship.

After the complainant ended the relationship and blocked him, the accused sent a barrage of 15 emails over a short period, which included threats to distribute intimate videos of the complainant.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and concluded that the accused's conduct caused her to reasonably fear for her safety.

The Crown proved all five elements of the offence, and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident where he provided a tattoo to the complainant.

The core issue at trial was whether the sexual activity that followed the tattooing was consensual, with the accused claiming it was agreed upon as payment, and the complainant testifying she repeatedly refused.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated by forensic and documentary evidence, while rejecting the accused's testimony as unreliable and untruthful.

The accused was found guilty.

Criminal trial on seven intimate-partner-violence counts, including multiple assaults, two choking/suffocation allegations, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's blanket denials after finding them incompatible with two contemporaneous recordings and police evidence about the absence of visible injuries.

The court held that inconsistencies in the complainant's sequencing on minor details did not undermine the reliability of her core allegations, which were corroborated by objective evidence.

Findings of guilt were entered on counts one through six, while one assault count was dismissed for absence of evidence.

In an impaired driving trial arising from a late-night traffic stop, the accused alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter and sought exclusion of breath readings.

The court held the arrest and breath demand were supported by objectively reasonable grounds, and rejected the claim that police failed to diligently assist access to counsel of choice through the accused's cell phone.

However, the court found a s. 10(b) breach when police were told duty counsel had hung up and failed to offer reconnection or confirm satisfaction with the legal advice received.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath results under s. 24(2), dismissed the 80 plus and dangerous operation charges, and convicted on impaired operation based on the officer's observations and video evidence.

The accused was charged with 27 offences arising from a shooting incident on the Six Nations Reserve on May 6, 2024.

The Crown alleged the accused fired a firearm at a van fleeing his residence after a physical altercation with three women.

The Crown conceded insufficient evidence for attempted murder charges.

The court found the accused guilty of five counts of pointing a firearm, careless use of a firearm, uttering a threat, five counts of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, breaching probation orders, breaching a firearms prohibition order, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and driving while prohibited.

The court acquitted on two assault charges and two firearm licensing charges, finding the weapon met the definition of firearm under section 2 of the Criminal Code but not the enhanced definition under section 84(3)(d).

The accused was charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and multiple firearm-related offences following a search warrant execution at a residence in Brantford.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found in a locked bathroom near satchels containing cocaine and a handgun, and was observed wearing a similar satchel minutes before the warrant was executed.

The defence argued that the accused's connection to the residence was unclear and that the drugs and firearms could have been placed by other occupants.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Villaroman and found that while the Crown's case was superficially compelling, there remained reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused possessed the drugs and firearms, and acquitted on all charges.

The accused, Luke Adam Martin, was convicted of two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving large quantities of fentanyl and methamphetamine, alongside guilty pleas to theft, possession of break-in instruments, and breach of probation.

The court considered the serious nature of the offences, the large quantities of drugs involved, the presence of firearms, and the accused’s prior criminal record and probation status.

The accused’s submissions to treat the drug possession as a fleeting courier incident and to exclude firearms as an aggravating factor were rejected.

The court imposed a sentence of 13 years for fentanyl trafficking and 6 years concurrent for methamphetamine trafficking, with credit for pre-sentence custody, and concurrent sentences for the other offences.

This decision addresses the issue of reasonable and probable grounds (RPG) for arrest and demand in a drug-impaired driving case.

The court found that Officer Accursi had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds to arrest Dalton Powell based on observations corroborated by a civilian witness and body camera footage.

The accused's Charter s. 8 and s. 9 rights were found not to be violated, including an overholding claim where the accused was detained for approximately six hours after the initial arrest.

The court also found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on officer observations, Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testing, and urinalysis results.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Luke Adam Martin guilty of two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and fentanyl found in a 2012 Ford Escape.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on evidence that Martin had control and knowledge of the drugs and firearms found in the vehicle.

The defence conceded possession and trafficking elements but argued Martin lacked knowledge of the drugs, attributing possession to a co-accused, Brandon Pfeiffer.

The court rejected this defence, finding Pfeiffer's testimony implausible and Martin's denials not credible, especially given the quantity and value of the drugs, Martin's control of the vehicle, and his wearing of latex gloves at arrest.

The court concluded Martin's guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The accused, Shabbir Dossa, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated end of trial was 24 months and 17 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued that portions of the delay were attributable to the defence or constituted exceptional circumstances (discrete events or case complexity).

The court found no delay attributable to the defence and no exceptional circumstances.

The primary reason for the delay was the Crown's unacceptable and unexplainable delay in providing meaningful disclosure, particularly the accident reconstructionist report and ITOs.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the accused's 11(b) right and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The accused, William Schatz, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a 17-year-old student.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the egregious breach of trust by a teacher and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her sister.

Mitigating factors included the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, and strong community support.

The Crown sought a two-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence proposed a 6 to 12-month conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing that carceral sentences are the norm for sexual offences against children, and imposed an 18-month incarceration period followed by two years of probation.

The court declined to impose a SOIRA order, finding it disproportionate given the accused's low risk of reoffending and the significant time elapsed since the offence.

The accused, J.C., brought a mid-trial application under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 20 months and 4 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that some delay was attributable to the defence or exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no waiver or attributable delay by the defence, noting Crown disclosure delays and prioritization of other matters.

The court also rejected the argument that pandemic-related backlog constituted an exceptional circumstance in this case, as the direct impacts had abated and the time to obtain trial dates was not inordinate.

The application was granted, and the charge was stayed.

The accused, Matthew Taylor, was charged with four counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and one count of breach of probation.

Taylor challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and the subsequent search of a backpack, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

The court found the arrest and search were lawful, primarily based on officer safety concerns, and that the seized substances were admissible.

The court also found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Taylor was in possession of the controlled substances.

The appellant, Joseph Scott Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for destroying or harvesting prescribed trees contrary to a Haldimand County by-law.

The appeal challenged the trial Justice of the Peace's interpretation of the "own use" exception and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant also sought a reduced fine and restitution.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the "own use" interpretation and no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for costs, deeming the appeal not to meet the high threshold for a cost award.

Raven Joseph-Soroka and Ashley Wilson were charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on police surveillance of the accused's movements and the items found in their vehicle, including fentanyl, a digital scale, numerous small baggies, and cash.

The court found that when viewed cumulatively and in light of human experience, the circumstantial evidence excluded any reasonable alternative explanations for the accused's activities, leading to convictions for both accused on both charges.

Joseph-Soroka was found to be a party to Wilson's trafficking under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and luring a person under 16.

The luring charge was dismissed by the Crown.

The court dismissed the invitation to sexual touching charge, finding no positive act of invitation by the accused.

However, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference, accepting the complainant's testimony despite her perceived lack of detail, and rejecting the defence's argument that her testimony was unreliable based on ungrounded common-sense assumptions about how a complainant should act.

The court applied the rules against ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypical inferences in assessing credibility.