Alicia Chiesa

Criminal prosecution arising from a controlled delivery of a child-sized sex doll, the seizure of a second doll from the accused's bedroom, AI-generated cache images on a phone, and videos stored on an external hard drive.

Applying the objective framework in s. 163.1 of the Criminal Code and Sharpe, the court held that both dolls and multiple AI images constituted child pornography, and that the accused knew or was wilfully blind to the features that made the dolls and images child pornography.

The court rejected exculpatory statements under the W. (D.) framework and found intentional access to the AI images.

The Crown failed to prove importation of the second doll and failed to prove that the hard-drive videos objectively had the dominant sexual characteristic or sexual purpose required by the Code.

Guilty findings were entered on importing and possessing the controlled-delivery doll, possessing the second doll, and accessing child pornography; acquittals were entered on importing the second doll and possessing the hard-drive videos.

The court sentenced B.B. for sexual offences against two child complainants, J.B. and F.T.G., including sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The decision details aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact on the victims and their families, and the application of sentencing principles such as denunciation, deterrence, and the totality principle.

The court imposed a total sentence of nine and a half years, with extended parole ineligibility, and made several ancillary orders for public protection.

Following a guilty plea to second degree murder committed at age 17, the Crown sought an adult sentence and the defence sought the maximum youth sentence with an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision order.

Applying ss. 71 and 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the court held the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, relying heavily on evidence of cognitive limitations, psychosocial immaturity, trauma, peer vulnerability, and meaningful rehabilitative progress in custody.

The court further held that a seven-year youth sentence, structured through IRCS, was sufficient to hold the accused accountable while promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.

A seven-year IRCS sentence was imposed, with partial credit for pre-trial custody, plus ancillary Criminal Code orders.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude a massager seized from his apartment, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant failed to disclose sufficient grounds, breaching s. 8.

The court reviewed the ITO, applying principles of excision and amplification to correct minor inaccuracies regarding the applicant's alleged sexual communications and use of the massager with the 11-year-old complainant.

The court found that even on the corrected record, there were overwhelming reasonable and probable grounds to believe offences had been committed and that the items sought would afford evidence.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses competing applications for a change of venue in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to transfer the trial from Gore Bay to Sudbury, while the accused sought a transfer to Toronto, or alternatively, North Bay.

The court determined that a change of venue from Gore Bay was expedient due to the lengthy trial, daily travel for the in-custody accused, and winter travel conditions.

The court granted the Crown's application, ordering the trial to proceed in Sudbury, finding it to be the most appropriate venue given its proximity to the original community, adjacent jail facilities, and available courtroom.

The accused's arguments regarding jail conditions and proximity to counsel and family were not sufficiently supported by evidence or did not outweigh the principle of local trials.

This criminal trial addressed charges of impaired operation, over 80 mg, flight from police, and dangerous operation.

The impaired operation charge was dismissed by the Crown due to insufficient evidence.

The court excluded breath test results for the over 80 mg charge under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding a serious and systemic s. 10(b) breach by the Ottawa Police Service regarding the immediacy of the right to counsel, despite a weak impact on the accused's rights.

The accused was found guilty of flight from a peace officer and dangerous operation, based on his actions in a parking garage, including ignoring police commands and driving dangerously.