Daniel Nugent

The court sentenced B.B. for sexual offences against two child complainants, J.B. and F.T.G., including sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The decision details aggravating and mitigating factors, the impact on the victims and their families, and the application of sentencing principles such as denunciation, deterrence, and the totality principle.

The court imposed a total sentence of nine and a half years, with extended parole ineligibility, and made several ancillary orders for public protection.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) to exclude a massager seized from his apartment, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant failed to disclose sufficient grounds, breaching s. 8.

The court reviewed the ITO, applying principles of excision and amplification to correct minor inaccuracies regarding the applicant's alleged sexual communications and use of the massager with the 11-year-old complainant.

The court found that even on the corrected record, there were overwhelming reasonable and probable grounds to believe offences had been committed and that the items sought would afford evidence.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit two video-recorded statements of a 13-year-old complainant (F.T-G.) in a sexual assault case.

The respondent opposed, arguing the statements were not taken within a reasonable time, did not adequately describe the alleged acts, and their admission would interfere with the proper administration of justice due to issues like leading questions, external influence, and the complainant's expressed animus.

The court found that the statements met the statutory preconditions, were taken within a reasonable time given the nature of child abuse disclosures, and sufficiently described the acts complained of.

The court dismissed the respondent's arguments regarding the administration of justice, emphasizing that concerns about memory frailties, leading questions, or external discussions generally go to the ultimate reliability of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The court ruled that the statements would be admitted at trial, provided the complainant adopts them, with the caveat that any presumptively inadmissible similar fact evidence must be vetted.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a teenage complainant who was the daughter of a woman he had briefly dated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence but held that the Crown still failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable because of significant internal inconsistencies, external contradictions with other Crown witnesses, and uncertainty about key factual details, including the number and sequence of the alleged incidents.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an incident in a supply room at the complainant's workplace.

Both the complainant and the accused testified, presenting conflicting versions of events.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework to assess credibility.

The court found both witnesses to be unreliable and noted significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the sequence of events and her subsequent behaviour.

Given the frailties in the evidence, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

This endorsement determined costs following a previous decision where the respondent's motion for interim supervised access was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs, arguing she was the successful party and the respondent acted unreasonably.

The court awarded the applicant costs, finding her behavior reasonable and the respondent's unreasonable due to lack of disclosure and a tailored access plan.

The respondent's limited financial means were considered but did not insulate him from costs given his conduct, outstanding child support, and previous unpaid cost orders.

The respondent sought interim supervised access to his two children, aged 9, after having no access since November 2017 due to charges of possession and distribution of child pornography and a prior conviction for sexually assaulting a minor.

The applicant opposed the motion, citing significant concerns about the respondent's criminal charges, mental health, and lack of disclosure.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for interim supervised access, finding it was not in the children's best interests given the serious nature of the charges, the respondent's mental health issues, the lack of information on the children's views, and outstanding disclosure.

The court ordered a referral to the Office of the Children's Lawyer and further disclosure from the Children's Aid Society and the respondent regarding his medical status and treatment.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, seeking extended society care for 11-year-old E.L. due to the mother's chronic mental health and substance abuse issues.

The mother sought the child's return under a supervision order.

The court found E.L. remained in need of protection, citing the mother's long history of relapses, inconsistent follow-through with treatment, and the significant emotional harm already suffered by the child.

Giving substantial weight to the child's expressed wishes for extended care, the court ordered extended society care with continued access to the mother and sister, rejecting the mother's plan as a "trial run" with the child's life.

The accused was charged with breach of probation for knowingly allowing her son to keep chickens and her granddaughter to keep mice at her house, contrary to probation conditions prohibiting her from owning, possessing, caring for, or providing shelter to animals, residing where animals are maintained, or possessing animals in any place she owns or resides.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that she did not possess the animals, did not shelter them (having moved to a tent on nearby land), and therefore did not breach any of the three probation conditions.

A Charter motion challenging a trespass notice issued during an Occupy Ottawa demonstration at Confederation Park.

The applicant, who participated in the occupation for approximately 48 hours, was directed to vacate the park and charged with failing to comply with a trespass directive under the Trespass to Property Act.

The applicant contended that the directive infringed her rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly under sections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that although the directive did infringe these rights, the infringement was justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court applied the Furtherance of Values test and the Oakes test, concluding that the city's bylaws and regulations governing park use were constitutionally valid and that the trespass notice was appropriately issued to restore the park to its lawful function.