Court File and Appearances

Court File No.: 22-11404546
Date of Judgment: June 4, 2025
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King – and – B.B., Defendant

Appearances:
Alicia Chiesa, for the Crown
Daniel Nugent, for the Defendant

Heard: April 4, 2025

Publication Ban

An order made pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code restricts the publication of any information that could identify the complainant or a witness in these proceedings.

Reasons for Sentence

McVey J.

Introduction

[1] B.B. was tried before me on a six-count indictment and found guilty of sexual offences involving two complainants, J.B. and F.T.G. The Crown withdrew counts four and five before B.B.’s arraignment. Midway through the Crown’s case, B.B. pleaded guilty to count six. At the end of trial, I found B.B. guilty of counts one through three. These are my reasons on sentence.

[2] J.B. is B.B.’s nephew. On one occasion between 1999 and 2004, when J.B. was approximately five to ten years of age, B.B. exposed his penis to J.B. and asked J.B. to touch it. When J.B. refused, B.B. asked J.B. to touch his penis with his feet, and J.B. complied. B.B. pleaded guilty to one count of invitation to sexual touching midtrial, but before J.B. testified.

[3] With respect to F.T.G., B.B. met F.T.G.’s mother through a mutual friend. F.T.G. was approximately nine to ten years old when he met B.B. B.B. offered to care for F.T.G. after school while his mother was at work. F.T.G.’s mother was a single parent in need of support. This arrangement lasted for approximately a year to a year and a half. Depending on the time of year, B.B. and F.T.G would spend more or less time at B.B.’s apartment, depending on factors like whether F.T.G was in school. F.T.G.’s mother, however, was not aware that B.B. and F.T.G. were spending time at B.B.’s apartment. The arrangement she had with B.B. was for him to entertain F.T.G. after school either at an outdoor skate park, or at F.T.G.’s home.

[4] I found that on numerous occasions at B.B.’s apartment, B.B. touched F.T.G. over his clothing on his bum and penis; showed F.T.G. how to use a massager on his penis; played pornographic videos on the television while F.T.G masturbated in B.B.’s presence with the massager; and told F.T.G. that he looked “good” while masturbating and that having sex with him would be like winning the lottery. I also found that B.B. purchased F.T.G. his own sex toy. F.T.G does not recall the exact number of times the touching occurred, and I would not expect him to have precise memory of those details considering how young he was at the time. F.T.G. testified that during the time he was frequently visiting B.B.’s apartment, the touching would occur “like most every time.” B.B. testified that F.T.G. masturbated with his massager at his apartment approximately two dozen times. I am satisfied that the sexual touching happened on at least twenty occasions, if not more. I also found that B.B. tried to touch F.T.G.’s genital area under his clothing on one occasion by placing his hand up F.T.G.’s shorts. F.T.G. told B.B. to stop and he did. Based on the above facts, I found B.B. guilty of sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and making sexually explicit material available to a child, contrary to sections 151, 152, and 171.1 of the Criminal Code.

Sentencing Positions

[5] The Crown seeks a sentence of three years for the sexual offence committed against J.B., and a consecutive sentence of nine years on the remaining counts relating to F.T.G, for a total sentence of twelve years less presentence custody. The Crown also asks me to delay B.B.’s parole eligibility pursuant to section 743.6(1).

[6] The defence seeks a sentence of eighteen months for the offence committed against J.B., and a consecutive sentence of four and a half years on the remaining counts, for a total sentence of six years.

[7] My role is not to decide between these two opposing positions. Instead, I must evaluate the seriousness of the offences and B.B.’s level of responsibility, taking into account any aggravating or mitigating factors. Based on that assessment, I must impose a sentence that falls within the appropriate range, reflects the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and fulfills the key sentencing objectives relevant to this case. The sentence I impose must be proportional to the gravity of the offences and the degree of B.B.’s responsibility.

Gravity of the Offences

[8] The sexual offences committed against F.T.G. and J.B. rank among the most reprehensible and serious crimes recognized by our legal system. The sexual exploitation of children causes deep and often lifelong harm, infringing not only on their physical integrity but also on their psychological, emotional, and social development. The elevated gravity of such offences arises from the inherent vulnerability of children and the profound short- and long-term consequences that this form of abuse inflicts upon them.

[9] There are numerous factors present that serve to aggravate the seriousness of the offences committed against J.B. and F.T.G. I will consider each point in turn.

Breach of Trust

[10] Children rely on adults for protection, support, and guidance. Sexual abuse constitutes a profound betrayal of that trust, one that can significantly impair a child’s development, undermine their sense of safety, and hinder their capacity to build healthy relationships in the future: see R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9.

[11] Further, parents cannot raise children entirely on their own. They must send them to school, enroll them in sports and other activities, rely on before- and after-school programs while they work, bring them to medical professionals when they are ill, and hire babysitters when they need time away. When those in these roles of trust and authority exploit their positions to target and harm children, it is a profound betrayal that instills fear in all parents who must rely on others to help care for their children.

[12] B.B. occupied a position of trust and authority in relation to both F.T.G. and J.B. He served as F.T.G.’s caregiver during a time when F.T.G. was contending with significant health and behavioral challenges. The abuse also took place during the COVID-19 pandemic—a time when young people were particularly vulnerable due to increased isolation. B.B. not only violated F.T.G.’s trust but also that of F.T.G.’s mother. At the time of the offences, she was a single parent struggling to manage F.T.G.’s medical and behavioral needs. In seeking help, she turned to trusted members of her community. B.B. presented himself as a source of support and then betrayed that trust in the most egregious manner. In my view, this is a highly aggravating factor on sentence: see s. 718.2(a)(iii).

[13] With respect to J.B., B.B. is his uncle. At the time of the offence, B.B. was entrusted with J.B.’s care while J.B.’s mother was out of town. J.B. chose to stay with B.B. during that period because he viewed him as “cool.” B.B. exploited this trust and affection to take advantage of J.B.—a betrayal that is, in my view, especially troubling.

[14] To adequately account for the breach of trust in this case, and all other factors being equal, B.B. should receive a longer sentence than someone who committed a comparable offence against a stranger: Friesen, at para. 130; R. v. T.J., 2021 ONCA 392, at para. 31.

Age of Complainants

[15] The seriousness of these offences is compounded by the ages of the complainants, who were both young children at the time B.B. exploited them: see section 718.2(a)(ii.1) of the Criminal Code; Friesen, at para. 134. Not only are children of this age particularly vulnerable given the power imbalance between children and adults, but children at this stage of development are old enough to instinctively recognize the wrongfulness of the conduct and to experience the shame and embarrassment it provokes. In my view, this awareness contributes to their particular vulnerability. The inherent feelings of guilt, confusion, and humiliation resulting from the abuse often lead to delayed disclosure—or no disclosure at all.

Number of Incidents

[16] Offenders who commit repeated acts of sexual violence against children should receive significantly longer sentences than those who engage in isolated incidents of abuse: Friesen, at paras. 131, 133. The harm suffered by the victim is compounded with each act, as “each instance of sexual victimization traumatizes the child victim anew and increases the likelihood that the risks of long-term harm will materialize”: Friesen, at paras. 131, 133. While the offence against J.B. occurred on a single occasion, B.B. subjected F.T.G. to numerous acts of sexual violence over the course of several months. The sentence I impose for the offences committed against F.T.G. must reflect the sustained and systematic nature of that abuse.

[17] That said, I wish to be clear: the offence against J.B. is not mitigated by the fact that it occurred only once. In Friesen, para. 114, the Court affirmed that significant custodial sentences may be appropriate even for a single incident of sexual abuse involving a single child: see also T.J., at para. 39. The mere absence of an aggravating factor does not constitute mitigation.

Impact on Victims

[18] Both section 718.2(a)(iii.1) of the Criminal Code and the common law obligate me to consider the impact on the victims. Offences of this nature inflict deep psychological trauma, including intense shame, guilt, confusion, and mistrust, which can resonate throughout a victim’s entire life.

[19] Although F.T.G. did not submit a victim impact statement, there is credible and compelling evidence of actual harm before me, which I accept. In her victim impact statement, F.T.G.’s mother states that F.T.G. is engaged in counselling and therapy, and that the abuse he suffered at B.B.’s hands has profoundly affected his sense of power, trust, and self-worth. She also informed the author of the presentence report that, during trial, F.T.G. would often retreat to the hotel bathroom in distress, screaming, questioning why his mother had allowed B.B. into their lives, and expressing that he no longer wished to live. That F.T.G. has been harmed—and that his relationship with his mother has been strained—as a result of B.B.’s actions is, regrettably, unsurprising, for all the reasons articulated in Friesen.

[20] In addition to the harm already inflicted upon F.T.G., I must also consider the potential for long-term psychological and emotional consequences that have not yet materialized: Friesen, at para. 80. The sentence I impose for the offences committed against F.T.G. must account for the “reasonably foreseeable potential harm” that may emerge later in life. To ignore that risk would imply, wrongly, that F.T.G. is expected to simply “outgrow the harm done to him”: Friesen, at para. 84. Given the duration of the abuse and the fact that it was committed by a trusted adult, I find it entirely foreseeable that F.T.G. may experience significant long-term effects, including difficulty forming healthy and loving relationships, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, diminished self-esteem, and a predisposition toward substance abuse: Friesen, at para. 81.

[21] I also take into account the harm B.B. has inflicted on F.T.G.’s mother. As recognized in Friesen, at para. 62, parents themselves are also victimized when their children are sexually abused. The sexual victimization of a child can shatter a parent’s confidence in family and community, give rise to intense and enduring guilt for failing to protect their child, and leave them to shoulder significant emotional, personal, and financial burdens in the aftermath, as they support their child’s recovery: Friesen, at paras. 62-63.

[22] Tragically, F.T.G.’s mother has endured all these impacts. In her victim impact statement, she describes how she will be haunted for years by the memory of B.B. touching her child. She speaks of the profound betrayal she feels, and how it has shattered her trust and faith in others. She now constantly second-guesses her maternal instincts and is tormented by self-blame—questioning whether she overlooked warning signs of B.B.’s deceit and deviance. She fears her son may never fully heal. As a result, she suffers from persistent insomnia and anxiety.

[23] The toll has also been financial. F.T.G.’s mother has incurred significant expenses for counselling and therapy to support her son’s recovery—costs that are not covered by insurance. She has also missed time from work both to care for F.T.G. and to attend trial.

[24] With respect to J.B., although no victim impact statement was provided, I do not infer from this that J.B. suffered no harm from B.B.’s offending conduct. On the contrary, I can infer significant harm from the circumstances of the offence. J.B. was exploited by a trusted uncle while his mother was away. It is unnecessary to hear directly from J.B. to appreciate the profound impact such a betrayal would have caused.

[25] I also note that the harm caused to children by this type of abuse is not contingent upon the physical degree of invasiveness of the assaults. In other words, the harm to F.T.G. is not lessened because the touching occurred over his clothing rather than under it, or because it was non-penetrative. Likewise, the harm to J.B. is not reduced because J.B. touched B.B.’s penis with his feet instead of his hands, nor because B.B. did not physically touch J.B. My focus is on the profound harm inflicted on F.T.G. and J.B. by a trusted individual in their lives, rather than the physical mechanics of the abuse itself: see Friesen, at para. 55.

[26] That said, I acknowledge that penetration is an aggravating factor, as it represents a more significant violation of the victim’s bodily integrity and often carries a greater risk of harm: Friesen, at paras. 138, 142. Penetration, when it has taken place, should be treated as a significant factor during sentencing. The central message in Friesen is not that all sexual assaults should be treated as equally grave. Rather, the Court cautioned against placing undue emphasis on the absence of penetration in a way that risks downplaying the significant emotional and psychological harm that non-penetrative assaults can cause: Friesen, at para. 144.

[27] Penetration as an aggravating factor is not present in this case. This is not mitigating of B.B.’s conduct, but it is relevant for the purpose of situating his sentence within the appropriate range. The absence of penetration may serve as a distinguishing feature when comparing this case to other sentencing precedents.

[28] I am also mindful that many of the harms evident in this case are, regrettably, common in instances of child sexual abuse, and were central to the Court’s rationale in Friesen in favor of enhanced sentencing ranges. As such, I must be careful not to double-count these harms when determining where B.B.’s sentence falls within the appropriate range: see R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, at para. 59. That said, the harm in each case must still be assessed on its own facts. As emphasized in Friesen, evidence of actual harm remains a “key determinant of the gravity of the offence”: para. 85.

Grooming Behavior

[29] The gravity of the offences committed against F.T.G. is further aggravated by B.B.’s calculated and manipulative conduct. He gradually groomed F.T.G. by first teaching him how to use a massager on his penis and complimenting his appearance while doing so. He later purchased a sex toy for F.T.G, told him that having sex with him would be like “winning the lottery,” and entertained F.T.G with pornography while he masturbated. These actions were not benign. Rather, they reflect a deliberate attempt to normalize B.B.’s sexual overtures and to exploit F.T.G.’s natural sexual curiosity: see R. v. Legare, 2009 SCC 56, at para. 30.

Mitigating Circumstances

[30] I find no mitigating factors relating to the gravity of the offences. F.T.G. and J.B.’s participation in the sexual acts is clearly not mitigating: Friesen, at para. 149. Nor does the fact that the offences could have been more physically invasive lessen their seriousness. The possibility that an offence might have occurred in more aggravating circumstances does not create mitigation where none otherwise exists: see Friesen, at para. 150.

Degree of Responsibility of Offender

[31] I will now assess B.B.’s degree of responsibility for the sexual offences he committed against F.T.G. and J.B., along with any aggravating or mitigating factors that arise from his personal circumstances.

Vulnerability of F.T.G.

[32] At the outset, I note that intentionally applying sexual force to a child constitutes conduct of the utmost moral blameworthiness. Except in truly exceptional cases, an offender is presumed to recognize the deep psychological, emotional, and physical harm caused to a child by such actions yet chooses to act out of self-serving and exploitative goals: Friesen, at para. 88. That moral culpability is further heightened when the offender targets a child who is especially vulnerable because of their personal circumstances: Friesen, at para. 90.

[33] In this case, I find that F.T.G. was particularly vulnerable. He was experiencing unexplained behavioral issues—later attributed by medical professionals to complications from Lyme disease treatment—and his mother, a single parent, was struggling to manage these challenges amidst the broader hardships of the COVID-19 pandemic. B.B. recognized this vulnerability and chose to exploit it for his own sexual gratification.

Breach of Trust

[34] Several of the factors that aggravate the gravity of the offences also serve to heighten B.B.’s degree of responsibility, as they reflect an elevated level of moral blameworthiness. Most significantly, B.B.’s position of trust with respect to both victims greatly heightens his culpability. This breach of trust not only deepens the harm experienced by the victims—by introducing a profound sense of betrayal—but also magnifies B.B.’s personal responsibility for that harm. He violated a clear duty of care to both F.T.G. and J.B. and deliberately exploited the faith and confidence they placed in him. Such conduct is particularly reprehensible and morally blameworthy: Friesen, at para. 129. His exploitation of two children in respect of whom he stood in a position of trust for his own gratification reveals a complete absence of moral restraint: see Friesen, at para. 90.

Number of Incidents

[35] Similarly, the repeated assaults on F.T.G. not only aggravate the gravity of the offences but also elevate B.B.’s degree of responsibility. The heightened risk of harm to F.T.G. was entirely foreseeable, and B.B. chose to persist nonetheless: see Friesen, at para. 131. His conduct demonstrates that the abuse was not an isolated or impulsive act, but part of a deliberate and sustained course of wrongdoing—an aggravating factor that increases his moral blameworthiness. As emphasized in Friesen, repeated acts of sexual violence warrant significantly lengthier sentences to reflect both the compounded gravity of the offences and the offender’s elevated culpability: Friesen, at para. 133.

Pattern of Conduct

[36] I acknowledge that any pattern of conduct that may be discerned from the facts concerning F.T.G. and J.B. is not, in itself, an aggravating factor: M.V., at paras. 63–65. The fact that B.B., at the time he abused F.T.G., had already engaged in related criminal conduct for which he had not yet been convicted “should not be treated as an aggravating factor calling for a harsher sentence,” as it does not bear on the gravity of the offence or the offender’s degree of responsibility: M.V., at para. 65. That said, B.B.’s history of offending is still relevant when considering the overall picture as it may properly inform the application of sentencing principles: M.V., at para. 65. In this case, the prolonged nature of B.B.’s offending supports the need for a sentence that gives meaningful effect to the goals of specific deterrence and the protection of the public. This is especially true given B.B.’s continued refusal to accept responsibility, including his decision to blame F.T.G. for his own abuse—an issue I will now address.

Lack of Insight

[37] B.B. demonstrates little to no insight into the harm he inflicted on F.T.G. He continues to deny any inappropriate touching or improper intent in providing F.T.G. access to pornography and a massager with which to masturbate. While this denial does not aggravate his moral culpability—B.B. is entitled to maintain his innocence—it is relevant to assessing his rehabilitative prospects and the ongoing need for specific deterrence.

[38] Moreover, even accepting B.B.’s own account, he fails to acknowledge his role in what occurred. B.B. testified that, on numerous occasions, he remained in the room while F.T.G. masturbated with B.B.’s massager, and that he repeatedly made the device available to F.T.G. for that purpose. He also admitted to playing pornography at F.T.G.’s request during these interactions. Yet rather than reflecting on how his conduct may have been inappropriate or harmful, B.B. told the probation officer that although he was the adult, “[F.T.G.] was the one in charge and instigated everything.” He went so far as to refer to F.T.G—who was approximately ten years old at the time—as a “nymphomaniac.” B.B.’s characterization of events is deeply concerning. His statements reveal significant cognitive distortions and troubling attitudes about children and sexual conduct. These views raise serious concerns about his insight, accountability, and risk of reoffending.

[39] This lack of insight significantly impacts the assessment of his rehabilitation prospects and the necessity for specific deterrence. As noted in R. v. Shah, 2017 ONCA 872, the absence of remorse may indicate a lack of acceptance of responsibility and a substantial likelihood of future dangerousness. I will return to this issue when considering the Crown’s position on delayed parole eligibility.

[40] I acknowledge that B.B. entered a guilty plea with respect to the offence involving J.B. As discussed below, he will receive credit for sparing J.B. the trauma of testifying. However, I am not persuaded—given his statements and demonstrated attitudes—that his plea reflects genuine insight into the harm he has caused. That is a distinct, albeit related, consideration.

Guilty Plea and Remorse

[41] B.B. did not plead guilty to the offences involving F.T.G. While this is not an aggravating factor, he is not entitled to any mitigation that would normally be afforded by a guilty plea. Further, B.B. has demonstrated a profound lack of remorse into the harm he has caused F.T.G. and his mother. He continues to deny the allegations of sexual touching and justifies the actions he does admit by blaming F.T.G., who was approximately ten years old at the time. B.B.’s statements, including referring to F.T.G. as a "nymphomaniac" reveal deeply troubling cognitive distortions and a failure to acknowledge the severity of his conduct. Furthermore, there is no evidence before me that B.B. has sought out counseling or therapy since his conviction on January 10, 2025. Genuine efforts at rehabilitation are positive indicators of remorse, yet none have been presented in this case.

[42] B.B. did enter a guilty plea in relation to J.B. Although he entered the plea midway through the trial and thus did not spare J.B. all the anxiety and uncertainty associated with preparing for trial, the plea did spare J.B. the trauma of testifying, and B.B. is entitled to mitigation on that basis. However, I do not infer a significant degree of remorse or insight from B.B., especially given his other troubling statements about his admitted behavior towards F.T.G. Remorse carries more weight when it is accompanied by insight and signs that the offender understands the gravity of their actions and has taken steps to change their attitude or impose self-discipline that significantly reduces the risk of reoffending: Friesen, at para. 165. Notwithstanding B.B.’s plea, I am not at all satisfied that he has experienced a “change of attitude.”

[43] In conclusion, B.B.’s lack of remorse, insight, and failure to engage in rehabilitative efforts indicate a significant risk of reoffending. These factors necessitate a sentence that prioritizes public protection and specific deterrence.

Criminal Record

[44] B.B. has a dated and unrelated criminal record. While this may be considered a mitigating factor in relation to the offence committed against J.B., I do not find it to be materially mitigating when determining the appropriate sentence for the offences committed against F.T.G—particularly in light of his admission to a related offence committed several years earlier. In these circumstances, I cannot infer prior good character based on the absence of a related criminal record when sentencing for the offences against F.T.G.: see M.V., at para. 68. Moreover, B.B. used his apparent good standing in the community to gain access to F.T.G. As Paciocco J.A. observed in M.V., at para. 69:

Similarly, his previous prosocial conduct has only limited significance in the sentencing of sexual offences, given that many sexual offences are committed by persons of prior good character and in many cases, prior good character helps enable sexual offences.

Childhood Sexual Abuse

[45] I’ve also considered other elements of B.B.’s personal circumstances. B.B. claims that both his brother and his sister propositioned him to engage in sexual activity on two separate occasions when he was 11 and 12 years of age. B.B. refused to engage them sexually. B.B. states that his relationship with his siblings deteriorated after the incidents. B.B.’s brother fell into alcoholism and his sister entered the sex trade. B.B. told the author of the presentence report that he wonders if their paths would have been more positive had he agreed to engage in sexual activity with them. Again, B.B.’s statement demonstrates cognitive distortions concerning sexual activity and children. While this may not be an aggravating factor, it underscores the importance of prioritizing specific deterrence.

[46] I acknowledge that a history of childhood sexual abuse can serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing: see R. v. P.V., [2016] O.J. No. 661, at para. 33. However, I do not find B.B.’s alleged experiences with his siblings to be significantly mitigating. First, the incidents appear to have been brief and did not involve physical contact. Second, there is little, if any, evidence before me linking these past experiences to B.B.’s current offending behavior. Finally, as a matter of public policy"everyone who is capable of understanding that conduct is condemned by society, whether they have been victimized or not, bears responsibility for their actions": see P.V., at para. 35.

Familial Dependence

[47] I understand that B.B. maintains a positive relationship with both his parents. His mother reports that B.B. visits her almost daily. His father, who is elderly, has expressed concern about the impact of B.B.’s incarceration, noting that he and his partner rely on B.B. for assistance. However, I have no evidence before me detailing the frequency or nature of this support. There are no letters of reference expanding on the extent of B.B.’s role, and counsel did not make oral submissions on this issue. It is unclear whether parental dependence was being advanced as a mitigating factor: see R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830; R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164; R. v. Spencer. Nevertheless, I am required by law to consider it.

[48] While I am sympathetic to any hardship B.B.’s incarceration may cause his parents, I do not find this to be a particularly persuasive factor in the sentencing analysis. The materials before me lack the necessary specificity to establish that B.B.’s role within his family unit justifies a reduction in sentence: see Brown, at paras. 11–12. This is not a case where family circumstances warrant a mitigated sentence.

Employment History

[49] B.B. does not have a strong employment history. He completed high school and later obtained a certificate from a personal support worker program at a local college. He worked in the hotel industry for approximately seven years before leaving due to unspecified safety concerns. He then worked for three years as a personal support worker but resigned due to difficulties with the work environment. B.B. has been unemployed since 2012. He currently relies on social assistance and applied for disability support in 2024.

Bail

[50] Finally, I have considered that B.B. has been on bail since August 11, 2023. However, there is no evidence before me regarding the impact of his bail conditions. Furthermore, the conditions were not so restrictive as to permit a reasonable inference of significant hardship. In my view, B.B.’s time on bail provides little, if any, mitigation in sentencing.

Sentencing Priorities and Principles

[51] Section 718 of the Criminal Code outlines the various objectives a sentencing judge must consider. In cases involving sexual offences against children, Parliament has mandated that primary emphasis be placed on denunciation and deterrence: Friesen, at para. 101; s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code. I must not place other sentencing objectives on an equal or higher footing: Friesen, at para. 104; T.J., at para. 37. In this case, I find that specific deterrence is equally important as general deterrence, given B.B.’s concerning attitudes and longstanding history of offending behavior. Where there are indications that an offender may reoffend, a longer sentence may be required to achieve personal deterrence: M.V., at para. 41.

[52] Although rehabilitation remains a relevant consideration in sentencing, in cases involving sexual offences against children, it is subordinate to the paramount objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and the protection of society. Sentencing must reflect the gravity of the harm inflicted on the child and the profound, often lifelong, consequences of the offender’s actions.

[53] A sentence must also be sufficiently severe to clearly express society’s disapproval of the offender’s actions. Naturally, the more abhorrent the offence, the harsher the sentence must be to reflect society’s condemnation – provided that such severity remains proportionate to the offence in light of its gravity and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Finally, I must apply the principle of restraint, which requires me to evaluate all reasonable alternatives to imprisonment—especially for a first-time offender—and to impose the shortest sentence necessary to achieve the relevant sentencing objectives. As noted by the Supreme Court in R. v. M.(C.A.), at para. 80, retribution “also incorporates a principle of restraint: retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate punishment, and nothing more.”

[54] As previously noted, a significant custodial sentence is required in light of the serious harm caused by B.B.’s conduct and his high level of moral culpability. His predatory behavior necessitates a sentence that strongly reflects both deterrence and denunciation. Specific deterrence is particularly important in this case. B.B. denies the offences against F.T.G., shows little to no remorse, and attributes blame to him for conduct that B.B. himself admits occurred—demonstrating a troubling lack of insight. In conclusion, I must give primacy to the interconnected sentencing objectives of retribution, denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, while considering rehabilitation only to the extent that it remains compatible with those primary purposes.

[55] Furthermore, while considering a sentence that fulfills these objectives, I must look to comparable cases and appellate-level decisions to determine the appropriate sentencing range, as the principle of parity requires that offenders who commit similar offences under similar circumstances receive similar sentences. The parity principle is essential to ensuring proportionality in criminal law and preventing unjust disparities in sentence.

[56] The reality is that there is a substantial body of trial-level sentencing decisions, and no two cases are identical. Nonetheless, the weight of the case law suggests that sentences for child sexual abuse generally range from the mid- to high-single digits to double-digit terms, particularly in cases involving repeated abuse or other aggravating factors. Lower single-digit sentences may be appropriate when mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, genuine remorse, and insight are demonstrated, coupled with the absence of aggravating elements like repetition. This broad range reflects the diverse circumstances in which these offences occur.

[57] I also note that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Friesen was released in early 2020, coinciding with the unprecedented pressures of the pandemic on the criminal justice system, including correctional institutions. This timing arguably limited the decision’s immediate impact, as the justice system was compelled to reduce incarceration rates. Furthermore, it is well established that those who served jail sentences during the pandemic endured harsher conditions. As a result, shorter sentences were often deemed sufficient to meet the objectives of punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, I read sentencing precedents established shortly after Friesen and during the pandemic with those nuances in mind.

Sentence

[58] With respect to J.B., considering the aggravating and mitigating factors discussed above—including B.B.’s late guilty plea and his position of trust—I find that a sentence of eighteen months is appropriate.

[59] In T.J., the Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of two years less a day on an offender with no prior criminal record who assaulted a seven-year-old child on a single occasion. During a sleepover, the accused placed the victim’s hands on his penis and used them to masturbate himself. He also asked the victim to put her mouth on his penis, but she refused. At the time of sentencing, the accused had been on bail for three years. The accused did not hold a position of trust or authority over the victim. Even if he had, positions of trust exist on a spectrum, and any such relationship in T.J. was far less significant than the bond between J.B. and B.B. In T.J., the Court reinforced that single digit penitentiary sentences in the context of child sexual abuse are “normal,” and that substantial sentences can result even for one single instance of sexual violence: T.J., at para. 30.

[60] I acknowledge that T.J. was sentenced following a trial, whereas B.B. entered a guilty plea in relation to the offence against J.B. However, as noted earlier, B.B.’s plea holds diminished weight as it was entered mid-trial. Moreover, I find B.B.’s breach of trust—both toward J.B. and his mother—to be particularly aggravating in this case. His selfish and deviant conduct exploited J.B.’s fundamental trust in him, causing emotional and psychological harm.

[61] The sentence for the offences committed against F.T.G. must be markedly more severe given their repetition and the other aggravating elements present, like grooming through the use of flattery, sex toys and pornography. In Friesen, the Court emphasized that offenders who commit repeated acts of sexual abuse against children ought to receive “significantly” higher sentences. If the Court in T.J. found that a two-year sentence was appropriate after trial for an offender who committed a single act of sexual violence, the sentence for the offences committed against F.T.G. must far exceed that given that B.B. committed repeated assaults against a vulnerable child in respect of whom he stood in a position of trust, abuse for which he has not shown an ounce of remorse. F.T.G. will bear the lifelong impact of B.B.’s selfish and deviant conduct. The sentence must appropriately reflect this enduring harm.

[62] Moreover, B.B caused all this harm while F.T.G.’s mother was at work, trusting that her vulnerable son was being cared for with love and protection. In doing so, B.B. inflicted a unique agony on the victim’s mother, who will carry misplaced guilt throughout her life, burdened by self-blame for what happened to F.T.G. She will continue to endure the unspeakable sorrow of believing that her son holds her responsible for his suffering. The depth of that pain is immeasurable.

[63] I acknowledge that the assaults on F.T.G. did not involve penetration. However, this does not diminish the harm inflicted on him. F.T.G.’s self-worth and ability to trust have been deeply damaged, and the relationship between F.T.G. and his mother has been severely fractured. The harm extends far beyond the physical. There are few, if any, mitigating factors before me that lessen either the severity of the harm or B.B.’s responsibility for it. In my view, a substantial sentence is necessary to reflect the gravity of B.B.’s offences against F.T.G. and his mother. A harsh sentence is also crucial to send a clear message to B.B.—and to others with similar intentions—that targeting society’s most vulnerable members will be met with severe repercussions: see R. v. D.D., at para. 45.

[64] I find that a total sentence of eight years less presentence custody is appropriate for the offences committed against F.T.G. The sentences shall run concurrently to one another given that they arose out of the same ongoing transaction. Concurrent sentences are also appropriate because I have considered B.B.’s conduct in making sexually explicit material available to F.T.G. as an aggravating feature of his overall conduct.

[65] This sentence shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed for the offence against J.B. Section 718.3(7)(b) of the Criminal Code mandates that sentences for sexual offences committed against different children be served consecutively. Even if this provision were inapplicable due to the timeframe of B.B.’s offences against J.B., I find that the common law would lead to the same conclusion. The offences represent distinct acts against different complainants, separated by approximately twenty years, and do not form part of the same sequence of events. In my view, a consecutive sentence is necessary to ensure that the total sentence remains proportionate and that the distinct harm suffered by each victim is individually acknowledged.

[66] Given the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple offences, the totality principle requires me to consider whether the aggregate sentence exceeds what is fair and appropriate, having regard to B.B.’s overall culpability: see s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code; M.(C.A.).

[67] A cumulative sentence may breach the totality principle if it far exceeds the usual range for the most serious offence or imposes an unduly harsh punishment given the offender’s record and prospects: see Clayton C. Ruby, Sentencing, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1994), at pp. 44-45. When applied in the appropriate case, the principle of totality promotes proportionality and reflects that, when sentences are combined, their intended purpose can often be achieved without simply multiplying individually appropriate sentences: R. v. Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339, at paras. 15-25. In essence, the full service of each component sentence is not typically required to achieve the applicable goals of sentencing: M.V., at para. 100.

[68] However, care must be taken to avoid an overly liberal application of the principle. The sentence must not be reduced to the point where it no longer accurately reflects the seriousness of the overall conduct or the offender’s degree of moral blameworthiness: see R. v. P.K., 2012 MBCA 69, at para. 23; R. v. Ladouceur and Traverse, 2008 MBCA 110. In R. v. Tasew, 2011 ABCA 241, at para. 74, the Court emphasized the following:

[T]he principle of totality reflected in s. 718.2(c) of the Code does not contemplate some sort of routinized rounding down to sentences leading to results that are fundamentally unrelated to proportionality. Worse, the results of doing so can communicate the appearance, if not the fact, of virtually no sentence for some crimes. Parliament certainly does not contemplate a "free ride", or, worse, a near incentive for aggravating the crime or for committing more crimes.

[69] The Ontario Court of Appeal has offered similar guidance on the application of the totality principle. In R. v. D.G.F., 2010 ONCA 27, while reviewing a sentence for sexual interference and making child pornography, the Court found that the sentencing judge erred by placing excessive emphasis on the totality principle, leading to a sentence that did not adequately reflect the overall gravity of the offender’s conduct:

In this case, the sentencing judge referred to many aspects of these offences that make them extremely serious transgressions calling for a significant penalty. However, in focusing on the totality principle, he failed to give sufficient weight or effect to the overall gravity of the course of conduct of the respondent and the cumulative circumstances that put his offences at the high end of moral culpability. [para 20]

[70] Finally, in R. v. Westcott, 2025 ONCA 291, the Court held that the sentencing judge did not err when stating that the totality principle is not intended to serve as a “volume discount” for repeat offenders, particularly where the offences are separate in time and location: para. 11.

[71] The total cumulative sentence in this matter, prior to the application of the totality principle, is nine and a half years. In Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that mid- to high-single-digit sentences should not be considered exceptional. In my view, the total sentence appropriately reflects the grave harm that B.B. knowingly, intentionally, systematically, and selfishly inflicted on two young boys who trusted and admired him. It also manifests the trauma suffered by their mothers, who likewise placed their trust in B.B., and the profound and enduring guilt experienced by F.T.G.’s mother, who B.B. deeply betrayed.

[72] In my assessment, no reduction is warranted under the totality principle. In my view, the sentence is not unduly long when considered in light of the seriousness of the offences and B.B.’s high level of moral culpability. Indeed, the sentence squarely aligns with the broad range deemed appropriate by the Supreme Court of Canada. While the sentence is undoubtedly severe, it is not, in my view, disproportionate. Its severity is justified by B.B.’s moral culpability, the number of victims, the repeated and systematic abuse inflicted upon F.T.G, the lifelong impact of the harm B.B. caused, the significant breach of trust, and the absence of any meaningful mitigating factors.

[73] Therefore, I sentence B.B. to a period of incarceration of eight years on count one less 390 days of presentence custody. This results in 2530 days left to serve on count one. I impose a concurrent sentence of five years on count two and a concurrent sentence of one year on count three.

[74] Finally, as noted, I impose a sentence of 18 months on count six that shall run consecutive to the sentences imposed on counts one through three.

Extended Parole Ineligibility

[75] The Crown asks me to delay B.B.’s parole eligibility pursuant to section 743.6(1) of the Criminal Code. Counts one and two are eligible counts for that purpose. Section 743.6(1) permits me to order that an offender serve half their sentence before they may be released on full parole if the circumstances of the offence, the character and circumstances of the offender, the expression of society’s denunciation of the offence or the objective of specific or general deterrence requires it. The paramount principles that guide the Court under the section are denunciation and specific or general deterrence, with rehabilitation being subordinate to these paramount principles: section 743.6(2) of the Criminal Code. The Crown bears the burden of satisfying me that the order is needed: R. v. Zinck, 2003 SCC 6, at paras. 29-31.

[76] Pursuant to this section, the determination of parole eligibility has become part of the sentencing process and no longer lies solely within the discretion of the Parole Board: Zinck, at para. 23. Where delayed parole is warranted, section 743.6(1) provides the appropriate mechanism to achieve that objective. It is improper to extend a jail term solely to manipulate the period of parole ineligibility: Zinck, at para. 18.

[77] The application of this provision involves a two-step analysis. First, I must determine an appropriate sentence by applying the factors outlined in section 718 of the Criminal Code, without regard to parole eligibility. Second, based on the same facts, I must assess the application of the provision with a primary focus on denunciation and deterrence, although other sentencing factors, while secondary to those emphasized by Parliament, remain relevant: Zinck, at paras. 24, 29–30. The power under section 743.6(1) should not be exercised routinely. Drawing on the evidence presented at trial and sentencing, I must decide whether this additional form of punishment is necessary to adequately achieve the objectives of sentencing: Zinck, at para. 31. While delaying parole eligibility is an exceptional measure, it may be justified where, after thorough consideration of all relevant principles and factors, the custodial sentence alone would be insufficient to fulfill the goals of denunciation and deterrence: Zinck, at para. 33.

[78] I am satisfied that a delay in B.B.’s parole eligibility is warranted. He has been convicted of sexually abusing two different children. He betrayed J.B.’s trust and exploited F.T.G. during a period of significant stress and vulnerability, when F.T.G was facing serious health challenges. B.B.’s conduct is rendered even more egregious by the fact that F.T.G.’s mother relied on him for support. The harm inflicted on both families will endure far beyond any extended period of parole ineligibility.

[79] Furthermore, B.B. does not merely maintain his innocence with respect to F.T.G.—a position that does not aggravate his sentence. He goes further. According to his own account, B.B. places blame on F.T.G. for the sexual misconduct that occurred under B.B.’s supervision in the home. He asserts that F.T.G. “instigated” the conduct and testified that F.T.G. “took advantage of him.” These statements underscore the ongoing risk that B.B. poses to the community and reinforces the need for specific deterrence.

[80] In Friesen, the Supreme Court of Canada urged sentencing judges to ensure that the sentence imposed—including parole eligibility, which is now recognized as an integral part of the sentencing process—adequately reflects the full gravity of the offence and the offender’s moral culpability. I agree that delayed parole eligibility should be recognized as an important tool in ensuring a just and proportionate sentence in cases of serious child sexual abuse: see R. v. P.G., [2020] O.J. No. 5590.

[81] In this case, B.B. shamelessly abused two young boys over whom he held a position of trust, and subsequently sought to shift blame onto one of them for B.B.’s own exploitative conduct. In these circumstances, to convey an adequate message of denunciation and deterrence, I am satisfied that B.B. must serve one-half of his sentence before being eligible for full parole. I recognize that the granting of full parole does not reduce the custodial sentence itself, as the offender remains under sentence until its expiry. However, while supervisory conditions remain in effect during parole, full parole affords the offender a “very substantial degree of personal freedom,” which inevitably lessens the sentence’s denunciatory and deterrent impact: Zinck, at para. 20. In my view, releasing B.B. after only serving one-third of the custodial portion of his sentence would fail to meet the pressing need for denunciation on these facts, as well as both general and specific deterrence.

[82] I acknowledge that, depending on the counselling or therapy B.B. may engage in while incarcerated, continued detention beyond one-third of his federal sentence might not be required to achieve rehabilitative or public safety objectives. However, the sentence I have imposed today is not grounded solely in rehabilitation. Its purpose is to denounce B.B.’s actions against these two young men and their families. This denunciatory aim stands apart from considerations of rehabilitation or even ongoing public protection.

[83] The sentence I impose today is intended to respond to the harm B.B. has already inflicted. Put simply, this sentence is required because B.B. deserves to be punished—proportionately, not arbitrarily—for the serious harm he has caused. I am satisfied that releasing B.B. after serving only one-third of his sentence would undermine the primary sentencing objectives in this case and fall short of the response that I consider necessary to fulfill them.

Ancillary Orders

[84] I am making an Order pursuant to section 490.012 of the Criminal Code requiring B.B. to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years. Counts one and two are designated offences; they were prosecuted by indictment; and B.B. received a sentence of over two years for each offence.

[85] I am also making an order pursuant to section 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code that a sample of B.B.’s DNA be taken forthwith for inclusion in the National Data Bank. All four offences for which B.B. has been sentenced are primary designated offences.

[86] Further, I am imposing a weapons prohibition pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code. B.B. shall be prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, or explosive substance for a period of ten years. Pursuant to that same section of the Criminal Code, B.B. is further prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life.

[87] I also impose an order pursuant to section 161 of the Criminal Code for a period of 20 years. Section 161 terms must be drafted carefully, and the specific conditions must constitute a reasonable attempt to minimize the risk an offender poses to the community. Put another way, the content of the order must carefully respond to the offender’s circumstances given that section 161 orders can have a significant impact on the liberty and security of the offender: see R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31.

[88] Though I have no expert evidence before me regarding B.B.’s risk of recidivism, I nonetheless assess it to be high given the evidentiary record before me: B.B. has a longstanding history of being sexually attracted to children; his offending behavior is opportunistic in nature; B.B. holds numerous cognitive distortions regarding children and sexual activity; he has expressed no remorse regarding what he did to F.T.G., in fact, he places the blame at F.T.G.’s feet; and, there is no evidence before me that B.B. has sought out counseling to deal with his longstanding predisposition.

[89] For a period of 20 years, I prohibit B.B. from attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of sixteen are present or can reasonably expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground, or community center. I appreciate that B.B. did not meet F.T.G. at any of these enumerated places, nor did the sexual acts perpetrated by B.B. on F.T.G. or J.B. occur at any such place. However, in R. v. L.T., 2022 ONCA 623, the Court of Appeal held that “it is not necessary before imposing a s. 161 order that the offender committed the offence in one of the prescribed circumstances of the section”: para. 3; see also R. v. R.J.H., 2021 BCCA 54, at paras. 19-30. B.B. clearly exhibits a sexual interest in children and, without intervention and counseling, presents a high risk of re-offending. Children must be protected from him. If B.B. engages in counseling in a meaningful way, thereby reducing his risk of re-offending, he may apply to have the terms or the duration of the Order varied. However, based on the evidence before me today, the protection of children must take priority over any inconvenience or hardship that may arise from the terms of the Order.

[90] B.B. is further prohibited from attending within 500m of F.T.G.’s residence, school, place of employment, or any other place B.B. knows F.T.G. to be. B.B. is further prohibited from having any contact – including communicating by any means – with a person under the age of 16 years, except for the purpose of a lawful retail or service transaction in a public or online establishment. Finally, B.B. is prohibited from seeking, obtaining, or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

[91] The Crown does not seek an Order pursuant to section 161(d). I agree that such a condition is unwarranted on the facts of this case, particularly given that the internet has become an indispensable component of everyday life: see R. v. Brar, 2016 ONCA 724.

Non-Communication Order

[92] Pursuant to section 743.21 of the Criminal Code, B.B. is prohibited from communicating, directly or indirectly, with F.T.G., or his mother, H.T., during the custodial period of his sentence.

Victim Surcharge

[93] Finally, B.B. is receiving a global sentence of nine and a half years with over eight years left to serve. Upon his release from custody, his focus must be on his rehabilitation and reintegration. B.B. has not been employed since 2012. In the circumstances, I find it appropriate to waive the victim surcharge.

Released: June 4, 2025

Anne McVey