Hank Goody

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim to a friend.

The Crown conceded necessity but argued the statement lacked threshold reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found that the statement met substantive reliability based on its inherent trustworthiness, corroborated by other evidence.

The court ruled the statement admissible, noting that admitting it also served the interests of trial fairness.

The applicant sought a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

The reviewing judge found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by not properly applying the "ladder principle" from R. v. Antic and by failing to provide sufficient reasons for rejecting less onerous forms of release, effectively imposing a reverse onus on the applicant.

The judge considered the release de novo and granted bail with enhanced community supervision conditions through the Toronto Bail Program, finding that the proposed plan adequately addressed primary and secondary ground concerns despite the applicant's lengthy criminal record and mental health issues.

Alex Sheikh sought a review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The applicant was charged with multiple offences, including assault and various firearm offences, and had a significant criminal record with prior breaches of court orders.

The original detention was based on secondary grounds, citing a substantial likelihood of committing further offences if released.

The applicant proposed four changes to his bail plan, including a new surety, a change in his mother's work schedule, willingness to undertake alcohol treatment, and GPS monitoring.

The court found that while these changes incrementally reduced the likelihood of re-offending, they were insufficient to overcome the substantial likelihood of committing criminal offences given the applicant's history.

The application for review was dismissed, and the detention order was upheld.

During a jury trial for first-degree murder, the self-represented accused brought multiple applications for a mistrial, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The accused alleged the judge called him a liar, favoured the Crown, withheld reasons on a Charter application, and made adverse evidentiary rulings.

The trial judge dismissed the applications, finding his actions were directed at controlling an ungovernable litigant who refused to abide by rulings, and that a fair-minded observer would not conclude there was bias.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the court held a pre-charge discussion to determine whether the lesser included offences of manslaughter and second-degree murder should be left to the jury.

The Crown argued that neither should be left, while the defence argued both should be available.

Applying the air of reality test, the court found no evidentiary foundation for manslaughter, as the forensic evidence indicated a targeted killing with no signs of a fight gone wrong.

However, the court found a gasping air of reality to second-degree murder, as a properly instructed jury could find the accused had the intent to kill but have a reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation.

Consequently, second-degree murder was left to the jury, but manslaughter was not.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the defence requested a jury instruction that the accused's after-the-fact conduct of attempting to collect the deceased's life insurance and death benefits had no probative value.

The Crown argued the conduct was relevant to the financial motive for the murder.

The court dismissed the defence's request, finding that the post-offence conduct was directly relevant to motive, which in turn was circumstantially relevant to the identity of the killers.

The court declined to give a 'no probative value' instruction.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found that the net delay was justified by the complexity of the case, which involved international extradition, voluminous disclosure, and significant defence-caused delays.

Furthermore, applying the transitional exceptional circumstances framework, the court determined that the delay was within the Morin guidelines and dismissed the application.

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's alleged 'high-risk' lifestyle, including his use of gay dating and fetish websites, to suggest an unknown third party committed the murder.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the probative value of the evidence was extremely low and based on conjecture.

The court held that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any probative value, as the proposed evidence relied on discredited myths and stereotypes about gay men and would distract the jury from the real issues.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce ante-mortem statements made by the deceased to demonstrate his state of mind and the accused's motive to kill.

The defence objected to the viva voce evidence of five witnesses and a Facebook thread, arguing they failed the test of necessity and were not material to motive.

The court ruled the statements admissible, finding they fell under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and were not introduced for the truth of their contents.

The court also held the statements were material to establishing motive and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, subject to minor redactions.

Two co-accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought an order permitting their joint representation by a single counsel, Ms. von Achten, following a prior order removing her as counsel for one accused due to conflict.

The court considered the accused's right to counsel of choice, the potential for tactical disadvantages, and the public interest.

Despite acknowledging potential future conflicts and the risk of proceeding unrepresented, the accused, having received independent legal advice, were adamant about their choice.

The court granted the application, emphasizing the accused's constitutional right to choose counsel, provided they confirm their understanding of the risks on the record.

The Crown brought an application to remove Susan von Achten as solicitor of record for Mladen (Michael) Ivezic, who is jointly charged with first-degree murder alongside Demitry Papasotiriou-Lanteigne.

Ms. von Achten had previously provided legal assistance to Mr. Papasotiriou-Lanteigne in a civil claim related to the matrimonial home and a police complaint, while also acting for Mr. Ivezic in the murder prosecution.

The court found a realistic prospect of conflict of interest due to the dual representation and the inevitable overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings.

Despite waivers from both accused, the court determined that Ms. von Achten could not satisfy the difficult burden of rebutting the presumption of confidential information being imparted.

The court emphasized that the potential for conflict, including the possibility of cross-examining a former client, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application to remove counsel was granted.

During a trial for second degree murder arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the accused requested a jury instruction on consciousness of innocence based on his post-offence conduct, including calling 911, asking about the victim's condition, and suggesting police check his vehicle for forensic evidence.

The trial judge declined to give the instruction, finding that the accused's actions were equally consistent with guilt or innocence and therefore lacked probative value to support an inference of a consciousness of innocence.

The accused was arrested for dangerous driving after striking and killing a skateboarder with his taxi.

The charge was later upgraded to second degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit the accused's video-recorded statement to police, while the accused applied to exclude it, alleging it was involuntary due to an atmosphere of oppression and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police treated the accused courteously and no oppressive conditions existed.

Although the court found an implementational breach of s. 10(b) due to a 1 hour and 50 minute delay in facilitating contact with duty counsel, the police made a "fresh start" by allowing the accused to consult duty counsel twice before taking the statement.

The police also made diligent efforts to contact the accused's counsel of choice before resorting to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application and ruled the statement admissible.

The offender, a taxi driver, was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after striking and killing a skateboarder with his vehicle.

The sentencing judge found as a fact that the offender intentionally struck the victim in a fit of road rage, using his vehicle as a weapon, though without the intent to kill.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 47.5 months' imprisonment (4 years less pre-trial custody credit), along with a 6-year driving prohibition and a weapons prohibition.