Richard Diniz

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction arose from an acrimonious divorce and custody/access dispute with his ex-wife.

The appellant alleged the trial judge demonstrated reasonable apprehension of bias through improper intervention, unequal scrutiny of evidence, and imposing a sentence significantly exceeding Crown submissions.

The appellate court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in imposing a sentence substantially longer than Crown submissions without prior notice and opportunity for further submissions.

The sentence was reduced from 18 months to 12 months imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

The defendant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a motorcycle collision where he was speeding and weaving through traffic, striking a pedestrian on the sidewalk who sustained severe injuries.

The court considered general deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing factors, along with mitigating factors such as no alcohol involvement and a non-intentional act.

Despite the defendant's expression of sorrow, the court noted his continued denial of fault and intent to resume motorcycle riding.

The court sentenced the defendant to 12 months in custody, 2 years' probation, and a 5-year motorcycle driving prohibition, declining ancillary DNA and firearms orders.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and criminal negligence causing bodily harm after his motorcycle collided with a left-turning vehicle and struck a pedestrian on the sidewalk.

Dash camera footage showed the accused speeding and weaving between vehicles, obscuring his view of the intersection.

The court found the accused's driving was a marked departure from the standard of care, resulting in a conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

However, the court acquitted the accused of criminal negligence, finding his actions did not amount to wanton or reckless disregard.

The offender, a taxi driver, was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after striking and killing a skateboarder with his vehicle.

The sentencing judge found as a fact that the offender intentionally struck the victim in a fit of road rage, using his vehicle as a weapon, though without the intent to kill.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 47.5 months' imprisonment (4 years less pre-trial custody credit), along with a 6-year driving prohibition and a weapons prohibition.

The accused was arrested for dangerous driving after striking and killing a skateboarder with his taxi.

The charge was later upgraded to second degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit the accused's video-recorded statement to police, while the accused applied to exclude it, alleging it was involuntary due to an atmosphere of oppression and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police treated the accused courteously and no oppressive conditions existed.

Although the court found an implementational breach of s. 10(b) due to a 1 hour and 50 minute delay in facilitating contact with duty counsel, the police made a "fresh start" by allowing the accused to consult duty counsel twice before taking the statement.

The police also made diligent efforts to contact the accused's counsel of choice before resorting to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application and ruled the statement admissible.

During a trial for second degree murder arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision, the accused requested a jury instruction on consciousness of innocence based on his post-offence conduct, including calling 911, asking about the victim's condition, and suggesting police check his vehicle for forensic evidence.

The trial judge declined to give the instruction, finding that the accused's actions were equally consistent with guilt or innocence and therefore lacked probative value to support an inference of a consciousness of innocence.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide breath samples.

The trial commenced on December 14, 2012, but was not completed and was scheduled to continue on August 1, 2013.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while 17 months had passed from arrest to the scheduled trial continuation, the delay was not unreasonable when accounting for inherent time requirements, defence unavailability, and the underestimation of trial length.

The court found no prejudice to the defendant's Charter rights beyond stress and strain.