Salar v. Salari, 2025 ONSC 3306

Court File No.: FS-25-00048388-0000
Date: 2025-05-23
Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Re: Seyedali Salar, Applicant
And: Mahnaz Salari, Respondent

Before: Lise Mathen

Counsel:
Meysa Maleki / Nadine Saba, for the Applicant
Susan Von Achten, for the Respondent

Heard: 2025-05-22

Endorsement

[1] The Applicant, Seyedali (“Ali”), brings a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home, and for exclusive possession in the interim period.

[2] The Respondent, Mahnaz, does not object to the sale provided that the Applicant provides her with $2 million to purchase a new home. She also seeks $10,000 in interim monthly spousal support; $50,000 for the purchase of a vehicle; and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home during the interim period.

[3] On April 10, 2025, the parties attended an urgent case conference at which Justice Vella granted leave for two separate motions:

a. The Applicant’s motion for disposition of the matrimonial home and exclusive possession, as well as the Respondent’s cross motion for exclusive possession.
b. The Respondent’s motion for a restraining order.

Issues and Brief Conclusion

[4] The issues on this motion are:

a. Whether the question of spousal support is properly before the court;
b. Whether Ali should be free to list the matrimonial home for sale, and if so, the terms on which that should proceed including who should have possession of the home during the interim period, and what should happen to the proceeds of sale.

[5] I find that the question of spousal support is not properly before the Court on this motion.

[6] Ali’s motion should be granted in part. Ali may list the home on the terms that he proposes. Ali is granted exclusive possession in 45 days. The entire proceeds of sale shall be held in trust subject to consent or further court order. Ali shall make a total uncharacterized payment to the Respondent of $30,000.

Facts

[7] The parties married in 2016 and separated in 2024. Ali has a son from a previous relationship who lived with the parties. The parties have no children of their own.

[8] The matrimonial home is solely owned by Ali. Mahnaz has been occupying it since the date of separation. There is no dispute that they moved into the home approximately two months prior to separation.

[9] There are currently two mortgages on the matrimonial home and an additional loan. The monthly mortgage payments are approximately $18,000. There are disputes about the nature of the second mortgage.

[10] Mahnaz was a physician in Iran. She is not qualified to practice medicine in Canada. She currently works in a medical office and reports an annual income of approximately $74,000.

[11] Ali owns several businesses in Iran including one with his brothers called Sepehr. His business interests amount to many millions of dollars. He claims that he earns an annual income of around $80,000. He reports annual expenses of just over $353,000.

Party Positions

Ali

[12] Ali purchased the matrimonial home on May 12, 2022, for $2,780,000. At the time there was a charge for the Bank of Montreal for $1,690,000. Ali deposes that the house was demolished and rebuilt – which the Respondent does not dispute. In December 2022, Ali incorporated Salar Dream Homes Inc. and 1000386103 Ontario Inc. for the purpose of starting a home renovation business.

[13] In 2023, because of additional development costs, Ali took out a second mortgage on the home for $1,100,000. The company he co-owns with his brothers, Sepehr, provided another $1,700,000.

[14] The parties moved into the matrimonial home in or around September 2024. On November 24, 2024, Ali was the subject of a police complaint that he assaulted Mahnaz. This is the date of separation and the date that Ali moved out. He deposes that pursuant to a peace bond he may not enter the home.

[15] Ali sought an urgent case conference on the basis he was no longer able to afford carrying the home. He pays all occupancy costs. In addition, he pays for a condominium where he lives with his son.

[16] Ali states that Mahnaz has shown that she will not cooperate in the home’s sale. He deposes that for several months she “unreasonably withheld her consent” to sell the matrimonial home. He points to several unanswered letters sent to her between January and March 2025.

[17] Ali attached as an exhibit a letter from his listing agent who recommends selling the home for $5,695,000. The agent urges that the house be listed within the next two months.

[18] Because of the peace bond, Ali says he requires exclusive possession of the home in order to effect the sale. He is willing to give Mahnaz thirty days to vacate. In addition, he will make an uncharacterized payment to her of $30,000 which should meet her needs until the case conference scheduled for September.

Mahnaz

[19] Mahnaz’s affidavit details her distress at the current situation. She alleges that Ali has a great deal of money and property in Iran and Toronto. She details the parties’ luxurious lifestyle. She discusses the circumstances under which she left Iran for Canada and was forced to abandon her career.

[20] Mahnaz deposes that she is “happy to sell the matrimonial home and move out once [she has] monies to purchase a new home.”

[21] Mahnaz deposes, without going into detail, that the home’s value is contested and “[Ali] is deliberately undervaluing the property to put [her] at a disadvantage.” In her factum and oral submissions, but not her affidavit, Mahnaz argues that the second mortgage was not genuine but was taken out to depress the equity in the home. She argues that she signed mortgage papers under duress.

[22] Mahnaz details the career sacrifices she has made. She deposes to her need for post separation and spousal support. She claims she is on a restricted diet and can no longer afford non-essential groceries. She has made “significant adjustments to her spending habits which are inconsistent with the lifestyle [she] previously maintained.”

Analysis

The Law

[23] The “primary objective” of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg 114/99 is to enable the court to deal with cases justly having regard to, among other things: ensuring that the process is fair to all parties; saving expense and time; and dealing with a case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity: Rule 2.

[24] Under section 21 of the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, the spouse who owns the matrimonial home may only sell it with the consent of the other spouse or pursuant to court order.

[25] Under section 23 of the FLA:

The court may, on the application of a spouse or person having an interest in property, by order…

(b) authorize the disposition or encumbrance of the matrimonial home if the court finds that the spouse whose consent is required…

(iii) is unreasonably withholding consent,

subject to any conditions, including provision of other comparable accommodation or payment in place of it, that the court considers appropriate[.]

[26] A sale of the matrimonial home must “fairly balance the prime facie right of a titled party to that sale with the correspondent obligation to consider whether a sale would prejudice the right of a party resisting a sale”: Kim v. Lee, 2024 ONSC 4788, para. 35. The non-titled spouse’s interest in the matrimonial home is an interest not in the property itself but the home’s potential value in any equalization claim: Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2023 ONSC 7203.

[27] Section 24 of the FLA provides for an order for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. In making such an order, the Court shall consider the factors enumerated in section 24(2):

• (a) the best interests of the children affected;
• (b) any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations;
• (c) the financial position of both spouses;
• (d) any written agreement between the parties;
• (e) the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and
• (f) any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children.

Issue One: The Question of Spousal Support

[28] Leave for this motion was granted at an urgent case conference.

[29] Justice Vella’s endorsement does not mention spousal support. She did grant the Respondent leave to bring a motion for a restraining order.

[30] The Respondent argues that she should receive over 2 million dollars right now and $10,000 a month in spousal support. In support of this the Respondent makes factual assertions about her entitlement based on need and the parties’ lifestyle prior to separation. It is not possible on this motion to decide these claims.

[31] Given the clear wording of Justice Vella’s endorsement, it was for the Respondent through her counsel to explain how the question of spousal support was properly before the Court on this motion. I find that she did not.

[32] I note that Rule 14(4) of the Family Law Rules permits a court on motion to consider an issue that has not been previously conferenced if it is nonetheless urgent. Even considering Rule 14(4), however, there is no evidence of urgency. The parties are scheduled for a case conference on September 25, 2025. Ali has offered to pay $30,000 to the Respondent as an uncharacterized amount. The Respondent has no dependents, is employed and, by her own evidence, has not paid accommodation costs for several months.

[33] The Respondent’s request for interim spousal support is dismissed.

Issue Two: The Matrimonial Home

[34] Ali is the registered owner of the matrimonial home. Mahnaz’s interest in the home is not property-based but related to her right to equalization.

[35] Mahnaz’s affidavit and factum does not provide any arguments against the sale. Instead, she lists conditions for the sale. In addition to interim spousal support, she seeks:

a. $2,000,000 towards the price of a new home;
b. $50,000 towards a new vehicle;
c. Exclusive possession in the interim period; and
d. Joint decision-making in the sale.

[36] The first two conditions are not reasonable. They rest on factual assertions regarding equalization and the parties’ lifestyle that are triable issues. The latter two conditions are not supported by Mahnaz’s evidence. Mahnaz’s legal arguments relate almost entirely to her claim for spousal support which I have determined is not properly before me. She made no substantive legal arguments in relation to the sale of the home itself or her right to exclusive possession.

[37] I can appreciate that Mahnaz finds it upsetting to have to vacate the home. But it is not reasonable for her to expect to live in a $5.5 million dollar home that is funded entirely by Ali. Nor, at this stage of the case, is it reasonable for her to expect to receive 2 million dollars towards the purchase of an alternative home.

[38] Mahnaz argues that the second mortgage is essentially a ruse in order to depress the equity in the home. She did not particularize this claim in her affidavit, but it came out in argument. I agree with Ali’s counsel that this argument is not supported by the evidence before the court.

[39] On the evidence that is before the court, I find it more likely than not that Ali cannot afford the upkeep of the home.

[40] I agree with Ali that there are no compelling circumstances which supersede his right to sell the home: Sokoloski v. Sokoloski, 2022 ONSC 4590, para. 31. Mahnaz will not be prejudiced in pursuing her equalization interest, since Ali does not object to all of the net proceeds being held in trust. While Mahnaz has fewer resources than Ali, she is employed full-time. She has no dependents. In addition, she will have the benefit of $30,000 from Ali as an uncharacterized payment. Added to her income, she should be able to afford suitable accommodation for at least some time. Her entitlement to interim spousal support can be revisited at the upcoming case conference in September 2025.

[41] I am not persuaded that it is appropriate for Mahnaz to have any participation in the sale. The parties have a difficult relationship that could threaten the necessary cooperation. Ali must carry out the sale in good faith having regard to the live issues regarding equalization.

[42] For the following reasons, I also find on a balance of probabilities that Ali is entitled to an order for exclusive possession:

a. The property is Ali’s.
b. There are no children who will be negatively affected by such an order. If anything, the order will benefit Ali’s son, who is currently unable to live in the home since the peace bond prevents his father from attending there.
c. There are no existing orders with respect to the home.
d. I do not accept the entirety of Ali’s narrative concerning Mahnaz’s prior lack of cooperation. Nevertheless, I find that an order of exclusive possession is warranted because of the peace bond which prevents Ali from going to the home. I find it a reasonable conclusion that this will unduly complicate his ability to sell the home.
e. Related to the above factor, I am not persuaded on a balance of probabilities that Mahnaz’s allegations of violence outweigh the other factors that suggest that Ali should have exclusive possession. Ali faces no current criminal charges. There is insufficient evidence before the court to find on a balance of probabilities that the peace bond is dispositive of past violence.

[43] Section 24 of the FLA permits the court to issue the order subject to any conditions it considers appropriate. I have decided that the order shall issue in 45 days, not the 30 days that Ali requests. Mahnaz must vacate within 6 weeks. I find that this period strikes the right balance between giving Mahnaz an opportunity to find suitable accommodation and permitting Ali to prepare the home for sale.

[44] Ali requests that the $30,000 be provided to Mahnaz in two tranches, one within 14 days and one when she vacates the property. Drawing on my authority under Rule 2, I find it just that the first tranche be provided within 7 days.

[45] The parties are urged to come to an agreement on costs. If they do not, they may forward submissions via my assistant Linda.Bunoza@ontario.ca as indicated in the penultimate clause of the Order below.

Order

[46] In conclusion, I make the following order:

a. The Respondent’s motion is dismissed.

b. The Applicant’s motion is granted in part:

i. An Order shall issue dispensing with the Respondent, Mahnaz Salari (the “Respondent”)’s consent to sell the matrimonial home municipality located at 35 Foursome Crescent, North York, ON M2P 1W1 (the “matrimonial home”) and authorizing the disposition of the matrimonial home pursuant to section 23 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3;

ii. The Applicant, Seyedali Salar (the “Applicant”) shall have the sole authority to make all decisions with respect to the listing agent, listing date, sale terms, and any other matters relating to the sale of the matrimonial home, provided that he effects the sale in good faith;

iii. The Applicant shall be granted exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to carry out the sale of the matrimonial home pursuant to section 24(3) of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 on Monday July 7, 2025;

iv. The Respondent shall vacate the matrimonial home by Friday July 4, 2025;

v. The Respondent shall not remove or destroy any contents of the matrimonial home before the date she is to vacate the property;

vi. The net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home shall be preserved in the trust account of the real estate lawyers acting on the transaction pending further agreement by the parties or an Order of the Court.

vii. Within 7 days of the date of this Order, the Applicant shall advance to the Respondent the sum of $15,000, as an uncharacterized amount to be a credit to him in the case against property and/or support. The Applicant shall advance to the Respondent the remaining sum of $15,000 as an uncharacterized amount to be a credit to him in the case against property and/or support contemporaneous with the date she vacates the home.

c. The parties may submit arguments for costs no longer than 3 pages, together with their bills of costs and any offers to settle, within 45 days of this Order. Neither party shall have the right of reply.

d. Either party may forward for my signature a Draft Order consistent with these provisions within 14 days. After that time, they can proceed via a 14B order.

Lise Mathen
Date: 2025-05-23