Christopher J. Thiesenhausen

The proposed defendant, having successfully defended a motion by the plaintiffs to add him as a party after the limitation period expired, sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,910.28.

The plaintiffs argued for nominal costs.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $6,082.64, finding the proceeding was not complex but of significant importance to the proposed defendant.

The court declined to order costs jointly and severally against the plaintiffs' principal, as no evidence was presented to justify such an exceptional order.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for unpaid professional invoices as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was extended by a written acknowledgment of the debt under s. 13 of the Act and alternatively that promissory estoppel prevented the defendants from relying on the limitation defence.

The court held that the plaintiff discovered the claim no later than the date of the final invoice and commenced the action outside the two‑year limitation period.

The alleged acknowledgment did not clearly and unequivocally admit liability for any amount owing, and the evidence did not establish the elements of promissory estoppel.

The claim was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim relating to an alleged beneficial interest in residential property.

The plaintiff had co-signed a mortgage to assist the defendant with the purchase and later executed a trust agreement and power of attorney confirming she held no beneficial interest.

After a prior court order declared those documents valid, the plaintiff commenced an action challenging them and asserting an interest in the property.

The court held the claim was statute‑barred because the limitation period began when the plaintiff consulted counsel and challenged the validity of the documents.

The plaintiff failed to provide admissible expert evidence establishing mental incapacity to delay discoverability under the Limitations Act.

The responding party sought to set aside a prior order on the basis that it had been obtained by fraud, alleging that motion materials had never been served despite an affidavit of service stating otherwise.

The court considered whether the alleged lack of service established fraud sufficient to invalidate the earlier order.

Evidence included an affidavit from the lawyer who effected service and a voicemail message from the moving party indicating knowledge of the proceeding.

The court found the lawyer’s evidence credible and concluded that proper service had been effected.

The motion to set aside the earlier order was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to stay pending summary judgment motions brought by the defendants, arguing that the motions were premature and that discovery was necessary to develop a full evidentiary record capable of satisfying the “full appreciation” test.

The defendants opposed the stay and argued that the issues—primarily a limitation period defence under the Limitations Act, 2002—were appropriate for determination on summary judgment.

The court reviewed the post‑2010 summary judgment framework articulated by the Court of Appeal and considered whether the evidentiary record required the procedural advantages of a trial.

The court found that the dispute was largely document‑driven, involved limited witnesses, and centred on whether the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the loss of her beneficial interest in property by at least April 2009.

The court held that the matter was suitable for summary judgment and dismissed the motion to stay.