David D’Intino

During a criminal trial for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, the accused was cross-examined by the Crown on a written statement he had provided to a Children's Aid Society worker.

The defence objected, arguing the worker was a person in authority and a voluntariness voir dire was required.

The court found that the CAS worker was a person in authority because the accused reasonably believed she had the power to compel the statement and influence proceedings.

However, the court declined to hold a voluntariness voir dire at that late stage of the trial due to prejudice to the accused, and instead excluded the evidence related to the statement.

Applications for a mistrial and stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The Crown brought a cross-count similar fact application at the close of its case, seeking to admit evidence related to three incidents of alleged sexual abuse by the accused, H.F., against his stepdaughter, LFR, to apply to each other count.

The charges included sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the similar fact evidence against its prejudicial effect.

Despite some dissimilarities in the specific acts, the court found compelling similarities in the surrounding circumstances, such as the complainant's young age and vulnerability, the accused's position of trust, the mother's absence during the incidents, and the location of the acts within the family home.

The court concluded that these common characteristics demonstrated a pattern of conduct, and that the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The application for the admission of similar fact evidence was granted.

The accused, H.F., facing sexual assault charges, brought an application for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) records related to the complainant, LFR, his stepdaughter.

The Defence argued H.F. was already in lawful possession of the records from prior child protection proceedings and thus the s. 278 Criminal Code regime for third-party records did not apply.

The Crown and Complainant argued the records were not in lawful possession for criminal proceedings and were subject to s. 278.

The court found that H.F. was not in lawful possession of the CAS records for the purpose of criminal proceedings, and the records were subject to the s. 278 disclosure scheme.

The court further determined that the Defence failed to establish the records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial and that their production was not necessary in the interests of justice, considering the complainant's privacy rights and the limited probative value of the records.

The application was denied, and the records were deemed inadmissible.

This is a sentence appeal concerning a three-year driving prohibition imposed for dangerous driving.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons and that the prohibition was excessive and disproportionate.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred by not providing explicit reasons for imposing the maximum prohibition, especially given the appellant's status as a first offender and single father, and by over-emphasizing denunciation without sufficient consideration of individual circumstances.

The court varied the driving prohibition from three years to two years.