Janine Elizabeth Hodgins

The offender pled guilty to 'over 80' and driving while disqualified.

He had 12 prior drinking and driving convictions, but there was a 15-year gap since his last offence.

The court considered whether the 'gap principle' should mitigate his sentence.

Finding that the offender had continued to drink heavily and made no efforts at rehabilitation during the 15-year period, the court accorded little weight to the gap principle.

Emphasizing specific deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to 21 months' incarceration for the 'over 80' charge, 12 months concurrent for driving while disqualified, and imposed a lifetime driving prohibition.

The respondent sought reimbursement of $107,000 in expenses allegedly incurred as a result of ex parte orders made on June 25 and 27, 2018.

The respondent claimed the applicant breached the duty of candour by omitting vital information and mischaracterizing facts, thereby misleading the court into making orders it would not otherwise have made.

The court dismissed the request for damages, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction to award damages on motions for interlocutory injunctions or mandatory orders.

The court noted that while such conduct might constitute bad faith or unreasonable behaviour, the appropriate remedy is through costs awards under the Family Law Rules, not damages.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought an application seeking disclosure of records relating to the Intoxilyzer device used to test his breath samples, including maintenance logs, calibration data, and internal quality assurance records.

The Crown and police service opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested records were third-party records subject to the O'Connor regime and that the accused had failed to meet the "likely relevant" threshold required for production of such records.

This is a sentence appeal concerning a three-year driving prohibition imposed for dangerous driving.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons and that the prohibition was excessive and disproportionate.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred by not providing explicit reasons for imposing the maximum prohibition, especially given the appellant's status as a first offender and single father, and by over-emphasizing denunciation without sufficient consideration of individual circumstances.

The court varied the driving prohibition from three years to two years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his 'straddle evidence' and reversing the burden of proof.

The appellant had consumed a large amount of alcohol shortly before driving (bolus drinking) and provided a toxicologist's report suggesting his blood alcohol level might have been below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that general elimination rates rarely defeat the presumption of identity under section 258(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol after entering a guilty plea.

He argued the plea was not informed because he relied on incorrect immigration advice that a conviction would not affect his immigration status in Canada.

After the conviction he learned the offence rendered him inadmissible to Canada as a foreign national and subject to removal proceedings.

The court held that a guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, and in the unusual circumstances the appellant’s reliance on erroneous legal advice regarding immigration consequences meant he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.