Margaret Osadet

The applicant, charged with marijuana-related offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months.

The court applied the Askov/Morin framework, attributing portions of the delay to inherent time requirements, institutional delay, the Crown, and the defence.

The court found the unjustified delay of almost 15 months fell within the Morin guidelines and that evidence of actual prejudice was weak.

The application was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence of the respondents' conviction and sentencing for manslaughter of one of their children in a Crown wardship proceeding.

The Society sought to adduce this evidence by way of a 14B motion without an oral hearing.

The respondents opposed, arguing that an oral hearing should be held to permit submissions on the weight to be attached to the convictions.

The court found that sentencing is a distinct process from conviction and dismissed the motion without prejudice, ordering that the matter proceed by way of an oral motion at a scheduled court date to allow the respondents an opportunity to be heard.

Following a jury conviction for manslaughter by reason of failing to provide the necessaries of life, the court sentenced both parents for the death of their young child.

The sentencing judge found the respondents equally culpable because they ignored medical advice and obvious warning signs over an extended period, resulting in chronic malnutrition that materially contributed to death alongside an asthma attack.

Applying the sentencing fact-finding framework for jury verdict cases, the court distinguished more egregious child-death authorities involving deliberate abandonment or overt deprivation, but held that denunciation and deterrence had to predominate under the Criminal Code because the offence was committed against a vulnerable child.

A fit sentence was 30 months for each offender, subject to presentence and bail credit, with probation imposed on one respondent and ancillary DNA and weapons prohibition orders made.

A child protection society sought to reopen a child protection trial after all evidence had been heard but before final submissions were made.

The purpose was to introduce evidence that the respondent parents had been convicted of manslaughter of one of their children.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the evidence was not necessary, that the society lacked diligence, and that reopening would violate their Charter rights.

The court allowed the motion, finding that the evidence was relevant, necessary, and reliable, and that in child protection cases a flexible approach should be adopted when the evidence relates to the best interests of the child.

In a family guardianship dispute concerning an adult daughter, the moving party sought interim guardianship or interim access pending determination of the full guardianship application.

The court held that the factual record was inadequate to draw conclusions about capacity and emphasized that any capacity issues required proper professional assessment.

Applying s. 55(2) of the Substitute Decisions Act, the court dismissed the interim guardianship request because alternatives had not been fully explored.

The court also dismissed interim access after receiving submissions from counsel appointed for the adult daughter, who reported clear instructions that she wished to remain with her father and aunt and did not wish to see her mother.

A media applicant sought to vary a publication ban imposed during a criminal trial so that the offenders' and victim's names could be published while continuing to protect the identities of surviving children.

Applying the Dagenais-Mentuck framework, the court held that a broader ban shielding the adult offenders' identities was not necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice or the relevant public interest in protecting vulnerable children.

The court distinguished authority concerning anonymity for child cyberbullying victims and emphasized the significant deleterious impact on the open court principle of withholding the names of adult offenders in a homicide case.

The publication ban was varied to prohibit only publication of the names of surviving children of the offenders.

In a contested guardianship proceeding concerning an adult child alleged to function at a much younger developmental age, the court dealt with multiple related applications.

On consent, it authorized production of police and school records sought for the guardianship case, subject to appropriate terms and privacy redactions.

The court held that the adult child's capacity was clearly in issue and directed the Public Guardian and Trustee to arrange counsel under s. 3 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The mother's request for interim guardianship or access was declined pending input from the Public Guardian and Trustee, and the related court files were merged for case management purposes.

Two co-accused brought pre-trial applications under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter seeking a stay for undue delay on drug trafficking charges.

Applying the Morin framework, the court assessed total delay, institutional delay across two court levels, prejudice, and the impact of one accused’s failure to appear.

The court held that the nearly 30 months of institutional delay in the first accused’s case, combined with lengthy restrictive bail conditions and repeated trial preparation, rendered the total delay constitutionally unacceptable.

The second accused’s application failed because his lengthy absence from the process materially reduced the institutional delay attributable to the state.

Following convictions for manslaughter by failing to provide the necessaries of life to a child, a publication ban had been imposed under s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code protecting the identities of surviving siblings and information that could identify them.

A media organization sought to narrow or vary the ban, while counsel for the convicted parents requested the appointment of amicus curiae to advance the interests of the affected children.

The Crown ultimately supported narrowing the ban but took no position on the appointment of amicus.

The court considered competing interests between freedom of expression and the protection of vulnerable children.

The court appointed a child advocacy legal clinic as amicus curiae to assist in determining the proper scope of the publication ban before sentencing.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges arising from a hostage-taking incident at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

Stanton David was charged with three counts of hostage taking, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

Alpha Water was charged with three counts of hostage taking and one count of placing a trap with intent to cause bodily harm.

The Crown also sought committal on two counts of mischief for Water.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on the hostage-taking charges and committed Water on the mischief charges, but discharged Water on the trap charge due to insufficient evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

During a sexual assault trial, the complainant began testifying but left the courthouse during cross‑examination after experiencing a mental health crisis and attempting self‑harm.

She was apprehended under the Mental Health Act and involuntarily admitted to hospital for psychiatric assessment.

The court addressed how the trial should proceed while the witness’s ability to complete testimony remained uncertain, noting potential reliance on Criminal Code provisions regarding prior testimony and video‑link evidence if the witness could not return.

The court directed that the trial continue with other evidence that would not prejudice the defence pending the complainant’s anticipated return.