No appearance

The court considered a motion for default judgment brought by the plaintiff, Ranjani Venkataramani, against Abdulla Abdul Fatah, 5053767 Ontario Inc. (operating as Apolo and Co.), John Doe Construction Corp, and Golden Seal Construction Corp. The plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract, breach of the Consumer Protection Act, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and punitive damages arising from a failed home renovation.

The court granted partial default judgment for $80,000 against Apolo and the same amount jointly and severally against Apolo and Mr. Fatah under the Consumer Protection Act, but declined to award further damages for delay, lost rental income, additional interest, or punitive damages due to insufficient evidence.

The court also clarified the limited circumstances in which corporate officers can be held personally liable.

The Ontario Court of Justice allowed the City of Toronto's appeal of judicial stays of proceedings against Henry Shein Canada and Lisa Lee-Tucker for red light camera infractions.

The stays were originally granted due to violations of s. 11(b) of the Charter (right to a trial within a reasonable time) and common law abuse of process because the cases exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Court found that the trial judge erred by initiating the stays sua sponte without proper notice to the prosecution, violating the procedural requirements under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The decision clarifies that stays for delay under s. 11(b) require notice and that trial judges must exercise caution when bringing motions on their own initiative, especially in unrepresented accused cases under the Provincial Offences Act.

The City of Toronto appealed the decision of Justice of the Peace N. Tahiri who imposed fines below the statutory minimum for red light camera offences under s. 144(18.1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal focused on whether the Justice of the Peace properly applied s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, which allows courts to impose fines below the minimum in exceptional circumstances.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the Justice of the Peace failed to properly apply the statutory test, relying instead on docket management considerations without addressing the required legal criteria or inquiring into defendants' personal circumstances.

The Court held that the discretion under s. 59(2) must be exercised judicially, with reasons explaining the decision, and that the fines were imposed arbitrarily.

The appeal was allowed, but the fines remained unchanged at the City's request.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) sought a garnishment order against H & M Flooring Inc. to recover a judgment debt owed by Hussein El Hossaini.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, finding that RBC failed to provide sufficient evidence of the amount, if any, owed by the garnishee to the debtor.

The court emphasized that a failure to respond to a garnishment notice does not create a presumption that the full amount claimed is owed, and that reliable evidence of the debt is required before a garnishment order can be made.

The applicants sought an order to discharge a mortgage under section 12(3) of the Mortgages Act, as the mortgagee, Frontiers Foundation Inc. (FFI), could not be found and had not responded to inquiries.

The court found that the applicants made diligent efforts to locate FFI and ascertain the mortgage status, and that FFI's claim was statute-barred by the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court exercised its discretion to discharge the mortgage without requiring payment into court, balancing the equities in favour of the mortgagor's successors.

The United Jewish Appeal of Greater Toronto (UJA) brought motions for default judgment against 100181947 Ontario Inc. o/a TLC Worldwide Inc. (TLC) and Daljit Sohal, and to enforce a settlement against Ryan Singh.

UJA also sought orders validating service on Singh and for substituted service on Mohammed Ashfaq and Prestige Worldwide Transportation Network LLC.

The court granted default judgment against TLC and Singh for breach of contract in the amount of $68,260.00 plus interest, validated service on Singh, and ordered substituted service on Ashfaq and Prestige.

However, the court declined to grant default judgment against Sohal, finding that the claim for unjust enrichment was not sufficiently made out as there was no incontrovertible evidence that Sohal personally received the benefit.

The Bank of Montreal (BMO) sued corporate and individual defendants for $277,827.96, representing funds mistakenly deposited into the defendants' accounts and subsequently withdrawn.

The defendants failed to participate in the lawsuit after delivering a statement of defence.

The court found the defendants liable on the grounds of restitution for money paid under mistake of fact, and alternatively, conversion and unjust enrichment, ordering repayment of the funds, costs, and interest.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) in 2016, appealed a 2024 disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his detention.

The ORB concluded he remained a significant threat to public safety primarily due to ongoing cannabis use.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB's reasons did not adequately explain how the legal test for "significant threat to the safety of the public" was met, particularly regarding the causal link between cannabis use, mental state deterioration, and a substantial risk of serious criminal harm.

The court noted the appellant's medication adherence and lack of recent violent behaviour, questioning the ORB's conclusion that intervention was the sole reason for no deterioration.

The appeal was allowed, the ORB's disposition set aside, and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to preserve the respondent mother's assets pending a guardianship application, alleging the mother lacked capacity and was subject to undue influence by a new, much younger husband.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no medical evidence to support the claim of incapacity and that the issue of undue influence was premature as the mother was alive and deemed capable.

The court emphasized that a competent person has the right to make decisions deemed foolish by others.

The appellant sought to recognize a verbal talaq divorce from 2010, arguing it was a legal divorce in the United Arab Emirates.

The motion judge dismissed the recognition motion, finding it did not conform with s. 22 of the Divorce Act and principles from Abraham v. Gallo, lacking judicial oversight or satisfactory evidence of foreign law.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's decision, affirming that no admissible evidence was provided to show the divorce was overseen by a judicial body or otherwise recognizable in Canada.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a divorce order, arguing improper service of the Notice of Application and alleging the divorce was fraudulent, relying on a signature comparison and postage irregularities.

The Court of Appeal found no credible evidence to support the appellant's claims of fraud or service issues, noting the signatures appeared similar and there was no support for postage irregularities.

The court also considered that the parties had been separated since 2014 and a prior order granted the respondent sole decision-making responsibility for the children.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought declarations and an order of mandamus to compel the Attorney General of Ontario to provide statistical data and court file numbers related to civil trials.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the open court principle does not extend to requiring the aggregation and generation of such bulk data, and that the Attorney General lacked the authority to provide the information, as it rests exclusively with the court.

The court also denied the applicant's request to transfer the application to the Divisional Court for judicial review, citing procedural deficiencies and lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for judgment based on a settlement agreement.

The defendants did not appear or file any materials.

The court granted judgment to the plaintiffs against Patricia Giankas for the remaining amount owing ($20,000) plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and awarded costs to the plaintiffs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court order declaring him a vexatious litigant and restricting his access to courts under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge lacked jurisdiction to make such an order on its own initiative, as s. 140 requires an application by an interested person, and there is no inherent common law authority for such orders.

While acknowledging the appellant's history of frivolous litigation, the court reluctantly allowed the appeal and quashed the vexatious litigant order, affirming that underlying dismissals of actions under Rule 2.1.01 remained undisturbed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich Order against David Shpilt, who was added as a defendant in an ongoing fraud action.

The plaintiffs had invested significant funds in a cannabis business, Sustainable Growth Strategic Capital Corp., which they alleged was fraudulent.

Shpilt was found to have drafted a forged contract used to induce investment and received over $110,000 of the plaintiffs' funds.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation against Shpilt, a serious risk of asset dissipation, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the Mareva injunction.

For the Norwich Order, the court determined there was a bona fide claim, a connection between financial institutions and the fraud, and that the order was the only practical source of information to trace funds.

Both the Mareva injunction and Norwich Order were granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, condominium unit owners, brought an urgent motion seeking to remove criteria for participating in director elections (payment of a special assessment), reschedule the Annual General Meeting (AGM), remove a director, and obtain court supervision of the Board.

The court found no urgency for most of the relief sought, noting the plaintiffs had prior knowledge of the issues.

While a prima facie case was established regarding the special assessment's propriety due to the Corporation's failure to investigate the unit 35 owner's liability, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored them.

The motion for injunctive relief (items a, b, d) was dismissed.

The request to remove a director (item c) was adjourned as it lacked urgency and could be scheduled as a regular motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion without notice to the foreign defendant, Taizhou Chuangju Valve Co. Ltd., seeking orders for substituted service, validation of service, and an extension of time for service of the statement of claim.

The motion followed an unsuccessful attempt to serve the foreign defendant via the Hague Convention.

The court dismissed the request for validation of service, finding no evidence of evasion, but granted substituted service by regular mail and extended the time for service.

The court also declined to award costs, noting the motion was brought without notice and there was no evidence of deliberate evasion by the foreign defendant.

The applicant, a mother, sought a restraining order against her adult son due to violent behaviour.

The motion was brought without notice to the respondent.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a restraining order was not available under the Family Law Act as the parties were not in a conjugal relationship.

Furthermore, the court declined to expand the scope of section 35(1) of the Children's Law Reform Act, determining that it is intended to support parenting orders, which was not the case here.

The court suggested that the applicant consider seeking a peace bond under the Criminal Code as an alternative remedy.

The applicant sought to set aside a single judge's order that dismissed his motion for an extension of time to pursue a motion to set aside an earlier order refusing an extension of time to appeal two costs orders.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the single judge's discretionary decision for legal error or misapprehension of evidence.

The court found no error in the finding of prejudice (which was wider than just legal expense) or in the understanding of the arbitrator's decision regarding costs jurisdiction.

The application for review was dismissed.

This is a consolidated appeal from two summary judgments and a costs order.

The appellants sought to hold a law firm liable for the actions of a lawyer who shared office space, alleging he was either a partner or held out as one.

The motion judge found the lawyer was not a partner and not held out as such, dismissing the claims against the firm.

The motion judge also issued a "boomerang" summary judgment in favour of the firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error in determining the lawyer was not a partner and that the appellants did not subjectively rely on any "holding out." The Court also affirmed the motion judge's authority to issue a boomerang order and her discretion regarding costs, including declining a Sanderson order.